Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Issue Writ of Habeas Corpus to Relieve from Commitment by State Court

1908 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 204
2018 ◽  
pp. 88-97
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman

The notion of an independent judiciary that restrained the other branches was an infant with a questionable life expectancy when John Marshall stated in placatory dicta in Ex Parte Bollman (1807)—quite wrongly as a matter of both British history and American constitutional law— that the federal courts had no inherent authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in the absence of legislation. The Suspension Clause, he claimed, was merely precatory, an injunction to Congress to pass such legislation. The highly political case involved Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, alleged members of the Aaron Burr conspiracy, and pitted prominent federalists such as petitioners’ counsel Robert Goodloe Harper and Charles Lee against the administration of Thomas Jefferson. After reviewing the factual and political background, this chapter details the arguments of counsel in favor of inherent judicial authority to grant the writ and Marshall’s rejection of them. Judicial autonomy was under threat at the time and Marshall was trying to defend it But his words were a judicial sea mine that created a long-term danger: Congress could by simple inaction evade the bedrock prohibition against suspension of the writ.


Author(s):  
David J. Armor

Despite nearly four decades of controversy and debate over school segregation, the desegregation dilemma is still largely unresolved. The “busing” problem has received less national attention in recent years, and there are no riots, bus burnings, and school boycotts, as witnessed in earlier decades. Yet current events reveal the depth of a dilemma that has divided educators, parents, jurists, social scientists, and many other groups since the beginning of the civil rights movement. Indicators of the current desegregation dilemma are numerous. Hundreds of school districts throughout the country still impose busing for desegregation purposes, many under court orders that are now more than twenty years old. Although the types of desegregation plans have evolved to some extent, with increased emphasis on school choice, many plans still compel children to attend schools that their parents would not choose, solely for the purpose of racial “balance.” Further, after a period of quiescence, school desegregation was again the subject of several major Supreme Court decisions in 1991 and 1992. The decisions affected the length of time and the conditions under which a school district has to maintain a court-ordered busing plan. Although these decisions dispelled a common misconception that school systems have to maintain desegregation plans “in perpetuity,” it is still unclear how many school districts can or will end their busing plans. Finally, new desegregation litigation and controversies continue to surface. In 1989 a lawsuit was initiated in a Connecticut state court by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to compel desegregation between the city of Hartford and its suburban districts. A similar city suburbs desegregation strategy failed in the federal courts, but the Hartford lawsuit seeks to build on the success of school equal-finance cases under state constitutions. In 1991 the school board of La Crosse, Wisconsin, adopted a busing plan to equalize economic (rather than race) differences among schools. Reminiscent of the busing controversies of the 1970s, all board members who supported the busing plan were voted out of office in a regular and a recall election, reflecting the widespread community opposition to busing for the purpose of achieving socioeconomic balance in schools.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. O'Brien

Federal habeas corpus challenges to state criminal convictions grew significantly between 1948 and 1996 when traditional de novo review was coupled with an expanding list of federal constitutional protections the Supreme Court made applicable to the states. The landscape changed dramatically in 1996 when Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Old and new procedural barriers to habeas review were codified. Merits review of state court decisions became highly deferential. In a series of recent decisions discussed in this article, most notably Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), the Court strongly expressed its frustration with the failure of lower courts to heed Congress' mandate. Federal courthouse doors are now closed to all but the rare case where there “is no possibility for fair-minded disagreement” the state court acted unreasonably (not just erroneously) in deciding the merits. Review becomes “doubly deferential” when the claim is one where deference is already owed in state court; most notably, challenges to the effectiveness of counsel and to the sufficiency of the evidence. Deference is owed even when the state court issues a summary merits decision without opinion.


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