Federal Courts. Relations of State and Federal Courts. Right of United States to Assert in Federal Court Claim to Property Where State Court Has Prior Jurisdiction

1936 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 835
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Court

scholarly journals Notes Procedural Fencing in Retiree Benefits Disputes: Applications of the First-Filed Rule in Federal Courts

2007 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Vanneman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
West Virginia ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Phone Call ◽  
District Court ◽  
Health Coverage ◽  
Southern District ◽  
Maximum Benefit

Basil Chapman retired from ACF Industries, a railroad-car maker, after thirty-eight years of service. In December 2003, he received an unexpected phone call at his West Virginia home from a union representative, who informed him that an ACF executive wanted to speak with him. When they spoke, the executive informed Mr. Chapman that ACF was planning on changing its retirees’ health coverage plan. The ACF plan would now have a lifetime maximum benefit cap on hospital and surgical expenses for each participant and would require retirees to make monthly contributions. According to court papers filed later, Mr. Chapman responded, “We have a contract. You can’t do that.” Then, he said that he would “file in federal court” against ACF. The next business day, ACF filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri asking the court to rule that retiree benefits were not vested and that ACF accordingly could alter benefits unilaterally. On January 26, 2004, Mr. Chapman, other named plaintiffs, and their union sued ACF in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.

Pendent Jurisdiction in Australia—Section 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976

1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. M. C. Gummow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Statutory Law ◽  
The Future

The Federal Court of Australia has only the jurisdiction conferred on it by statute. However, many disputes falling within that jurisdiction, particularly in trade practices matters, will also involve elements of common law or other State or federal statutory law. Section 32 invests in the Federal Court additional jurisdiction in some such cases in respect of “associated matters”. This may be compared with “pendent jurisdiction” developed by the federal courts in the United States. The object of this article is to analyse the meaning of the term “associated matters” and to consider the bearing it has upon the future relationship between the Federal Court and the various State courts.

28 USC § 1782—looking for consensus

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-345
Author(s):  
David J Stute
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Arbitral Tribunal ◽  
Civil Proceedings ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract Since the 1948 enactment of 28 USC § 1782 in the United States, no consensus has emerged as to the availability of federal court discovery to parties in private foreign or international arbitral proceedings. This year, within months of one another, six federal courts have issued rulings that are widely inconsistent on the availability of section 1782 discovery. The courts have ruled that a proceeding before a private international arbitral tribunal is eligible for section 1782 discovery; that, categorically, no such discovery is available; that the definition of private arbitral tribunal applies to CIETAC; and that discovery is available by virtue of a party’s parallel pursuit of discovery through foreign civil proceedings. As these cases demonstrate, recent US court decisions have brought no predictability, let alone certainty, to the subject. Congress, on the other hand, could and should amend the statute so as to include private tribunals in the scope of section 1782. This article discusses the case law’s state of disarray; proposes a legislative solution; considers the proposed amendment’s merits; and advocates for Congress to act.

scholarly journals Essay: Justiciability, Federalism, and the Administrative State

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary D. Clopton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Federal State ◽  
State Court ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Advisory Opinion

103 Cornell Law Review 1431 (2018)Article III provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to certain justiciable cases and controversies. So if a plaintiff bringing a federal claim lacks constitutional standing or her dispute is moot under Article III, then a federal court should dismiss. But this dismissal need not end the story. This Article suggests a simple, forward-looking reading of case-or-controversy dismissals: they should be understood as invitations to legislators to consider other pathways for adjudication. A case dismissed for lack of standing, for mootness, or for requesting an advisory opinion might be a candidate for resolution in a state court or administrative agency. And although the Supreme Court has frequently policed the delegation of the “judicial power of the United States,” legislative delegations of non-justiciable claims should not transgress those limits. Instead, case-or-controversy dismissals imply that non-Article III options are permissible.This formulation is more than a doctrinal trick. It has normative consequences across a range of dimensions. For one thing, this approach reinvigorates the separation-of-powers purposes of justiciability doctrine by turning our attention from judges to legislators. When courts seemingly use justiciability to curtail private enforcement or access to justice, we could re-interpret the results as revealing a legislative failure to authorize non-Article III options. More affirmatively, case-or controversy dismissals could be focal points for political pressure in favor of more rigorous enforcement of important laws that the federal executive may be shirking. Further, consistent with “new new federalist” accounts, this Article suggests another avenue for federal–state interactivity in the development and enforcement of federal law. This too is of added salience given that private and state enforcement may become even more significant in light of the current occupants of the federal executive branch.

The United States: Creation, Reconstruction, the Progressives, and the Modern Era

2021 ◽  
pp. 97-182
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
American People ◽  
State Governments ◽  
State Laws

This chapter focuses on the origins and growth of judicial review of the constitutionality of federal and state legislation in the United States. American judicial review emerged from the vertical federalism umpiring of the King-in-Council, which reined in errant colonies; and from the open political space created by bicameralism, the separation of powers, and federalism, which gave the federal courts the political leeway to engage in judicial review of the constitutionality of federal and state laws. American judicial review took its present form of allowing horizontal separation of powers and enumerated powers vertical judicial review during the critical years between 1776 and 1803 when the faith of the American people shifted away from state legislatures and state governments and toward stronger executives and courts and a much stronger national government. This theory is set forth correctly by Professor Gordon S. Wood in both articles he has shared with me and in conversation. The addition of the three Reconstruction Amendments, and the enormous statutory expansions of federal court jurisdiction and of the number of lower federal court judges after the Civil War, occurred for rights from wrongs reasons. They led, after the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states between 1940 and 1970, to a situation where the Supreme Court now reins in errant state legislatures in much the same way the King-in-Council used to rein in errant colonial legislatures.

International Law in U.S. Courts within the Limits of the Constitution

2020 ◽  
pp. 265-280
Author(s):  
John C. Harrison
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
State Court ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
General Law ◽  
State Of The Union ◽  
Substantive Law

This chapter explains that in order to facilitate the expert, impartial, and uniform ascertainment, development, and application of customary international law in U.S. courts, the Supreme Court of the United States should return to treating customary international law as neither State nor federal, but general, law. The federal courts should ascertain the content of that body of law for themselves, treating State-court precedents on that subject with respect but not as binding on them. The lower federal courts should follow both the Supreme Court’s approach to customary international law and any principles thereof that it announces. The Court should take the same approach to private international law when a conflicts question concerns the extraterritorial application of the law of a State of the Union. Indeed, although the chapter does not propose applying this approach to all of conflict of laws, it suggests that the federal courts apply general principles of conflicts to decide when and whether the substantive law of a State of the Union applies to transactions outside the United States.

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