The United States Internal Revenue Tax System

1895 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 167
Author(s):  
A. K. G. ◽  
Charles Wesley Eldridge
2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 73-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Slemrod

Based on the experience of recent decades, the United States apparently musters the political will to change its tax system comprehensively about every 30 years, so it seems especially important to get it right when the chance arises. Based on the strong public statements of economists opposing and supporting the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, a causal observer might wonder whether this law was tax reform or mere confusion. In this paper, I address that question and, more importantly, offer an assessment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The law is clearly not “tax reform” as economists usually use that term: that is, it does not seek to broaden the tax base and reduce marginal rates in a roughly revenue-neutral manner. However, the law is not just a muddle. It seeks to address some widely acknowledged issues with corporate taxation, and takes some steps toward broadening the tax base, in part by reducing the incentive to itemize deductions.


1899 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
C. H. H. ◽  
Mark Ash ◽  
William Ash

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Danielle Thorne

<p>This paper analyses the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich tax structures used by large multinational enterprises. These structures enable companies to shift significant profits to offshore tax havens through the use of wholly owned subsidiaries in Ireland and the Netherlands. Application of the New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance rule in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 reveals that any attempt to counteract these structures would be highly fact dependent. The paper concludes that it would be possible to apply the rule, but that there would be practical difficulties in relation to enforceability of the Commissioner’s ruling. A similar result was reached when applying the United States General Anti-Avoidance rule. The attempted application of the General Anti-Avoidance rules reveals a fundamental flaw in the income tax system. That is, the inability of the current system to regulate and control intangible resources and technology based transactions.</p>


2022 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Seiichiro Mozumi

Abstract In the United States, tax favoritism—an approach that has weakened the extractive capacity of the federal government by providing tax loopholes and preferences for taxpayers—has remained since the 1930s. It has consumed the amount of tax revenue the government can spend and therefore weakened the possibility of the redistribution of fiscal resources. It has also made the federal tax system complicated and inequitable, resulting in undermining taxpayer consent. Therefore, since the 1930s, a tax reform to create a simple, fair, and equitable federal income tax system with the capacity to raise revenue has been long overdue. Many scholars have evaluated the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA69), which Richard M. Nixon signed into law on December 30, 1969, as one of the most successful steps toward accomplishing this goal. This article demonstrates that TRA69 left tax favoritism in the United States. Furthermore, it points out that TRA69 turned taxpayers against the idea of federal taxation, a shift in public perception that greatly impacted tax reform in the years to follow.


1933 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 930-942
Author(s):  
Carroll K. Shaw

The two revenue-collecting services of the United States government offer interesting contrasts in the methods used for the administrative control of their respective field services. This arises in large part from the fact that the Bureau of Customs has been the more decentralized service. Ever since its establishment in 1789, and in the course of a long and continuous existence, it has built up a background of traditional decentralization which contrasts with the policy of centralization characterizing the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The latter service has a much shorter history, really beginning in 1862, although internal taxes were levied by the federal government from 1791 to 1802, and from 1813 to 1817. By virtue of the fact that Congress conferred administrative powers directly upon the commissioner of internal revenue, rather than upon the Secretary of the Treasury (as was done in the case of the customs service), a more integrated and centralized system of control has been used in the internal revenue service since the beginning of its existence.


1956 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 107
Author(s):  
Alfred G. Buehler ◽  
Joseph P. Crockett

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