Interstate Commerce: Freight-Rate Discrimination: Action by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Supreme Court

1948 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 532
Author(s):  
John F. Buchman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freight Rate ◽  
Interstate Commerce Commission ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Rate Discrimination

“Acting Directly on the People”

2019 ◽  
pp. 142-155
Author(s):  
David S. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Race Relations ◽  
Legal Tender ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
Paper Money ◽  
Legislative Authority ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of

Post–Civil War nationalism meant a partial but significant reversion to prewar constitutionalism, recognizing federal legislative authority over “every foot of American soil” and implementing the antebellum Whig-nationalist economic agenda, but allowing states to retain, or regain control over race relations. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of internal improvements, but declined to embrace implied commerce powers, suggesting instead (as in Gibbons v. Ogden) that the question involved the definition of interstate commerce as an enumerated power. The Court seemed to want to confine McCulloch v. Maryland to taxation, banking, and currency matters. The Legal Tender Cases, which relied on McCulloch to uphold the federal power to issue paper money, were a watershed in the history of implied powers, and were recognized as such at the time by many commentators. Yet the Supreme Court over the ensuing decade and a half seemed unwilling to follow through on McCulloch’s full implications.

scholarly journals Seamen, Railroad Employees, and Uber Drivers: Applying the Section 1 Exemption in the Federal Arbitration Ace to Rideshare Drivers

2021 ◽  
pp. 525
Author(s):  
Conor Bradley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Physical Movement ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Independent Contractors ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
Legal Difficulties ◽  
The Relationship

Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) exempts “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” from arbitration. In 2019, the Supreme Court held in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that this provision exempted independent contractors as well as employees. This decision expanded the reach of the section 1 exemption and may affect the relationship between ridesharing companies, such as Uber, and their drivers. Previously, ridesharing companies argued that courts must enforce the arbitration clauses in their employment contracts because their workers were independent contractors and, therefore, section 1 was inapplicable. Since this argument is now prohibited by the holding in New Prime, rideshare drivers have an opportunity to avoid arbitration using the section 1 exemption. But they still face legal difficulties because of the narrow construction of the exemption employed by courts. This Note argues that the current interpretation of the exemption, which focuses on the physical movement of goods across state lines, is incongruent with the text and history of the FAA and that courts should broaden the exemption to include rideshare drivers.

Constitutional Law in 1923–1924: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1923

1925 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-68
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Utilities ◽  
Capital Account ◽  
Net Income ◽  
Interstate Commerce Commission ◽  
Federal Authority ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Reserve Fund

No one who has followed the steady expansion of federal authority over the business of interstate carriers sanctioned by the Supreme Court in the Shreveport Case, Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, and Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., will view with surprise the unanimous decision of that tribunal in Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, sustaining the validity of the “recapture” clause of the Transportation Act of 1920. This clause provided in substance that since it is impossible to establish uniform rates upon competitive traffic which will adequately sustain all the carriers needed to do the business, without giving some of them a net income in excess of a fair return, any carrier receiving such excess shall place one-half of it in a reserve fund to be maintained by the carrier for certain specified purposes, and shall pay the other half into a general railroad revolving fund to be maintained in the interstate commerce commission. This fund is to be used by the commission to make loans to carriers to meet expenditures for capital account, and so forth.

Setting Expectations for the Federal Role in Public Health Emergencies

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (S1) ◽  
pp. 8-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric D. Hargan
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Practice Of Medicine ◽  
Administrative Framework

I would like to begin by discussing the legal and administrative framework of the role of the federal government in public health. At the heart of it is, of course, the Constitution. At the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) we depend, as does much of the federal government, on our power to regulate interstate commerce. Since the Supreme Court in 1942 removed essentially any restraint from the meaning of interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn, the federal government has been regulating with wide latitude, in spite of small and, arguably, equivocal reverses in recent years. However, even though the Supreme Court no longer provides any real constitutional check on the federal government's interstate commerce power, some other restraints persist. For example, many parts of the health system have traditionally been deemed inherently state functions, such as the licensing and disciplining of doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, as well as the practice of medicine itself.

Constitutional Law in 1918–1919. I: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of The United States in the October Term, 1918

1919 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-633
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
West Virginia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Use ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

United States v. Hill by a vote of seven to two sustained the so-called Reed Amendment by which Congress prohibited the introduction of liquor into any state which forbade the sale or manufacture of liquor within its borders. West Virginia, though interdicting manufacture and sale, allowed any person to bring into the state for personal use a quart of liquor each month. Since Mr. Hill did only what West Virginia sanctioned, Mr Justice McReynolds for himself and Mr. Justice Clarke insisted that “the Reed Amendment in no proper sense regulates interstate commerce, but is a direct intermeddling with the state's internal affairs.” He inquired rhetorically: “If Congress may deny liquor to those who live in a state simply because its manufacture is not permitted there, why may not this be done for any suggested reason, e.g. because the roads are bad or men are hanged for murder or coals are dug. Where is the limit?” For the majority Mr. Justice Day answered that the control of Congress over interstate commerce is not limited by state laws and that “the policy of Congress acting independently of the states may induce legislation without reference to the particular policy or law of any given state.”

Baseball on Trial

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Grow
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Professional Baseball ◽  
Supreme Court Ruling ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
Oliver Wendell Holmes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Hall Of Fame ◽  
Antitrust Immunity ◽  
Frequent Criticism

The 1922 Federal Baseball Supreme Court ruling held that the “business of base ball” was not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act because it did not constitute interstate commerce. This book explains why the unanimous Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, which gave rise to Major League Baseball's exemption from antitrust law, was correct given the circumstances of the time. Currently a billion-dollar enterprise, professional baseball teams crisscross the country while the games are broadcast via radio, television, and Internet coast to coast. The sheer scope of this activity would seem to embody the phrase “interstate commerce.” Yet baseball is the only professional sport—indeed the sole industry—in the United States that currently benefits from a judicially constructed antitrust immunity. Using recently released documents from the National Baseball Hall of Fame, the book analyzes how the Supreme Court reached this seemingly peculiar result by tracing the Federal Baseball litigation from its roots in 1914 to its resolution in 1922, in the process uncovering significant new details about the proceedings. The book observes that while interstate commerce was measured at the time by the exchange of tangible goods, baseball teams in the 1910s merely provided live entertainment to their fans, while radio was a fledgling technology that had little impact on the sport. The book concludes that, despite the frequent criticism of the opinion, the Supreme Court's decision was consistent with the conditions and legal climate of the early twentieth century.

Railroads

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Local Economy ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Case ◽  
Trust Company ◽  
The Creation

This chapter discusses the legal battles between Texas's railroads and the Texas Railroad Commission. James S. Hogg lobbied for the creation of a railroad commission after becoming governor in 1890. The Railroad Commission immediately lowered rates between 10 and 75 percent from their unregulated levels with the result of stimulating the local economy. The trustees of seven railroads filed for an injunction against the rates and a further injunction against any future rates. The chapter examines the Supreme Court case Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, which laid the groundwork for both Smyth v. Ames and Ex parte Young, as well as the Commerce Court ruling that Texas's railroad rates were discriminatory and interfered with interstate commerce. It also considers the Shreveport Rate Cases, in which the railroads claimed that Congress did not have the power to regulate intrastate rates, and another case involving Pullman.

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