Conflict of Laws: Limitation of Actions: Determination of Place of Accrual of Action to Enforce Liability of Stockholders in Insolvent National Banks

1947 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 260
Author(s):  
Edwin F. Uhl
Author(s):  
Monika Pauknerová

Private international law smoothes the edges of civilian law and common law thanks to its specific legislative and technical structure. Conflict-of-law rules are considered to be neutral, and therefore more appropriate for unification, than substantive rules because countries are prepared to surrender their own individual solutions for the sake of uniform international or supranational regulation. This is evident in the successful unification of conflict-of-law rules at the global and European Union levels, as compared with the less common partial unifications of substantive rules. The paper illustrates several examples of unilateral legal acts in the European space, how diverse may be their substantive qualification in different legal systems, and what impacts these substantive differences may have upon the determination of the applicable law for obligations under European conflict-of-law rules. From the perspective of the conflict of laws, an issue remains open regarding what approach should be taken where a uniform legislative instrument – namely a European Regulation – fails to include a particular institution or act either expressly or impliedly.


1933 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 474
Author(s):  
Edgar H. Ailes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Whytock ◽  
Zachary D. Clopton

The Second Circuit held that “when a foreign government, acting through counsel or otherwise, directly participates in U.S. court proceedings by providing a sworn evidentiary proffer regarding the construction and effect of its laws and regulations, which is reasonable under the circumstances presented, a U.S. court is bound to defer to those statements.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d Cir. 2016). This “bound-to-defer” rule is incorrect and unwise.First, the “bound-to-defer” rule is inconsistent with basic American conflict-of-laws principles governing the determination of foreign law. It is inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1’s broad authorization for U.S. courts to “consider any relevant material or source” when determining foreign law. It is inconsistent with the principle that determinations of foreign law should be accurate. And it is inconsistent with the principle of judicial independence in the determination of foreign law.Second, the “bound-to-defer” rule is inconsistent with foreign and international practice. In most other countries, information about foreign law is not binding on courts. Moreover, the world’s two main treaties on the interpretation of foreign law expressly provide that information supplied by foreign governments in accordance with those treaties is not binding on courts. Simply put, foreign governments do not expect each other’s courts to be “bound to defer” to each other’s interpretations of foreign law, much less the interpretation of one executive agency of a foreign government.Third, there are important reasons why deference principles should be kept separate from the principles governing the determination of foreign law. The Second Circuit’s “bound-to-defer” rule would inappropriately delegate to foreign governments power to influence the application of domestic law — and hence the implementation of domestic policy — in a wide range of cases in which the proper application of U.S. law depends on the determination of foreign law. In addition, international comity does not require U.S. courts to defer to foreign governments in the determination of foreign law. International comity is a traditional rationale for choice-of-law rules that require the application of foreign law as a rule of decision under specified circumstances. But in this case, foreign law is at issue because the application of U.S. law depends on the interpretation of foreign law, not because choice-of-law rules require the application of foreign law. Therefore, this case does not implicate the comity rationale for choice-of-law rules. Moreover, the concerns that animate comity doctrines are not the same as those that animate the rules governing the determination of foreign law. The former are concerned with the respect owed between governments, whereas the latter are concerned with ensuring that U.S. courts independently and accurately determine the content of foreign law. In fact, the “bound-to-defer” rule raises issues that are likely to pose significant comity concerns that the ordinary Rule 44.1 approach avoids. U.S. courts can still address comity concerns — separately from their independent determination of foreign law.To be sure, U.S. courts should give respectful consideration to a foreign government’s statements about its law. But as a matter of law, a foreign government’s statements cannot be binding on U.S. courts. Instead, U.S. courts should accurately and independently determine the meaning of foreign law taking into account not only the foreign government’s own statements, but also other relevant information about that law. This independent approach is especially important when — as in this U.S. antitrust case and many other cases — the proper application of American law depends on a determination of foreign law.


Author(s):  
Möckesch Annabelle

Attorney–client privilege is often invoked as a defence in international arbitration proceedings. Nevertheless, the participants often have very different expectations regarding the applicable privilege standard, as national attorney–client privilege laws vary widely between jurisdictions. This is complicated by the fact that institutional arbitration rules do not include provisions on the scope of attorney–client privilege, nor do they contain conflict-of-laws rules to determine the applicable national privilege standard. The determination of the applicable level of protection is rather left to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. Drawing on interviews with more than thirty leading international arbitration practitioners and extensive academic research, this book provides guidance to arbitral tribunals regarding the determination of the applicable attorney–client privilege standard. It compares attorney–client privilege in key common and civil law jurisdictions, analyses precedent from previous tribunals, and finally sets out proposed changes to the legal framework governing this area.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document