Trade Regulation. Price Discrimination. Conditioning of Lower Price on Execution of "Tying Contract"

1935 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 127
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Discrimination Conditioning ◽  
Trade Regulation

scholarly journals Price discrimination in two-sided markets

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Zhang ◽  
Weiqi Liu
Keyword(s):  
Discount Rate ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Discrimination Threshold ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Time Increase ◽  
Exogenous Variables ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Good For ◽  
Two Sided Markets

The use of a price discrimination strategy is an important tool in competition. It can hurt firms and benefit consumers in a one-sided market. However, in two-sided markets, its primary goal is to attract more agents or increase profits. Here, the performance of a second-degree price discrimination strategy in the context of duopoly two-sided platforms is analysed. Two exogenous variables, which include the discount rate and the price discrimination threshold, are used in order to examine whether the price discrimination strategy could help two-sided platforms achieve their objective, which is to maximise their market value. Three cases are considered, and we demonstrate that the price discrimination strategy cannot attract more agents and at the same time increase the profits; a lower price discrimination threshold cannot ensure larger markets shares; a higher discount rate is detrimental to the profit of a platform. However, this is good for its market shares. Moreover, discriminative pricing increases the competition.

scholarly journals PARALLEL IMPORTS, INNOVATIONS AND NATIONAL WELFARE: THE ROLE OF THE SIZES OF INCOME CLASSES AND NATIONAL MARKETS FOR HEALTH CARE

2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (01) ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAJAT ACHARYYA ◽  
MARÍA D.C. GARCÍA-ALONSO
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Third World ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
The Third ◽  
National Welfare ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Health Care Innovation

This paper shows that regardless of any intra-country income differences, parallel imports result in a lower level of health-care innovation but, contrary to popular as well as conventional theoretical wisdom, a lower price in the Third World compared to market-based discrimination. Despite such a lower price, however, parallel imports unambiguously make all buyers in the Third World worse off when intra-country income disparity exists. On the other hand, even discarding the MNC's profit, there will be cases in which the richer country prefers price discrimination as well. That is, in those cases, no countries will have any incentive under the welfare criterion to undo price discrimination, contrary to Richardson (2002).

scholarly journals On the degree of distortions under second-degree price discrimination

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-112
Author(s):  
Ram Orzach ◽  
◽  
Miron Stano ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Nonlinear Pricing ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Free Disposal ◽  
General Utility ◽  
Single Crossing ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

This paper highlights the limitations and applicability of results developed by Chao & Nahata (2015) for nonlinear pricing. Although Chao and Nahata appear to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for general utility functions, we show that one of their results leads only to a restatement of two constraints, and another result may not be valid when consumers can freely dispose of the good. Their model allows for the possibility that higher quantities will have a lower price than smaller quantities. We provide conditions under free disposal that preclude this anomaly. Our analysis suggests that further research on violations of the single-crossing condition should be encouraged.

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