The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court

1913 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis W. Bird
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Due Process Of Law

The United States Supreme Court, 1936–1946

1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter F. Dodd
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
General Welfare ◽  
Due Process Of Law ◽  
Governmental Power ◽  
National Power

In order to analyze the trend of the United States Supreme Court from the beginning of its 1936 term in October, 1936, to the end of the 1945 term in June, 1946, it is first necessary to state the situation at the beginning of this period.Before the pressure of our last great depression, the United States Supreme Court had found restrictions to exist upon the powers of the national government, and had found barriers against governmental power, both national and state. These barriers were found primarily in a small number of cases: Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928), which restricted price regulation; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1923), in which federal power was held not to extend to the shipment of child-made goods in interstate commerce; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923), in which it was held that a statutory regulation of minimum wages for women was violative of due process of law; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915), which sustained the so-called “yellow-dog” contract, and held that it was unconstitutional for either state or nation to forbid the employer's contracting that his employees should not belong to unions.These opinions have now been overruled or explicitly disregarded and the Court has expressed the further opinions that state powers in no way restrict the powers granted to the nation; and that the national power to spend for the “general welfare of the United States” is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.

Punishment Legalized: Protest Against Corporal Punishment in Schools

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-293
Author(s):  
Hania W. Ris
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
School Children ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
School Official

An unexpected and repressive decision affecting school-children was reached in October 1975 by the United States Supreme Court. It allows the states, if they so choose, to permit teachers to spank students as long as due process is maintained. This implies that other means for control of misbehavior have to be used first, that the student must be informed in advance about the nature of misbehavior which warrants spanking, and that another school official must be present at the time of spanking.

Legal Issues Facing Parole

1979 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-235
Author(s):  
Eugene N. Barkin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Parole Board

Judicial decrees enunciating the due process required in parole board decisions impose restraints upon the boards' decision making and supervision. Confusion reigns in many instances because the courts do not speak with one voice or even clearly. As a consequence, parole board administrators often remain in states of uncertainty for long periods of time. It is vital that the United States Supreme Court speak clearly and categorically on the issues in question.

Vitek v. Jones: Transfer of Prisoners to Mental Institutions

1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-207
Author(s):  
Nancy R. Gottlieb
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Alternative Methods ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Transfer Procedures ◽  
Mental Institutions

AbstractIn Vitek v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the due process clause as requiring that certain procedures be followed before transferring prisoners to mental institutions. This Note analyzes the Court's reasons for concluding that the existing transfer procedures embodied in the state's commitment statutes infringed on the prisoner's liberty interests and, therefore, were constitutionally inadequate. It finds that not only was one of the grounds used by the Court to find a constitutionally protected liberty inappropriate, but the calculus that the Court employed in mandating additional procedures was incorrect. This Note suggests alternative methods of holding the statutes unconstitutional, methods that would not lead to markedly different procedures for committing prisoners and civilians. Finally, die Note examines the procedures that the Court actually prescribed and discusses their implementation.

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