Reformation of Instruments. Executory Land Contract. Enforcement

1914 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 649
Keyword(s):  
Contract Enforcement

States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey I. Herbst: A Review Essay

2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 510-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Review Essay ◽  
State Failure ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
Defense Contract ◽  
Comparative Institutions

Herbst argues that Africa is plagued by “state failure” to provide certain public goods in society, such as law and order, defense, contract enforcement, and infrastructure. Herbst has provided a bold, historically informed theoretical analysis, essential reading for economists interested in comparative institutions and development.

Argument Based Contract Enforcement

2007 ◽  
pp. 145-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nir Oren ◽  
Alun Preece ◽  
Timothy J. Norman
Keyword(s):  
Contract Enforcement

Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement

2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Bentley MacLeod
Keyword(s):  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
Efficient Level ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms ◽  
Real Costs

When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that the seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a bonus to the seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality is unacceptable can, in theory, provide efficient incentives. But how are such contracts enforced? While the courts can be used, doing so involves high real costs. Informal enforcement, involving a loss of reputation and future access to the market for any party that defaults on a contract, may often be a better alternative. This paper explores the use of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, provides a rationale for a variety of observed market mechanisms, and then generates a number of testable hypotheses.

Property rights and investment: the mediating effect of contract enforcement

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Ziade Hailu ◽  
Isaac N. Nkote ◽  
John C. Munene
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Goodness Of Fit ◽  
Addis Ababa ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Mediation Effect ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Design Data ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically test whether enforceability mediates the relationship between property rights and investment in housing, using data from land formalization project in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Design/methodology/approach The study was cross-sectional in design; data were collected from a sample of 210 households that benefited from the recent Addis Ababa city land and buildings formalization project. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the goodness-of-fit of the latent structures underlying the constructs. Mediation was tested using the Baron and Kenny steps, combined with bootstrapping technique. Robustness of results was checked. Findings The results indicate statistically significant mediation effect of contract enforcement. However, the mediation is partial, there is still a substantial direct effect of security of property rights on investment. Practical implications Any initiative to land formalization projects needs to consider contract enforcement environment, as presence and size of property rights effects largely depend on whether those rights are properly enforced. Originality/value This is the first study that conceptualizes the mediating effect of contract enforcement on the relationship between property rights and investment from an African country perspective.

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