Quakers, coercion, and pre-modern growth: why Friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early modern trade expansion

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 418-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther Sahle
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Trade Expansion

scholarly journals Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 43-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arun G. Chandrasekhar ◽  
Cynthia Kinnan ◽  
Horacio Larreguy
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Network Centrality ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Lab Experiment ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Social Proximity ◽  
Network Position ◽  
Informal Contracts ◽  
Close Pairs

Lack of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social proximity and network centrality may affect cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects’ partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners’ relative network position differentially matters across contracting environments. While socially close pairs cooperate even without enforcement, distant pairs do not. Individuals with more central partners behave more cooperatively without enforcement. Capacity for cooperation in the absence of contract enforcement therefore depends on the subjects’ network position. (JEL C93, D86, K12, O15, O17, Z13)

Cross-Jurisdictional Trade and Contract Enforcement in Qing China

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maura Dykstra
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Chinese Economy ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Early Modern Europe ◽  
Late Imperial China ◽  
Late Imperial ◽  
The Qing Dynasty ◽  
History Of ◽  
Imperial China ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms

AbstractThis article argues that claims about the different economic trajectories of early modern Europe and late imperial China have incorrectly focused on the importance of formal contract enforcement mechanisms. As a first step toward more productive conversations about the history of economic development across world regions, this article provides a look at the factors in the development of the late imperial Chinese economy that led to the emergence of contract enforcement mechanisms not based on codified contract law. Several case studies from the Qing dynasty Chongqing archives are presented to illustrate how the mechanisms of contract enforcement operated.

TRUST AND CULTURE

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (02) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
THORSTEN JANUS
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Scale Economies ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Cultural Boundaries ◽  
Large Populations ◽  
Optimal Group Size

Large populations can gain from economies of scale but lose internal trust due to diluted information. This creates an optimal group size. However, trusting strangers who claim to be members invites outsiders to disguise as insiders and abuse extended trust. Thus, if cultural diversity can raise the imitation cost it can promote cooperation. Even so, however, scale economies are lost when the population subdivides and the cultural boundaries may have to be enforced to prevent assimilation. The model is consistent with norms against inter-cultural marriage and episodic boundary-reinforcing conflict where formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak.

Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement

2003 ◽  
Vol 111 (6) ◽  
pp. 1293-1317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit
Keyword(s):  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Trade Expansion
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