Rent Seeking from a Property Rights Perspective

1984 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Benson
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rent Seeking

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

The tragedy of the cocoa pod: rent-seeking, land and ethnic conflict in Ivory Coast

2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwayne Woods
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Ethnic Conflict ◽  
Ivory Coast ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Ethnic Violence ◽  
Easy Access ◽  
Economic Decline ◽  
Labour Costs ◽  
Forest Rent

Many people have been surprised by the eruption of ethnic conflict and civil war in Ivory Coast. The country had gained a reputation as a relatively stable and economically prosperous agricultural republic in a region known for ethnic conflict, economic decline and civil war. The underlying factors that have led to the ethnic violence, the flight of immigrants from neighbouring countries, and the division of the country into a predominantly Muslim north and largely Christian south have been known for some time. The country's property rights regime that encouraged easy access to a forest rent – as long as cheap migrant labour and virgin forested land were available – was a recipe for future conflict. As available land declined and labour costs increased, a cycle of sharpening conflicts over these assets contributed to the current situation of ethno-regional division and civil war.

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 422-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick W Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Investment Incentives ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Ex Post

The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investment decision.

Putin's Presidency and Russian History

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Blank
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The State ◽  
Russian History ◽  
Vladimir Putin ◽  
Service State ◽  
Key Industries ◽  
The Military

AbstractThe regime crafted by Vladimir Putin and extended now with the election of Dmitry Medvedev in many ways represents a continuation of the Muscovite paradigm delineated by Professor Hellie in his earlier work. Indeed, we are witnessing the consolidation of a fourth version of the Muscovite service state and in the military a kind of serfdom still reigns. This continuity is not just a question of the autocracy of the Tsar but also of the tenuous situation regarding property rights which are not fully established. Furthermore, it is quite clear that government is still a service state where officials' income, power and status derive from the service they render the Tsar and their ability to provide the state's requirements in key industries. Just as this elite may be considered a rent-seeking elite, so may the state be considered a rent-granting state that grants them rents in the form of office so that they can provide for themselves at the same time as they serve the Tsar.

The Effect of Incentives: The Problem of Collective Action

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-165
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan ◽  
William English ◽  
John Hasnas ◽  
Peter Jaworski
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Firm Structure ◽  
Group Interest ◽  
Group Settings ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Group Members

Even if cooperating will make everyone better off, cooperation won’t happen if people lack certain kinds of knowledge and motivation. In group settings, individuals will often have incentives to promote their own interest at the expense of the group, either by exploiting others or by failing to contribute to public goods. There are two ways to overcome these “collective action” problems: (1) the incentives that individuals face can be changed so that individual and group interest no longer conflict, and/or (2) group members can embrace norms that enable them to exercise self-restraint and forego opportunities to get ahead at the expense of others. The rule of law, property rights, and proper firm structure can help overcome collective action problems. However, these same structures can also create new opportunities for rent seeking.

Intellectual Property Rights, Resources Allocation and Ethical Usefulness

2011 ◽  
pp. 68-83
Author(s):  
Bruno de Vuyst ◽  
Alea M. Fairchild
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Trips Agreement ◽  
Resources Allocation

Intellectual property rights (IP) are established through the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement (part of the Uruguay Round Agreements creating the WTO) as global and uniform. This absolute IP may provide such opportunities for rent-seeking that misallocations may occur, resulting in a perception of IP as ethically unuseful.

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