Endogenous Property Rights, Conflict Intensity and Inequality in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contest

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander M. Yarkin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Endogenous Property Rights ◽  
Conflict Intensity

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

scholarly journals Endogenous Property Rights

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Georgy Egorov ◽  
Konstantin Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Endogenous Property Rights

The tragedy of the cocoa pod: rent-seeking, land and ethnic conflict in Ivory Coast

2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwayne Woods
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Ethnic Conflict ◽  
Ivory Coast ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Ethnic Violence ◽  
Easy Access ◽  
Economic Decline ◽  
Labour Costs ◽  
Forest Rent

Many people have been surprised by the eruption of ethnic conflict and civil war in Ivory Coast. The country had gained a reputation as a relatively stable and economically prosperous agricultural republic in a region known for ethnic conflict, economic decline and civil war. The underlying factors that have led to the ethnic violence, the flight of immigrants from neighbouring countries, and the division of the country into a predominantly Muslim north and largely Christian south have been known for some time. The country's property rights regime that encouraged easy access to a forest rent – as long as cheap migrant labour and virgin forested land were available – was a recipe for future conflict. As available land declined and labour costs increased, a cycle of sharpening conflicts over these assets contributed to the current situation of ethno-regional division and civil war.

scholarly journals Endogenous Property Rights

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Georgy Egorov ◽  
Konstantin Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Endogenous Property Rights

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 422-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick W Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Investment Incentives ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Ex Post

The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investment decision.

Rent Seeking from a Property Rights Perspective

1984 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Benson
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rent Seeking

Putin's Presidency and Russian History

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Blank
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The State ◽  
Russian History ◽  
Vladimir Putin ◽  
Service State ◽  
Key Industries ◽  
The Military

AbstractThe regime crafted by Vladimir Putin and extended now with the election of Dmitry Medvedev in many ways represents a continuation of the Muscovite paradigm delineated by Professor Hellie in his earlier work. Indeed, we are witnessing the consolidation of a fourth version of the Muscovite service state and in the military a kind of serfdom still reigns. This continuity is not just a question of the autocracy of the Tsar but also of the tenuous situation regarding property rights which are not fully established. Furthermore, it is quite clear that government is still a service state where officials' income, power and status derive from the service they render the Tsar and their ability to provide the state's requirements in key industries. Just as this elite may be considered a rent-seeking elite, so may the state be considered a rent-granting state that grants them rents in the form of office so that they can provide for themselves at the same time as they serve the Tsar.

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