scholarly journals Meta-axiological buck-passing account of value

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-139
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Dobrijevic

In this paper we consider an incomplete T. M. Scanlon?s meta-axiological project, analysis of the relationship between values and reasons which he referred to as the ?buckpassing account of value?. We will try to show the necessity of distinguishing between the ?broader? and ?narrower? buck-passing conception of value, a difference that critics of the conception usually ignored. This will also show that the objection which has been defined as the ?wrong kind of reason problem? is unjustifiably expanded to the conception as a whole.

Author(s):  
Richard Rowland

Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good is just for there to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to the buck-passing account, for pleasure to be good is just for there to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. And for liberty and equality to be values is just for there to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. There has been extensive discussion of some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces such as the wrong kind of reason problem. But there has been little discussion of why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. This book provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. It argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. It argues that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, are uninformative, and are at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. And it extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties, such as fittingness and ought, in terms of reasons.


Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD ROWLAND

In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of reasons for pro-attitudes are reasons that would not still be reasons for pro-attitudes if it were not for the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.


Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
LARS SAMUELSSON

In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason problem’ (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang's suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang's suggestion for a solution to the WKR problem, they have not provided sufficient grounds for dismissing the kind of solution that Lang proposes. I show how a version of this kind of solution can be formulated so as to avoid both Olson's and Brunero's objections. I also raise some worries concerning an alternative solution to the WKR problem suggested by Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson.


Author(s):  
Richard Rowland

This chapter motivates and defends a new buck-passing account of all moral notions in terms of reasons for action and reasons to make amends. According to this view, for an action to be wrong is for there to be reasons for us not to perform and for us to have pro-attitudes towards our apologizing or otherwise making amends if we perform it. This chapter shows that this account evades various objections including Parfit and Scanlon’s to buck-passing accounts of morality. It argues that this account explains several features of the relationship between moral properties and reasons, is more informative than alternative views, is part of an illuminating account of the relationship between moral and non-moral obligations, and fits with and explains the distinctively but not necessarily exclusively social status of morality. The chapter argues that there are reasons to reject alternative views to a buck-passing account of morality. It also shows that analogues of the arguments that show that the buck-passing account of value should be accepted show that a buck-passing account of morality should be accepted. So, it is not possible to consistently be buck-passers about value but not about morality.


Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  

According to the Buck-Passing Account (BPA), for X to be good is for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. Suppose that a demon will punish everyone if they do not admire it. There are reasons for everyone to admire the demon, so BPA entails that it is good, but it is not good. So, BPA produces too much value. This chapter argues that this problem, often dubbed the wrong kind of reason problem, can be dissolved because there are no reasons to admire the demon. But, this chapter argues, even if there are reasons to admire the demon this does not show that BPA should be rejected, but only that it should be revised to hold that the reasons for pro-attitudes in BPA are reasons to have pro-attitudes that are not provided or enabled by facts about the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 22-32
Author(s):  
Enkh-Otgon NARANGEREL ◽  
Anıl Boz Semerci

The aim of this study was to investigate the mediating role of self-efficacy in decision making between the relationship of workload, work control and decision-making styles. Although the decision-making process seems basically the same for every individual, it is different for each individual in terms of content. The reason for this is the methods used by individuals in making decisions and their approach to problems are different. The data was gathered from 252 government officials, chiefs, branch managers and heads of the departments of the Republic of Turkey. The data was analysed with structural equation model. The results indicate that there was a negative relationship between the level of workload and vigilant decision-making style, and a positive relationship with buck-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance decision making styles. On the other hand, a positive relationship between work control and vigilance decision-making style, and a negative relationship between buck-passing, procrastination and hypervigilance decision-making styles were observed. At the same time, there was a negative relationship between workload and self-efficacy in decision-making, yet a positive relationship was found with work control. In addition, a full mediating role in the relationship between workload in decision-making self-efficacy, work control, vigilant, buck-passing, and procrastination decision-making styles; a partial mediating role was found in the relationship between workload and hyper vigilant decision-making style in work control were found separately. The results were interpreted with the light of literature and lead to develop practical suggestions for managers and employees.


Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN BRUNERO

In his article ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’, Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected.


Utilitas ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
GERALD LANG

Recent discussion of Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value, which analyses the value of X in terms of agents' reasons for having certain pro-attitudes or contra-attitudes towards X, has generated the ‘wrong kind of reason’ problem (WKR problem): this is the problem, for the buck-passing view, of being able to acknowledge that there may be good reasons for attributing final value to X that have nothing to do with the final value that X actually possesses. I briefly review some of the existing solutions offered to the WKR problem, including those by Philip Stratton-Lake and Jonas Olson, and offer a new, better one, which accommodates all the relevant cases presented in the literature.


Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONAS OLSON

The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.


1967 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 239-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. J. Kerr

A review is given of information on the galactic-centre region obtained from recent observations of the 21-cm line from neutral hydrogen, the 18-cm group of OH lines, a hydrogen recombination line at 6 cm wavelength, and the continuum emission from ionized hydrogen.Both inward and outward motions are important in this region, in addition to rotation. Several types of observation indicate the presence of material in features inclined to the galactic plane. The relationship between the H and OH concentrations is not yet clear, but a rough picture of the central region can be proposed.


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