scholarly journals Challenges for monetary policy in the enlarged European monetary Union

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irena Radovic

The eastward enlargement of the Euro area entails significant implications for the accession candidates in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the existing Euro system and the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). The present analysis assesses the challenges and critical aspects in monetary policy modeling with special emphasis to enlargement. The focus is on the difficulty of implementing a unique currency policy in view or growing heterogeneity within the enlarged monetary union, and secondly - the issue of the voting mechanism within the ECB. When analyzing those two issues, it is conclusive that the difficulties for the ECB and the current Euro zone members will increase. For the enlarged Euro zone, which is becoming more divergent, it will be very hard to find adequate recipes to meet the needs and requirements of all. The big question is: whether centralization of monetary policy is a sustainable and superior solution?.

1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-57
Author(s):  
Christa Randzio-Plath

Economic and Monetary Union has been created to complete the single market, to provide optimal macro-economic conditions for employment-enhancing growth and to promote further political integration in the European Union. Unfortunately in the discussion about monetary union the reasons why Europe needs EMU have been almost forgotten. As the future European Central Bank will be solely responsible for European monetary policy and thus be influencing strongly the overall macro-economic framework in Europe, the question of democratic accountability of monetary authorities needs to be debated. EMU is Europe's answer to the challenges of the 21 st century.


Author(s):  
Massimo Rostagno ◽  
Carlo Altavilla ◽  
Giacomo Carboni ◽  
Wolfgang Lemke ◽  
Roberto Motto ◽  
...  

Institutions dedicated to serving the public good must look to the past to learn from experience; and look to the future to prepare, as best they can, for the trials that might lie ahead. The 20th anniversary of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) offers an opportunity to apply such a perspective to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB): to evaluate its accomplishments and to learn the lessons that can improve the conduct of its policy in the future....


1998 ◽  
Vol 165 ◽  
pp. 109-114
Author(s):  
John Arrowsmith

The decision by the EU Council of Heads of State or of Government at the beginning of May, that eleven Member States would form an Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 1999, occasioned little surprise: financial markets and economic commentators had become increasingly convinced over the preceding months that EMU would start on time with a membership extending beyond the six ‘core’ countries—France, Germany, the Benelux countries and Austria—to include also Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. What was not widely expected was that the ECOFIN and HoSoG Councils on 1–2 May appear to have spent little time debating the economic case for including each of the eleven countries but to have been preoccupied instead with a heated political row about who should be appointed President of the European Central Bank.This note assesses the possible consequences that this cavalier approach to the vital question of membership of monetary union might have for the conduct of policy in Stage 3 and the future viability of EMU. It examines the economic evidence that had been presented to the Councils to see whether their judgement that the economies of all eleven countries are sufficiently convergent is warranted. It also considers whether the unseemly compromise through which the dispute about the ECB Presidency was resolved will prejudice the political independence of the ECB in its conduct of monetary policy.


1998 ◽  
Vol 163 ◽  
pp. 87-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Artis ◽  
Bernhard Winkler

The ‘Stability Pact’ agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 and concluded at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 prescribes sanctions for countries that breach the Maastricht deficit ceiling in stage three of European Monetary Union. This paper explores the central provisions and possible motivations of the Stability Pact as an incentive device for fiscal discipline and as a partial substitute for policy coordination and a common 'stability culture’.


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