scholarly journals Exploratory experimentation and taxonomy of experimentation

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 199-217
Author(s):  
Milutin Stojanovic

Transformation of the philosophy of science during the last three decades is largely based on the philosophers? insights in the experimental side of science. Central issues in this new field, such as classification of basic elements and types of experimentation, are still developing. Subject of this work will be one of these types, Steinle?s ?exploratory experimentation? (EE), and its place in taxonomy of experimentation. After presenting an array of historical cases of experimentation, I analyze Elliott?s systematization of EE subtypes. I will claim that it does not represent development of Steinle?s ideas, although it can be used to improve taxonomy of experimentation in general. Special attention will be dedicated to the development of this taxonomy and understanding forms of experimentation not focused on theory testing - specifically EE.

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (9999) ◽  
pp. 83-94
Author(s):  
Stanisław Czerniak ◽  

This article aims to reconstruct Max Scheler’s conception of three types of knowledge, outlined in his late work Philosophical Perspectives (1928). Scheler distinguished three kinds of knowledge: empirical, used to exercise control over nature, eidetic (essential) and metaphysical. The author reviews the epistemological criteria that underlie this distinction, and its functionalistic assumptions. In the article’s polemic part he accuses Scheler of a) crypto-dualism in his theory of knowledge, which draws insufficient distinctions between metaphysical and eidetic knowledge; b) totally omitting the status of the humanities in his classification of knowledge types; c) consistently developing a philosophy of knowledge without resort to the research tools offered by the philosophy of science, which takes such analyses out of their social and historical context (i.e. how knowledge is created in today’s scientific communities).


Author(s):  
Marie Gueguen ◽  
Stathis Psillos

Duhem’s philosophy of science is difficult to classify according to more contemporary categories like instrumentalism and realism. On the one hand, he presents an account of scientific methodology which renders theories as mere instruments. On the other hand, he acknowledges that theories with particular theoretical virtues (e.g., unity, simplicity, novel predictions) offer a classification of experimental laws that “corresponds to real affinities among the things themselves.” In this paper, we argue that Duhem’s philosophy of science was motivated by an anti-sceptical tendency, according to which we can confidently assert that our theories reveal truths about nature while, at the same time, admitting that anti-scepticism should be moderated by epistemic humility. Understanding Duhem’s epistemological position, which was unique amongst French philosophers of science in the beginning of the 20th century, requires a careful examination of his accounts of representation, explanation, and of their interrelation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 136
Author(s):  
Muntu Abdullah

AbstractThe aim of this article is to point out the function of philosophy of science as a foundation to develop accounting theory. Historically, there are some philosophy branches developed. Nowadays, one of the philosophy branches that often used to develop accounting theory is philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is often used by accounting experts to build up accounting theory. The development of accounting theory and accounting thought is overly influenced by the basic assumption that the experts normally use. Just as four paradigms of social reality: Functionalist, Interpretative, Radical Humanist and Structuralist. The classification of these thoughts is based on the research and practice accounting which are in progress. This ism is called contemporary accounting backers. In philosophy of science, a theory is constructed by using a positive preposition and a hypothesis. It starts with an observation and then via induction process, it brings out a positive preposition. Afterwards, a positive preposition and an apriori assumption process a deduction so that bring out hypothesis preposition. The next step is examine the hypothesis in order to produce a theory which can be applied as a foundation to make rules, procedures, methods in carrying out practice accounting.


Information ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Birger Hjørland

Information retrieval (IR) is about making systems for finding documents or information. Knowledge organization (KO) is the field concerned with indexing, classification, and representing documents for IR, browsing, and related processes, whether performed by humans or computers. The field of IR is today dominated by search engines like Google. An important difference between KO and IR as research fields is that KO attempts to reflect knowledge as depicted by contemporary scholarship, in contrast to IR, which is based on, for example, “match” techniques, popularity measures or personalization principles. The classification of documents in KO mostly aims at reflecting the classification of knowledge in the sciences. Books about birds, for example, mostly reflect (or aim at reflecting) how birds are classified in ornithology. KO therefore requires access to the adequate subject knowledge; however, this is often characterized by disagreements. At the deepest layer, such disagreements are based on philosophical issues best characterized as “paradigms”. No IR technology and no system of knowledge organization can ever be neutral in relation to paradigmatic conflicts, and therefore such philosophical problems represent the basis for the study of IR and KO.


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 150-166
Author(s):  
Andrey S. Zilber

The international conference “Kantian Rationality in Philosophy of Science” was held on 9–11 October 2020 at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (IKBFU) in Kaliningrad. Fifteen participants from different countries discussed aspects of the Kantian understanding of science and the roles of reason in it: the unity, difference, and systematicity of the functions of reason in science, as they are revealed in Kant’s discussions of criteria of scientificity, the classification of sciences, or methods of theoretical and experimental research in specific sciences. The topics discussed fell into two broad categories: firstly, the relationship between metaphysics and science in the context of Kant’s time; secondly, the relevance of Kant’s ideas to modern sciences and the concepts of philosophy of science in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 109-111
Author(s):  
Sanjaya Baral ◽  
Dhurba Chhetri

Multiverse scenarios in cosmology assume that other universes exist "beyond" our own universe. They are an exciting challenge both for empirical and theoretical research as well as for philosophy of science. They could be necessary to understand why the big bang occurred, why (some of) the laws of nature and the values of certain physical constants are the way they are, and why there is an arrow of time. This essay clarifies competing notions of "universe" and "multiverse"; it proposes a classification of different multiverse types according to various aspects how the universes are or are not separated from each other; it reviews the main reasons for assuming the existence of other universes: empirical evidence, theoretical explanation, and philosophical arguments. The Himalayan Physics Vol. 5, No. 5, Nov. 2014 Page: 109-111


Author(s):  
K.W.M. Fulford ◽  
Martin Davies ◽  
Richard G.T. Gipps ◽  
George Graham ◽  
John Z. Sadler ◽  
...  

In this introduction to Section VI, the thrust of the component chapters is described. The classification and diagnosis of mental disorders collects a number of philosophical challenges to the field that call for responses from a variety of philosophical resources: hermeneutics, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, narrative theory, philosophy of science, epistemology-to name a few. The authors in this section address the general challenges in the classification of psychopathology, as well as address particular kinds of mental disorders, including autism, dementia, mania, psychotic disorders, and personality disorders.


Author(s):  
Сергей Александрович Гашков

В статье ставится вопрос о классификации знания как философской проблеме, и сопоставляются некоторые подходы, имеющие место в философии науки (Кедров, Мейен) с подходами, распространёнными во французской эпистемологии (Гобло, Мейерсон, Кангийем), и особенно «постструктурализме» второй половины ХХ в. (Барт, Деррида, Делёз, Лакан, Фуко, Касториадис). Автор приходит к выводу, что классификация в истории философии присутствует в нескольких связанных друг с другом смыслах: классификации наук, критического концепта «классификации» и классификации (периодизации) самой философской мысли. The article raises the question of the classification of knowledge as a philosophical problem, and compares some of the approaches that take place in the philosophy of science (Kedrov, Meyen) with the approaches prevalent in French epistemology (Goblot, Meyerson, Canguilhem), and especially «poststructuralism@ of the second half of the twentieth century (Barthes, Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan, Foucault, Castoriadis). The author comes to the conclusion that the classification in the history of philosophy is present in several interconnected senses: the classification of sciences, the critical concept of «classification» and the classification (periodization) of philosophical thought itself.


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