scholarly journals Integration of cognitive and moral enhancement

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Vojin Rakic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Enhancement ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Moral Enhancement

I will discuss four major perspectives on cognitive enhancement and morality: 1) cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible because humans are not supposed to alter what God has ordained or nature has shaped; 2) cognitive enhancement is our moral duty, because a cognitively upgraded human is a better human; 3) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is preceded by moral enhancement; 4) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is a means to moral enhancement. I shall argue that the first three perspectives are less cogent than the fourth. The fourth perspective integrates cognitive and moral enhancement into one whole. I will denote it by (C+M) E.

scholarly journals The current debate: (C+M) E and ultimate harm

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
Vojin Rakic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Enhancement ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Ultimate Harm

Persson and Savulescu (2011b) is a largely successful defense of the position promoted in Persson and Savulescu (2008) against Fenton?s critique of this position in Fenton (2009). However, one of Fenton?s essential censures has remained without response: if moral enhancement (ME) is to occur at the genetic or biological level, as Persson and Savulescu suppose it can and ought to, it will not be possible without significant scientific progress, including cognitive enhancement (CE) by bio-medical means. I will offer a response here to this critique Fenton raised-a response Persson and Savulecu did not give. It will be based on the concept of ?integrated neuroenhancement?, abbreviated (C+M) E.

scholarly journals The perils of moral enhancement

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-110
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Dobrijevic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Enhancement ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
New Form

The idea of biotechnological enhancement of people for non-medical purposes is not unambiguous. A gap that may arise between the ?cognitive? and so-called ?moral? enhancement points precisely to this fact. This article shows that, contrary to the intentions of its supporters, the idea according to which moral enhancement has precedence over cognitive enhancement is essentially just a new form of undermining human freedom.

We Must Create Beings with Moral Standing Superior to Our Own

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
VOJIN RAKIĆ
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
List Type ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Inductive Argument ◽  
The Creation ◽  
To Come ◽  
Status Enhancement

Abstract:Several lines of reasoning have been employed to both approve and disapprove two of Nicholas Agar’s positions: his argument that the creation of postpersons (based on moral status enhancement) is imaginable and possible and his inductive argument disfavoring the creation of postpersons. This article discusses a number of these lines of reasoning, arguing that1)The creation of postpersons is imaginable if they are envisaged as morally enhanced beings.2)The creation of postpersons is justified, subject to the condition that we create morally enhanced postpersons.The reason given for the first point is that it is possible to imagine postpersons who are morally enhanced, provided that we consider moral enhancement as an augmented inclination to act in line with how we believe we ought to act. There are two reasons offered for the second point: the first indicates probability, and the second offers proof. That is, if we assume that the higher moral status of postpersons implies their enhanced morality, we can conclude, inductively, that (morally enhanced) postpersons will not be inclined to annihilate mere persons. For if mere persons have moral inhibitions against obliterating some species of a lower moral status than their own, morally enhanced postpersons will be even less likely to do the same to mere persons. In fact, they might consider it their moral duty to preserve those beings who enabled them to come into existence. Moreover, even if morally enhanced postpersons decide to annihilate mere persons, we can conclude, deductively, that such a decision is by necessity a morally superior stance to the wish of mere persons (i.e., morally unenhanced persons) to continue to exist.

scholarly journals Is armageddon the alternative to moral enhancement?

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Vojin Rakic
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Enhancement ◽  
Moral Enhancement

Eudaimonic agents have to become dominant in humanity if it is to seriously diminish the probability of its self-annihilation. In order for this to happen, humanity ought to be morally enhanced. It will be argued that moral and cognitive enhancement have to be combined in such a way that all cognitive bio-enhancement leads to moral enhancement.

scholarly journals Cognitive Diversity and Moral Enhancement

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRIS GYNGELL ◽  
SIMON EASTEAL
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Enhancement ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Cognitive Diversity ◽  
Widespread Availability ◽  
Widespread Access ◽  
Enhancement Technologies

Abstract:One debate in contemporary bioethics centers on whether the development of cognitive enhancement technologies (CETs) will hasten the need for moral enhancement. In this article we provide a new argument in favor of pursuing these enhancement technologies together. The widespread availability of CETs will likely increase population-level cognitive diversity. Different people will choose to enhance different aspects of their cognition, and some won’t enhance themselves at all. Although this has the potential to be beneficial for society, it could also result in harms as people become more different from one another. Aspects of our moral psychology make it difficult for people to cooperate and coordinate actions with those who are very different from themselves. These moral failings could be targeted by moral enhancement technologies, which may improve cooperation among individuals. Moral enhancement technologies will therefore help society maximize the benefits, and reduce the costs, associated with widespread access to cognitive enhancements.

Psychedelic Moral Enhancement

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 415-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian D. Earp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Cognitive Enhancement ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Alternative Form ◽  
Moral Bioenhancement ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Psychedelic Drugs ◽  
The One ◽  
Smart Drug

AbstractThe moral enhancement (or bioenhancement) debate seems stuck in a dilemma. On the one hand, the more radical proposals, while certainly novel and interesting, seem unlikely to be feasible in practice, or if technically feasible then most likely imprudent. But on the other hand, the more sensible proposals – sensible in the sense of being both practically achievable and more plausibly ethically justifiable – can be rather hard to distinguish from both traditional forms of moral enhancement, such as non-drug-mediated social or moral education, and non-moral forms of bioenhancement, such as smart-drug style cognitive enhancement. In this essay, I argue that bioethicists have paid insufficient attention to an alternative form of moral bioenhancement – or at least a likely candidate – that falls somewhere between these two extremes, namely the (appropriately qualified) use of certain psychedelic drugs.

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