scholarly journals Corporate governance cycles during transition: A comparison of Russia and Slovenia

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Mygind ◽  
Natalia Demina ◽  
Aleksandra Gregoric ◽  
Rostislav Kapelyushnikov
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Employee Ownership ◽  
Russian Enterprise ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
External Finance ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Privatized Firms ◽  
Governance Institutions

The governance cycle – here defined as the changes in the identity of the dominant owner and ownership concentration - is marked by the key phases of firm life-cycle, including start-up, growth, an eventual restructuring or exit stage. Privatized firms in transition countries, however, experience somehow specific cycles, which reflect the characteristics of the economic and institutional environment in transition: i) the type of privatization that initially often introduced a high proportion of employee ownership (like in Russia and Slovenia); ii) strong pressures for restructuring and ownership changes; iii) limited possibility for external finance due to the embryonic development of the financial system. The hypotheses on the development of the governance cycles in transition are tested upon a sample of Russian enterprise data for 1995-2003 and Slovenian data covering 1998-2003. In spite of the differences in institutional development concerning privatization and development of corporate governance institutions, we find that governance cycles are broadly similar in the two countries. Employee ownership is rapidly fading in both countries. While change to manager and non-financial domestic outsider ownership is typical for Russia, this is not the case in Slovenia. Instead, change to financial outsiders in the form of Privatization Investment Funds is more frequent. Foreign ownership, which is especially rare in Russia, is quite stable. The ownership diversification to employees and diversified external owners during privatization did not fit well to the low development of institutions. As expected, we observe a subsequent concentration of ownership on managers, external domestic and foreign owners in both countries

Convergence of Corporate Governance Models

2004 ◽  
pp. 129-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tretyakov
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Commodity Markets ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
National Institutions ◽  
Governance Models ◽  
Changing Role

The article focuses on the analysis of the process of convergence of outsider and insider models of corporate governance. Chief characteristics of basic and intermediate systems of corporate governance as well as the changing role of its main agents are under examination. Globalization of financial and commodity markets, convergence of legal systems, an open exchange of ideas and information are the driving forces of the convergence of basic systems of corporate governance. However the convergence does not imply the unification of institutional environment and national institutions of corporate governance.

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals in Other Emerging Markets

2018 ◽  
pp. 630-656
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Daniel Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Foreign Direct Investments

This chapter reviews the literature on foreign direct investments among emerging economies (E-E FDI), focusing on the motivations behind E-E FDI, country-specific advantages and firm-specific advantages associated with emerging-economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs), and spillover effects of E-E FDI on host-country economic and institutional development. We identify the following topics as posing important questions for future research: EMNEs’ ability to leverage home-government resources and diplomatic connections to promote investment in other emerging economies; nonmarket strategies of EMNEs in emerging economies; ownership and corporate governance affecting investment strategy and performance of EMNEs; E-E FDI contributions to sustainable development in host countries. Future studies should also consider potential heterogeneity among EMNEs by integrating insights from institutional theory, network theory, political science, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and sustainable-development research.

The evolution of the monitoring board in Japan: how the board performs monitoring function in Japanese corporate governance

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 999-1014
Author(s):  
Kohei Miyamoto
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
White Paper ◽  
Lifetime Employment ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Legal Reforms ◽  
Legal Evolution ◽  
Commercial Code ◽  
Governance Institutions

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to trace a legal evolution of the monitoring board and to reveal what brought the evolution and what is expected to emerge. The paper points to unique complementarities in Japanese corporate governance institutions and norms which will affect how the monitoring board performs its functions. Design/Methodology/Approach Analysis is based on texts on corporate governance legislations in Japan from the revision of Commercial Code in 1950 to the revision of Companies Act in 2014. Other sources include Tokyo Stock Exchange regulations, White Paper on Corporate Governance and other academic literatures on Japanese corporate governance. Findings Changes of non-legal institutions and norms in Japanese corporate governance necessitated legal reforms toward the monitoring board. Persisting institutions and norms, in particular lifetime employment, influences how the monitoring board performs its functions in Japan. Originality/Value This paper explains how the evolution of the monitoring board in Japan emerged and what will cause different expected functions of the monitoring board in Japan and other jurisdictions.

Crossing the Line: Unionized Employee Ownership and Investment Funds

1997 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 344
Author(s):  
Donald Dennie ◽  
Jack Quarter
Keyword(s):  
Employee Ownership ◽  
Investment Funds

scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Resource Misallocation ◽  
Property Rights Protection

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.

An Overview of Corporate Governance and Innovation in Chinese IT and Manufacturing Listed Firms

2021 ◽  
pp. 338-357
Author(s):  
Xihui Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Research Field ◽  
Manufacturing Industries ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Current Structure ◽  
Listed Firms

This study introduces the current structure of corporate governance (ownership and board structure) and innovation in Chinese IT and manufacturing listed firms. It highlights the unique features and potential issues of corporate governance and innovation in the Chinese institutional environment. This chapter helps advance the understanding of ownership and board structures, as well as innovation in Chinese IT and manufacturing industries. It is hoped that this study will encourage more research to pursue this interesting research field.

Corporate Governance and the Role of Investment Funds

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Seibert
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Master Plan ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Striking Increase ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Come ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure

Since the mid-90\'s Germany has seen a whole range of laws on corporate governance: first and foremost the KonTraG, i.e. the law on control and transparency, followed by the NaStraG, i.e. the law on registered shares and the facilitating of proxy voting, then, more recently, the TransPuG, i.e. the law on transparency and disclosure, and - finally - the German Corporate Governance Codex issued by the Cromme Commission – and there is probably more to come during the next legislative period. What are the reasons for this striking increase in activity? What are the driving forces and is there a master plan behind these efforts?

scholarly journals Boundary Conditions of the Curvilinear Relationships between Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility and New Product Performance: Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 4968
Author(s):  
Yang ◽  
Zhang ◽  
Gao ◽  
Gao ◽  
Huang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
New Product ◽  
Product Performance ◽  
Ownership Type ◽  
New Product Performance ◽  
Development Level ◽  
Corporate Social

This study examines whether a firm’s environmental corporate social responsibility advances the growth of its new product performance, and investigates the moderating roles of a firm’s heterogeneous local institutional environment and ownership type. Based on a multi-informant survey dataset of 303 Chinese firms, we found that a firm’s environmental corporate social responsibility has a U-shaped relationship with the firm’s new product performance. In addition, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises with a higher environmental corporate social responsibility would receive relatively lower new product performance. Firms located in the provinces with a lower local institutional development level and higher environmental corporate social responsibility may experience relatively higher new product performance than firms located in the provinces with a higher local institutional development level.

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