scholarly journals Cutting the dividends tax…and corporate governance too?

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-34
Author(s):  
Dino Falaschetti ◽  
Michael J. Orlando

Economists tend to agree that the recent cutting of US dividends taxes will encourage investment and reduce financial distress. In addition to creating these “benefits,” however, the tax cut can also increase governance costs. For example, by removing a bias for leveraged capital structures, the tax cut foregoes debt’s superiority on at least three dimensions: Evaluating and monitoring demanders of financial capital; Constraining managerial agents’ from opportunistically employing capital market proceeds; and Encouraging non-financial stakeholders (e.g., employees, suppliers) to make firm-specific investments.

Author(s):  
Shantanu Dutta ◽  
Ken MacAulay ◽  
Mary M. Oxner

Studies of corporate governance in the capital markets area have focused on the mechanisms and structures of governance and less on the medium through which it is accomplished. This chapter examines the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) as a medium to enhance governance in the capital markets, focusing in particular on the Canadian capital market. Parallels are drawn between the e-governance issues faced by governments and the capital markets. The chapter concludes with a discussion of future directions for e-governance in the capital markets.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
Rumanintya Lisaria Putri ◽  
Dyah Agustin Widhi Yanti ◽  
Mahmud

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui mekanisme <em>corporate governance</em> (komisaris independen, kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, komite audit dan kualitas audit) berpengaruh terhadap potensi kesulitan keuangan (<em>financial distress</em>) perusahaan publik. Metode penelitian yang digunakan regresi linear berganda dengan uji asumsi klasik, dan pengujian hipotesis yang menghasilkan analisa sebagai berikut: Nilai F pada statistik hitung sebesar 11,731 dan nilai sig sebesar 0,014 karena α &gt; 0,014 artinya signifikan Ho1 ditolak dan Ha diterima. Hasil penelitian membuktikan bahwa mekanisme <em>corporate governance</em> berpengaruh terhadap potensi <em>financial distress</em> perusahaan publik. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa komisaris independen (nilai t<sub>hitung </sub>sebesar -3,139. Nilai ini lebih besar dari t<sub>tabel</sub> -2,500) secara statistik berpengaruh signifikan terhadap potensi kesulitan keuangan. Hasil uji t menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan manajerial (memiliki  nilai t<sub>hitung </sub>sebesar -4,236. Nilai ini lebih kecil dari t<sub>tabel</sub>  2,500) secara statistik berpengaruh signifikan terhadap potensi kesulitan keuangan. Hasil uji t menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan saham institusional (memiliki nilai t<sub>hitung </sub>sebesar 2,747. Nilai ini lebih besar dari t<sub>tabel</sub> 2,500) secara statistik berpengaruh signifikan terhadap potensi kesulitan keuangan. Hasil uji t menunjukkan bahwa komite audit (memiliki  nilai t<sub>hitung </sub>sebesar -2,615. Nilai ini lebih kecil dari t<sub>tabel</sub> -2,500) secara statistik berpengaruh signifikan terhadap potensi kesulitan keuangan. Hasil uji t menunjukkan bahwa kualitas audit (memiliki  nilai t<sub>hitung </sub>sebesar 7,426. Nilai ini lebih kecil dari t<sub>tabel</sub>  -2,500) secara statistik berpengaruh signifikan terhadap potensi kesulitan keuangan. Koefisien determinasi yang ditunjukkan dari nilai <em>adjusted</em><em> R<sup>2</sup> </em>sebesar 0,054 berarti 5,4% variasi potensi kesulitan keuangan dapat dijelaskan oleh ke-5 prediktor yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini, sedangkan sisanya sebesar 94,6% potensi kesulitan keuangan dapat dijelaskan oleh variabel lainnya.


Author(s):  
Vladimiro Marini ◽  
Massimo Caratelli ◽  
Gian Paolo Stella ◽  
Ilaria Barbaraci

AbstractPrivate equity is a source of finance and a governance device characterised by active monitoring through sponsors that intervene in targets’ corporate governance. As sponsors are skilled and motivated acquirors, we investigated whether corporate governance mechanisms mitigate leveraged targets’ risk of financial distress differently compared to non-acquired companies through the lenses of agency theory and resource-based theories. We found that targets and non-acquired companies are not significantly different in terms of corporate governance features, but sponsors are skilled enough to choose corporate governance members to mitigate risk more, especially when boards are smaller, have busier industry expert directors, and mandate execution to more managers. These results can be useful to targets, targets’ investors and lenders, and policymakers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-149
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

Empirical findings that common ownership is associated with anticompetitive outcomes including higher prices raise questions about possible policy responses. This comment evaluates the major proposals, including antitrust enforcement against common owners, regulation of corporate governance, regulation of compensation of management of portfolio firms, regulation of capital market structure, and greater antitrust enforcement against portfolio firms.


Asian Survey ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-821
Author(s):  
Vincent C. Ma ◽  
John S. Liu

Taiwan is a regional laboratory for Anglo-American-style corporate governance; we examine it from legal, capital, labor, and management perspectives. Statistical analyses of Taiwanese-listed companies show that independent directorship reduces financial distress and improves information disclosure.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 108-117
Author(s):  
Sylvi Angelia ◽  
Rizal Mawardi

Objective – The purpose of this study is to examine the effect between financial distress, corporate governance, auditor switching and audit delay. This research sample using data on a manufacturing company on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Methodology – The analysis technique used is multiple linear regression analysis technique. Findings– The research finding show that financial distress and the size of the audit committee have a significant effect on audit delay, while the concentration of ownership, managerial ownership, change of directors, and auditor switching has no significant effect on audit delay. Second finding explain that consideration for companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange to pay attention to the timeliness of submitting financial reports and independent auditor reports so as not to get sanctions from the Financial Services Authority. Novelty – Our novelty research using the relationship of Financial Distress, Corporate Governance and Auditor Switching on new research model to Audit Delay. Type of Paper: Empirical JEL Classification: M41, M42 Keywords: Financial Distress, Corporate Governance, Auditor Switching, Audit Delay


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Mahdi Filsaraei ◽  
Reza Jarrahi Moghaddam

Given the importance of corporate governance for increasing the monitoring of company operations, i.e., reducing information asymmetry and increasing control over operations, in this study, we investigate some indicators of corporate governance and financial distress as one of the most important criteria in the decisions of the users of financial statements. Corporate governance Indicators that have been mentioned in this study, including the independence of the board of directors (the ratio of non-executive members), institutional investors and duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. This study is applied research and the required information is gathered from financial statements of listed companies on the TSE. Using a sample of 82 company stock during the period 2010-2014 and multivariate regression analysis, the results of the analysis of information gathered indicates that institutional ownership reduces the financial distress. However, there was no significant relationship between board independence (proportion of outside board members) and the duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board with the financial distress. The results also indicate that financial leverage and a qualified audit opinion increases financial distress and firm size and management performance reduces it.


Author(s):  
Arifin Syofyan ◽  
Vinola Herawaty

<p>Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji dan menganalisisis hubungankepemilikan institusi, kepemilikan manajerial, proporsi dewan komisaris, ukuran dewan direksi, dan ukuran komite audit terhadap <em>financial distress</em> dengan kualitas audit sebagai variabel moderasinya. Penelitian ini menggunakan data sekunder yaitu laporan tahunan dan laporan keuangan. Sampel yang digunakan adalah perusahaan perbankan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada rentang waktu 2014 - 2018. Total sampel yang terpilih adalah 160. Teknik pengambilan sampel yang digunakan adalah <em>purposive sampling.</em> Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis regresi logistik.Hasil analisis penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa variabel kepemilikan manajerial dan ukuran dewan direksiberpengaruh negatifterhadap kemungkinan suatu perusahaan terjadinya <em>financial distress, </em>dan variabel kualitas audit dapat meperkuat pengaruh dari kepemilikan manajerial terhadap terjadinya <em>financial distress </em>pada perusahaan perbankan.</p>


Author(s):  
Ratih Pujirahayu Nugroho ◽  
Sutrisno T Sutrisno ◽  
Endang Mardiati

This study aims to verify the correlation between financial distress and earnings management of tax aggressiveness moderated by corporate governance. This study uses a population of manufacturing companies that publish their financial statement on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 until 2018. Sample collection was performed using a purposive sampling method, resulting in a total of 212 populations that published complete financial reports. This study was tested by using the Multiple Regression Analysis test. This research gave empirical proofs that financial distress and real earnings management positively influenced the tax aggressiveness was supported, the proportion of independent commissioners weakened the financial distress and negatively impacted the tax aggressiveness was supported, the total audit committees weakened the financial distress and negatively influenced the tax aggressiveness was not supported, the proportion of independent commissioners and total audit committees weakened the real earnings management and negatively affected the tax aggressiveness was not supported


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