scholarly journals Characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards with women inside directors

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Dahlen Zelechowski ◽  
Diana Bilimoria

Women corporate inside (executive) directors constitute an elite minority of leaders of large corporations. This study examines the characteristics of CEOs and boards of Fortune 1000 firms that had women who held the dual leadership positions of corporate director and executive officer in 1998 in order to determine whether firms with women insiders had substantially different characteristics than firms without. We find that compared with firms without women inside directors, firms with women inside directors were characterized by CEOs with longer board tenure, more family ties, and fewer director interlocks, and by boards that were larger, with more insiders, and that utilize a management Chair of the board. Corporate governance implications are drawn for the presence of women at the top of the executive hierarchy.

GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-52
Author(s):  
Karam Pal Narwal ◽  
Sonia Jindal

The paper empirically examines the impact of corporate governance on the cash holding of the firms. The components of corporate governance are measured by board size, board meeting, audit committee members, directors remuneration and non executive directors and the cash holding is measured with the log of average cash and size is taken as control variable for the control effect on the dependent variables. Moreover, correlation and panel regression model were employed to examine the relationship between the corporate governance and cash holding. Empirical data was collected from 96 firms over the period of 2004-05 to 2013-14. The results show that directors remuneration and the number of audit committee members positively influence the cash holding and the board size also positively influences the cash holding whereas, the non executive directors and the board meetings do not play any role in enhancing the cash holding.


GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 01-09
Author(s):  
Asma Rafique Chughtai ◽  
Afifa Naseer ◽  
Asma Hassan

The crucial role that implementation of Code of Corporate Governance plays on protecting the rights of minorities, shareholders, local as well as foreign investors cannot be denied. Companies all over the world are required to implement their respective Code of Corporate Governance for avoiding agency conflicts between companies management and stakeholders and for assuring transparency in accountability. This paper aims at exploring the impact of implementation of corporate governance practices (designed by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) have on the financial position of companies. For explanatory variables of the study, composition of the board as per the Code of Corporate Governance that comprises of presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors has been taken into consideration. Return on equity has been taken as an indicator of firms profitability i.e. the dependent variable. For this study, companies listed on food producing sector of Karachi Stock Exchange have been screened for excogitation of the relationship. It is an empirical research based on nine years data from 2007–2015. Using Hausman Test for selecting the data analysis technique between Fixed or Random, Fixed Cross Sectional Panel Analysis has been used for analysis of the data collected. Findings indicate that presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors as per the code requirements levies a significant impact on the profitability of companies indicated by return on equity. It is, thus concluded that companies should ensure compliance with code of governance practices to reduce not only the agency issues but also to increase their profitability.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Nana Yaw Simpson

Purpose – This study aims to examine the structure, attributes, and performance of boards of directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the broader context of public sector governance. This is informed by the less attention given to the concept among public sector organizations despite efforts to make state enterprises more effective and efficient, especially in developing and middle income countries. Design/methodology/approach – Data was collected through questionnaires self-administered in 2010 to all 25 SOEs in Accra, Ghana, out of the 29 nationwide. Some key officials were interviewed and documentary evidence analyzed to achieve triangulation of data and results. Findings – Results show that state-owned enterprises have boards and comply with the minimal governance issues outlined the legal frameworks establishing them. However, they exhibit significant weaknesses in the areas of board performance evaluation, criteria for board appointment, the balance of executive directors and non-executive directors, and other board characteristics, indicating a departure from general practices. Practical implications – Findings suggest the need for a tailored corporate governance framework or code for state-owned enterprises in developing countries. Originality/value – Compared to the literature, this study provides insight on boards from the perspective of state enterprises in ensuring good corporate governance, particularly in the context of a middle income country (Ghana).


2021 ◽  
pp. 097215092110362
Author(s):  
Obi Berko O. Damoah ◽  
Yvonne Ayerki Lamptey ◽  
Alex Anlesinya ◽  
Barbara Naa Amanuah Tetteh

This study explored how and when female board members make effective contribution to board processes in a sub-Saharan African country (Ghana), a context characterized by low female representation on corporate boards, but highly under-researched with respect to the gender and corporate governance literature. The study is based on interview data from 25 female board directors in Ghana. The results show that women on corporate boards contribute to effective board processes and outcomes when their proposed ideas during board meetings are accepted by other board members, implemented by management and impact positively on organizational outcomes such as enhanced financial, product and staff outcomes. These effective contributions of female board directors to corporate board processes can further be enhanced by suitable female directors’ personal-level conditions such as their human capital (advanced degree and professional qualification, and past board membership experience) and family support (supportive husbands, and having grown up children), as well as board-level conditions like occupying chairperson/leadership position on the board or committees, and regular attendance at board meetings. Consequently, this research study contributed to the gender and corporate governance literature by providing new evidence from under-researched geographical context on how women on corporate boards contribute to effective board processes. It further highlights personal and board-level conditions that are necessary for greater contributions of female directors to corporate board processes and outcomes in male-dominated societies and boards.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 934-949
Author(s):  
Husna Siraji Nyambia ◽  
Hamdino Hamdan

Purpose This study extensively aims to investigate the effects of different aspects of corporate governance (CG) mechanism, including board size, executive directors’ shareholdings, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, a family member as the CEO and/or chairperson of the board, independent directors in remuneration committee and number of board meeting, on executive directors’ remuneration in small firms listed on Bursa Malaysia (BM). Design/methodology/approach The sample of this study consists of 173 bottom-listed companies from Bursa Malaysia in Year 2010. The Year 2010 was chosen because the disclosure of remuneration committee activities and directors’ pay structure is required under the revised Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance, 2007. Furthermore, the period selected is after the global economic crisis (2008), which may have an effect on the remuneration structure in small firms. The ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the relationship between remuneration as dependent variable and other independent variables. Findings A finding from this study reveals that there is a significant positive relationship between executive ownership and executive remuneration, and between board size and executive remuneration. The results provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. This indicates that the independent directors are not truly independent to monitor and control the firm activities, including minimizing the excessive remuneration. Research limitations/implications This study examines how the corporate governance (CG) affects remuneration among 173 small firms in Malaysia based on market capitalization, for one year, 2010. Hence, the results may not be generalizable to other periods or types of the companies. This shows the possibility of the absence of some additional variables in the research model and hence a limitation to the findings of the study. Although the study is being parsimonious in the choice of relevant variables, prior literature serves the guide in the selection of the used variables. This therefore gives room for future research using the potential omitted variables. Furthermore, the study focuses on total remuneration, such as fees, salaries, bonuses and benefits in kind, which makes aggregate directors’ remuneration. However, this study did not consider the remuneration related to stock options. Finally, this study only uses secondary data; hence, it could be interesting to use other instruments to collect data like a questionnaire to add more weight to the research. This study only uses one-year data; therefore, impact of changes between years cannot be analysed. Originality/value Results of the study provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. They reduce the effectiveness of non-executive directors because most of them are appointed by a family member and not socially responsible to their stakeholders.


2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 725-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy L. Fort

Abstract:This paper is a response to a recent colloquy among Professors David Messick, Donna Wold, and Edwin Harman. I defend Messick’s naturalist methodology, which suggests that people inherently categorize others and act altruistically toward certain people in a given person’s in-group. This paper suggests that an anthropological reason for this grouping tendency is a limited human neural ability to process large numbers of relationships. But because human beings also have the ability to modify, to some extent, their nature, corporate law can organize small mediating institutions within large corporations in order to take ethical advantage of this grouping tendency. Within a corporate law taking seriously a mediating institution’s formulation of business communities, a virtue ethics approach can be integrated with a naturalist approach in a way that fosters ethical business behavior while mitigating the dangers of ingrouping tendencies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chryssoula Tsene

Corporate governance is widely acknowledged as a key factor of market’s efficiency and corporate performance. Greek company law, under the influence of the financial crisis, has responded actively by incorporating in national law EU directives on corporate governance of listed companies and by adopting recently self-regulatory provisions. This regulatory framework contributes essentially to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholder protection and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, two pillars should be illustrated as regards board of directors in listed companies: Greek company law provides traditionally for the establishment of the general duties of loyalty and care of all board members in companies limited by shares, which are furthermore reinforced by the provisions of the Hellenic Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. Secondly, hard law rules introduce the participation of non-executive and non-executive independent directors as a legal mechanism of confronting agency problems in listed companies. These provisions have been strongly argued as regards the exact content of the obligations of all board members of listed companies to promote the corporate interest and especially as regards the monitoring role of non-executive directors. These conceptions should be followed by empirical researches in order to address a completely legal and functional approach.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Serban Bakay Ergene ◽  
Erdinc Karadeniz

This study examined the relationships and interactions between corporate governance and firm values of lodging companies with different characteristics. The companies were analyzed separately using a classification and regression tree (CRT) analysis. The analysis results did not show a direct relationship between value and governance, yet that does not mean there is no relationship between them. When the companies’ governance scores were similar, corporate governance showed no distinguishing variable on firm value but is a hygiene factor. The analysis also found negative relationships between value and size. This may be important in preventing companies from becoming cumbersome. Also, positive relationships were found between value and the debt ratio of the lodging companies from the most valuable brands. This relationship showed the significance of using the debt ratio as a control tool in evaluating management performance.


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