A Study on the Relationships among the Theory of Mind, Language Ability, and Cognitive Processing Ability of Young Children

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 319-343
Author(s):  
Ji Eun Kim ◽  
Sung Ae Chi
2021 ◽  
pp. 019394592110216
Author(s):  
Audrey Rosenblatt ◽  
Michael Kremer ◽  
Olimpia Paun ◽  
Barbara Swanson ◽  
Rebekah Hamilton ◽  
...  

Millions of young children undergo surgery and anesthesia each year, yet there is a lack of scientific consensus about the safety of anesthesia exposure for the developing brain. Also poorly understood is parental anesthesia-related decision-making and how neurotoxicity information influences their choices. The theoretical model of parental decision-making generated in this research explicates this process. Interviews with 24 mothers yielded a theoretical framework based on their narratives developed using a qualitative grounded theory analysis. Five major themes emerged from these interviews: emotional processing, cognitive processing, relationships as resources, the mother/child dyad, and the health care context. Mothers described a non-linear, iterative process; they moved fluidly through emotional and cognitive processing supported by relationships as resources and influenced by the health care context. A key element was the subtheme of the medical translator, an individual who provided context and information. The mother/child dyad grounded the model in the relationship with the child.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Slaughter ◽  
Candida C. Peterson ◽  
Chris Moore

2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (12) ◽  
pp. 881-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meizhu Liu ◽  
Lingxiang Wu ◽  
Weijing Wu ◽  
Guangdi Li ◽  
Taisheng Cai ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 359 ◽  
pp. 56-65
Author(s):  
Elaine Y.L. Kwok ◽  
Janis Oram Cardy ◽  
Brian L. Allman ◽  
Prudence Allen ◽  
Björn Herrmann

1995 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-369
Author(s):  
L.M. Montenegro ◽  
E.A. Zillmer ◽  
E. Klein ◽  
G. Greenberg

Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter focuses on children’s ability to separate the imagined from the real and does so through a focus on imaginary companions. Imaginary companions appear in many forms; they can have physical forms (a puppet friend), or they can be purely mental creations. Typically, imaginary companions have ideas, emotions, and desires separate from the child’s, and thus they are saturated in theory-of-mind understandings. Although some authorities and many parents worry that imaginary companions are a particularly good example of children’s inability to separate the imagined from the real, research shows that young children easily distinguish between fantasy and fact, between the mental and the real, between imagined entities and real physical ones. Moreover, children who have imaginary companions not only distinguish between mind and reality, but also show numerous theory-of-mind strengths.


Author(s):  
Robert S. Siegler

My children have never looked much like those described in most theories of cognitive development. I don’t mean that they are generally deviant or that they perform abnormally on conservation or class inclusion tasks. They generally seem more or less normal, and on the few occasions when I have presented tasks from the cognitive developmental literature, they have acted pretty much like the children described in the articles. Where my children are altogether different from the theoretical descriptions is in the variability of their thinking. Cognitive developmental theories generally depict age and thought as proceeding in a 1:1 relation. At an early age, children think in one way; at a later age, they think in another way; at a still later age, they think in a third way. Such descriptions are so pervasive that they begin to feel like reality. Young children are said to form thematic concepts; somewhat older ones to form chain concepts; yet older ones to form true concepts. The reasoning of young children is said to be preoperational; that of somewhat older ones concrete operational; that of yet older ones formal operational. Young children are said to have one theory of mind; somewhat older ones a different, more inclusive theory; yet older ones a more advanced theory still. The story is the same with characterizations of performance on specific tasks. In descriptions of the development of the concept of living things, 3- and 4-yearolds are said to think that anything that moves is alive, 5- to 8-year-olds that animals—and only animals—are alive, and older children that plants as well as animals are alive. In descriptions of the development of addition skill, kindergartners are said to count from one; first through third graders to count from the larger addend; fourth graders and older children to retrieve answers from memory. In descriptions of the development of serial recall strategies, 5-year-olds are said not to rehearse; 8-year-olds to rehearse in a simple way; 11-year-olds to rehearse in a more elaborate way. My children’s thinking has never looked as neat and clean as these 1:1 characterizations of the relation between age and thought.


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