The axiom of choice and combinatory logic

2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1091-1108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Cantini

AbstractWe combine a variety of constructive methods (including forcing, realizability, asymmetric interpretation), to obtain consistency results concerning combinatory logic with extensionality and (forms of) the axiom of choice.

1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 623-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Spector

The usefulness of measurable cardinals in set theory arises in good part from the fact that an ultraproduct of wellfounded structures by a countably complete ultrafilter is wellfounded. In the standard proof of the wellfoundedness of such an ultraproduct, one first shows, without any use of the axiom of choice, that the ultraproduct contains no infinite descending chains. One then completes the proof by noting that, assuming the axiom of choice, any partial ordering with no infinite descending chain is wellfounded. In fact, the axiom of dependent choices (a weakened form of the axiom of choice) suffices. It is therefore of interest to ask whether some use of the axiom of choice is needed in order to prove the wellfoundedness of such ultraproducts or whether, on the other hand, their wellfoundedness can be proved in ZF alone. In Theorem 1, we show that the axiom of choice is needed for the proof (assuming the consistency of a strong partition relation). Theorem 1 also contains some related consistency results concerning infinite exponent partition relations. We then use Theorem 1 to show how to change the cofinality of a cardinal κ satisfying certain partition relations to any regular cardinal less than κ, while introducing no new bounded subsets of κ. This generalizes a theorem of Prikry [5].


1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 721-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Pincus

Fraenkel-Mostowski models are a particularly simple and conceptual tool for proving consistency results involving the axiom of choice, AC. These models satisfy the theory, FM, of a well founded universe of sets built from a ground set of individuals. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF, is the extension of FM in which the set of individuals is assumed to be empty. In this paper we show that there is a large class of statements whose consistency with ZF can be proven directly by means of a Fraenkel-Mostowski model.A statement, Φ, of set theory is said to be transferable if there is a metatheorem: If Φ is true in a Fraenkel-Mostowski model then Φ is consistent with ZF. Jech and Sochor introduced, in [12], the class of boundable statements and proved them to be transferable. Most existential contradictions of AC are boundable. It remains to find criteria under which Ψ ∧ Φ is transferable where Ψ is a universal consequence of AC and Φ is an existential contradiction of AC. To this end we give two classes of statements. Each class is closed under conjunction, contains the boundable statements, and contains a number of universal consequences of AC. Nearly every Fraenkel-Mostowski consistency in the literature falls into one of these two classes.In §2 we give two generalizations of the boundable statements. In §§3 and 4 the classes of transferable statements are discussed. In §5 we discuss the transfer problem and prove a metatheorem concerning nontransferable statements.


2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
ASAF KARAGILA

AbstractThe notion of a symmetric extension extends the usual notion of forcing by identifying a particular class of names which forms an intermediate model of $ZF$ between the ground model and the generic extension, and often the axiom of choice fails in these models. Symmetric extensions are generally used to prove choiceless consistency results. We develop a framework for iterating symmetric extensions in order to construct new models of $ZF$. We show how to obtain some well-known and lesser-known results using this framework. Specifically, we discuss Kinna–Wagner principles and obtain some results related to their failure.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


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