Zermelo-Fraenkel consistency results by Fraenkel-Mostowski methods

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 721-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Pincus

Fraenkel-Mostowski models are a particularly simple and conceptual tool for proving consistency results involving the axiom of choice, AC. These models satisfy the theory, FM, of a well founded universe of sets built from a ground set of individuals. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF, is the extension of FM in which the set of individuals is assumed to be empty. In this paper we show that there is a large class of statements whose consistency with ZF can be proven directly by means of a Fraenkel-Mostowski model.A statement, Φ, of set theory is said to be transferable if there is a metatheorem: If Φ is true in a Fraenkel-Mostowski model then Φ is consistent with ZF. Jech and Sochor introduced, in [12], the class of boundable statements and proved them to be transferable. Most existential contradictions of AC are boundable. It remains to find criteria under which Ψ ∧ Φ is transferable where Ψ is a universal consequence of AC and Φ is an existential contradiction of AC. To this end we give two classes of statements. Each class is closed under conjunction, contains the boundable statements, and contains a number of universal consequences of AC. Nearly every Fraenkel-Mostowski consistency in the literature falls into one of these two classes.In §2 we give two generalizations of the boundable statements. In §§3 and 4 the classes of transferable statements are discussed. In §5 we discuss the transfer problem and prove a metatheorem concerning nontransferable statements.

1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 623-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Spector

The usefulness of measurable cardinals in set theory arises in good part from the fact that an ultraproduct of wellfounded structures by a countably complete ultrafilter is wellfounded. In the standard proof of the wellfoundedness of such an ultraproduct, one first shows, without any use of the axiom of choice, that the ultraproduct contains no infinite descending chains. One then completes the proof by noting that, assuming the axiom of choice, any partial ordering with no infinite descending chain is wellfounded. In fact, the axiom of dependent choices (a weakened form of the axiom of choice) suffices. It is therefore of interest to ask whether some use of the axiom of choice is needed in order to prove the wellfoundedness of such ultraproducts or whether, on the other hand, their wellfoundedness can be proved in ZF alone. In Theorem 1, we show that the axiom of choice is needed for the proof (assuming the consistency of a strong partition relation). Theorem 1 also contains some related consistency results concerning infinite exponent partition relations. We then use Theorem 1 to show how to change the cofinality of a cardinal κ satisfying certain partition relations to any regular cardinal less than κ, while introducing no new bounded subsets of κ. This generalizes a theorem of Prikry [5].


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Keremedis ◽  
Eleftherios Tachtsis

AbstractWe establish the following results:1. In ZF (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory minus the Axiom of Choice AC), for every set I and for every ordinal number α ≥ ω, the following statements are equivalent:(a) The Tychonoff product of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact.(b) The union of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite subsets of I is well orderable.2. The statement: For every infinite set I, every closed subset of the Tychonoff product [0, 1]Iwhich consists offunctions with finite support is compact, is not provable in ZF set theory.3. The statement: For every set I, the principle of dependent choices relativised to I implies the Tychonoff product of countably many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0 (i.e., ZF minus the Axiom of Regularity).4. The statement: For every set I, every ℵ0-sized family of non-empty finite subsets of I has a choice function implies the Tychonoff product of ℵ0many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0.


Axioms ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitri Shakhmatov ◽  
Víctor Yañez

We give a “naive” (i.e., using no additional set-theoretic assumptions beyond ZFC, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory augmented by the Axiom of Choice) example of a Boolean topological group G without infinite separable pseudocompact subsets having the following “selective” compactness property: For each free ultrafilter p on the set N of natural numbers and every sequence ( U n ) of non-empty open subsets of G, one can choose a point x n ∈ U n for all n ∈ N in such a way that the resulting sequence ( x n ) has a p-limit in G; that is, { n ∈ N : x n ∈ V } ∈ p for every neighbourhood V of x in G. In particular, G is selectively pseudocompact (strongly pseudocompact) but not selectively sequentially pseudocompact. This answers a question of Dorantes-Aldama and the first listed author. The group G above is not pseudo- ω -bounded either. Furthermore, we show that the free precompact Boolean group of a topological sum ⨁ i ∈ I X i , where each space X i is either maximal or discrete, contains no infinite separable pseudocompact subsets.


1962 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 105-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katuzi Ono

The theory of mathematical objects, developed in this work, is a trial system intended to be a prototype of set theory. It concerns, with respect to the only one primitive notion “proto-membership”, with a field of mathematical objects which we shall hereafter simply call objects, it is a very simple system, because it assumes only one axiom scheme which is formally similar to the aussonderung axiom of set theory. We shall show that in our object theory we can construct a theory of sets which is stronger than the Zermelo set-theory [1] without the axiom of choice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 1234-1256 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS STREICHER

In a sequence of papers (Krivine 2001; Krivine 2003; Krivine 2009), J.-L. Krivine introduced his notion of classical realisability for classical second-order logic and Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. Moreover, in more recent work (Krivine 2008), he has considered forcing constructions on top of it with the ultimate aim of providing a realisability interpretation for the axiom of choice.The aim of the current paper is to show how Krivine's classical realisability can be understood as an instance of the categorical approach to realisability as started by Martin Hyland in Hyland (1982) and described in detail in van Oosten (2008). Moreover, we will give an intuitive explanation of the iteration of realisability as described in Krivine (2008).


1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. P. Monro

AbstractLet ZF denote Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (without the axiom of choice), and let M be a countable transitive model of ZF. The method of forcing extends M to another model M[G] of ZF (a “generic extension”). If the axiom of choice holds in M it also holds in M[G], that is, the axiom of choice is preserved by generic extensions. We show that this is not true for many weak forms of the axiom of choice, and we derive an application to Boolean toposes.


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