scholarly journals Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Not Given Author
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Environmental Legacy

The Role of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in the Cleanup of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynne K. Smith ◽  
Mary L. Bisesi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Pilot Plant ◽  
The United States ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
United States Department ◽  
National Academy Of Sciences ◽  
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant ◽  
Term Operation ◽  
Transuranic Waste

As a result of nuclear weapons production, the United States of America produced significant quantities of transuranic waste, which consists of clothing, tools, rags, residues, debris and other items contaminated with small amounts of radioactive man-made elements — mostly plutonium — with an atomic number greater than that of uranium. Transuranic waste began accumulating in the 1940s and continued through the Cold War era. Today, most transuranic waste is stored at weapons production sites across the United States. In 1957, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the most promising disposal option for radioactive wastes was disposal in deep geologic repositories situated in the salt formations. After nearly a decade of study, the United States Department of Energy decided in January 1981 to proceed with construction of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) at a site 41.6 km (26 miles) southest of Carlsbad, New Mexico. After years of study, construction, and permitting, the WIPP facility became operational in early 1999. As the United States continues to clean up and close its former nuclear weapon facilities, the operation of WIPP will continue into the next several decades. This paper will provide on overview of the history, regulatory, and public process to permit a radioactive repository for disposal of transuranic wastes and the process to ensure its long-term operation in a safe and environmentally compliant manner.

Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam

2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Nation States

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.

The Rise and Fall of Great Powers

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Lundestad
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
The West ◽  
Economic Modernization

There are no laws in history. Realists, liberals, and others are both right and wrong. Although no one can be certain that military incidents may not happen, for the foreseeable future China and the United States are unlikely to favor major war. They have cooperated well for almost four decades now. China is likely to continue to focus on its economic modernization. It has far to go to measure up to the West. The American-Chinese economies are still complementary. A conflict with the United States or even with China’s neighbors would have damaging repercussions for China’s economic goals. The United States is so strong that it would make little sense for China to take it on militarily. There are also other deterrents against war, from nuclear weapons to emerging norms about international relations. It is anybody’s guess what will happen after the next few decades. History indicates anything is possible.

Nuclear Guarantees and Nonproliferation

1971 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 836-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph I. Coffey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Atomic Weapons ◽  
The United Kingdom

On March 5, 1970, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect, having been ratified by 47 states including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty legally bars these three nuclear powers from transferring atomic weapons to nonnuclear states and formally pledges those nonnuclear states signing the treaty to refrain from developing such weapons or acquiring them from other powers. It thus caps a long effort by the United States to inhibit—so long as it could not preclude—the spread of nuclear weapons and to avoid the potential instabilities associated with that spread.

scholarly journals Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: The Major Implications of Nuclear Iran for the Middle East

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. p50
Author(s):  
Sayed Reza Hussaini
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Cascade Effect ◽  
The Face ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Socioeconomic Consequences

Iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. The basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. Almost three and a half years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Pact (JCPOA), Tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. Iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards Israel. Besides, Iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for Israel.Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. The West, particularly the United States, would seek to offset this risk by providing a “defenceumbrella”. HhhhjkhggHowever, some might be reluctant to be openly protected by the United Statesor would find the umbrella questionable and choose nuclear option for both security concerns and prestige.

Knowledge Transfer for Emerging Work Paradigms

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maggie Sturdivant ◽  
Earl Carnes
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Transfer ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Individual Experience ◽  
Good Practices ◽  
Collective Experience ◽  
Environmental Legacy

Abstract Department of Energy (DOE) missions include scientific research and development, nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, and cleanup of the environmental legacy from weapons production. Since the cold war’s end, changes in mission focus have placed considerable attention on the standards for performing work. For activities where risk is understood, the work force’s collective experience is codified in standards. For activities with unconventional risks, good practices and individual experience communicate what is known at the edge of technology and consensus Standards. This paper describes the basis for a Procedures standard, a principles-based enterprise approach for knowledge transfer that supports the unique missions of DOE.

The Making of the Western Defense System: France, the United States, and MC 48

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Defense System ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
History Of ◽  
Military Strength ◽  
The Military

This chapter focuses on a document formally adopted by the NATO Council in December 1954, called MC 48, a report by the Alliance's Military Committee on “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years.” In approving this document, the Council authorized the military authorities of the Alliance to “plan and make preparations on the assumption that atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be used in defense from the outset.” One very important consequence of the new strategy from the European point of view had to do with what was called “nuclear sharing”—that is, with the provision of American nuclear weapons to the NATO allies. This policy of nuclear sharing was one of the key elements in the history of this period.

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