scholarly journals Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures

10.2172/12462 ◽  
1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
j.k. mattingly ◽  
j.t. mihalczo ◽  
j.a. mullens ◽  
r.b. perez ◽  
t.e. valentine
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Fissile Material

Nuclear Pakistan – Dichotomy of Power and Weakness (the end)

2011 ◽  
pp. 31-40
Author(s):  
I. Khokhlov
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Fissile Material

The article analyses the fears that Pakistan's nuclear weapon or stockpiled fissile material could fall into the hands of terrorists. The author analyses the main security safeguards to prevent this scenario as well as the main threats to these weapons: corrupted military and intelligence officers, insurgency in the Pashtunistan and terrorist activities.

User Requirements and Criteria for Proliferation Resistance in INPRO

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun-Mo Choi ◽  
Robert D. Hurt ◽  
Thomas E. Shea ◽  
Richard Nishimura
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Energy Systems ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
User Requirements ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Nuclear Weapon Program ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Weapon Program

In designing future nuclear energy systems, it is important to consider the potential that such systems could be misused for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons. INPRO set out to provide guidance on incorporating proliferation resistance into innovative nuclear energy systems (INS). Generally two types of proliferation resistance measures are distinguished: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic features consist of technical design features that reduce the attractiveness of nuclear material for nuclear weapon program, or prevent the diversion of nuclear material or production of undeclared nuclear material for nuclear weapons. Extrinsic measures include commitments, obligations and policies of states such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards agreements. INPRO has produced five basic principles and five user requirements for INS. It emphasizes that INS must continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapon program. It also addresses as user requirements: 1) a balanced and optimised combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, 2) the development and implementation of intrinsic features, 3) an early consideration of proliferation resistance in the development of INS and 4) the utilization of intrinsic features to increase the efficiency of extrinsic measures. INPRO has also developed criteria, consisting of indicators and acceptance limits, which would be used by a state to assess how an INS satisfies those user requirements. For the first user requirement, the most important but complex one, INPRO provides a 3-layer hierarchy of indicators to assess how unattractive a specific INS would be as part of a nuclear weapon program. Attributes of nuclear material and facilities are used as indicators to assess intrinsic features. Extrinsic measures imposed on the system are also assessed. Indicators to assess defence in depth for proliferation resistance include the number and robustness of barriers, and the redundancy or complementarity of barriers. The cost of incorporating proliferation resistant features is used to assess the cost-effectiveness of any particular INS in providing proliferation resistance. The stages in the development of an INS at which proliferation resistance is considered in the process are assessed. Awareness of extrinsic measures by designers and use of intrinsic features for verification illustrate how intrinsic features facilitate extrinsic measures. An INPRO-consistent methodology to assess the proliferation resistance of an INS is still under development, with feedback expected from the case studies undertaken by Argentina, India, Russia and the Republic of Korea.

Justice and Injustice in the Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-598
Author(s):  
Annette Schaper
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Fissile Material

The Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (fm(c)t) has been on the negotiation agenda since 1996, but has seen little progress. This is due to a fundamental disagreement over whether emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament or nuclear non-proliferation. Several delegations perceive the fm(c)t as a tool to draw in states from outside the non-proliferation regime, while others understand it to be a disarmament measure that reduces quantities of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. They however, regard the unwillingness of nuclear weapon states to engage toward this end as deeply unjust. Additional disagreements also concern justice: Should there be different standards of verification? May some states continue to produce unverified military fuel? As long as the nuclear weapon states only push their interests through pure power instead of respecting the notion of justice, no progress can be expected and the non-proliferation regime will further erode.

Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Terror Attack ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Terror Attacks ◽  
Nuclear Terrorism ◽  
State Sponsor ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Invasion Of Iraq

Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.

FLASH X-RAY DEVICES FOR PUMPING NUCLEAR MATERIALS DEVELOPED IN THE GAMMA-RAY LASER PROGRAM AT TEXAS

1987 ◽  
Vol 48 (C9) ◽  
pp. C9-367-C9-370
Author(s):  
C. B. COLLINS ◽  
F. DAVANLOO ◽  
T. S. BOWEN ◽  
J. J. COOGAN
Keyword(s):  
Gamma Ray ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
X Ray

Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status: Concept and Practice

Asian Survey ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-359
Author(s):  
J. Enkhsaikhan
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Free Status

A nuclear-weapon-free Arctic

2008 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-60
Author(s):  
Michael D. Walace
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapon

Korean Nuclear Crises: Is There A Way Forward?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muzaffar Ganaie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Nuclear Weapon State ◽  
Policy Challenge ◽  
Positive Results

<p><i>North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a key foreign policy challenge for United States. After its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has made an impressive progress in developing a credible nuclear deterrent through series of nuclear and missile tests. The diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have not yielded positive results so far, as Pyongyang has not only developed a credible deterrent but continues to expand and strengthen it. The failure of Hanoi Summit, latest in the series of diplomatic initiatives to end the series has depended pessimism regarding future negations. Experts are skeptical about finding a diplomatic solution to the crises and the demand to explore other alternatives <sup>_____</sup> limited surgical strike, regime change, treating North Korea as de-facto nuclear weapon state <sup>_____</sup> to end the crises has intensified in recent years. However, dealing with the threat though these tools is highly risky and diplomatic outreach is the most preferred course to end the crises.</i></p>

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