Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.

Author(s):  
Nany Tuor ◽  
Allen Schubert

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site is a former nuclear weapons production facility owned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Located in central Colorado near Denver, the facility produced nuclear and non-nuclear components for weapons from 1953 to 1989. During this period, Rocky Flats grew to more than 800 facilities and structures situated on 2,500 hectares. Production activities and processes contaminated a number of facilities, soil, groundwater and surface water with radioactive and hazardous materials. In 1989, almost all radioactive weapons component production activities at Rocky Flats were suspended due to safety and environmental concerns related to operations, and the site was placed on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Priorities List (also known as the Superfund list). In 1992, the nuclear weapons production role at Rocky Flats officially ended and the mission changed from weapons production to one of risk reduction. In 1995, Kaiser-Hill, LLC (Kaiser-Hill) was awarded a five-year contract to reduce the urgent health and safety risks at the site, as well as begin the cleanup. At that time, the U.S. government estimated that it would cost more than $36 billion and take more than 70 years to cleanup and close Rocky Flats. Beginning in the summer of 1995, Kaiser-Hill developed a series of strategic planning models which demonstrated that accelerated cleanup of the site could be achieved while dramatically reducing cleanup costs. Within a few years, Kaiser-Hill developed a cleanup plan or lifecycle baseline that described how cleanup could be accomplished by 2010 for about $7.3 billion. Additionally, between 1995 and 2000, Kaiser-Hill made significant progress toward stabilizing special nuclear materials, cleaning up environmental contamination, demolishing buildings and shipping radioactive and hazardous waste for disposal. This initial contract was completed for approximately $2.8 billion. In January 2000, based its record of successes, Kaiser-Hill was awarded DOE’s first “closure contract” to close the site no later than December 2006, at a target cost of $3.96 billion. To date, some of the key enablers of the accelerated closure project concept and successful closure project execution include: • Shared vision of the end state; • Flexible, consultative regulatory agreement; • Credible project plan and robust project management systems; • Closure contract; • Empowered and motivated workforce; • Commitment to safety; • Closure-enhancing technologies. The scope of the closure project encompasses the following key completion metrics: • Disposition of 21 metric tons of weapons-grade nuclear materials; • Treatment of more than 100 metric tons of high-content plutonium wastes called residues; • Processing of 30,000 liters of plutonium and enriched uranium solutions; • Demolition of more than 800 facilities and structures totaling more that 325,000 square meters — many of which are contaminated with radioactive and/or hazardous materials; • Offsite shipment of more than 250,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste; • Disposition of approximately 370 environmental sites.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 774-778
Author(s):  
Mark S Bell

AbstractIn an important article, McIntosh and Storey (2018) challenge the “acquisition-use presumption” that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would inevitably seek to detonate it in an attack. They argue that a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons has more attractive options than conducting a direct nuclear attack, that organizational politics mean that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to seek to detonate it, and that a nuclear attack would escalate the threats the terrorist organization faced. I argue that these arguments are ultimately unpersuasive and that the acquisition-use presumption remains a valid basis for theorizing about the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-68
Author(s):  
Li Bin

The U.S. government considers “power competition” to be the nature of the relations among big powers, and that it will have an impact on the evolving nuclear order in the near future. When big powers worry about power challenges from their rivals, they may use the influence of nuclear weapons to defend their own power and therefore intensify the danger of nuclear confrontation. We need to manage the nuclear relations among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation. The fact is that big powers including the United States have neither the interest nor the capability to expand their power, and understanding this might cause big powers to lose their interest in power competition. If we promote dialogue among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states on their strategic objectives, it is possible to reduce the power competition that results from misperceptions and overreactions. Some other factors, for example, non- nuclear technologies and multinuclear players, could complicate the future nuclear order. We therefore need to manage these factors as well and develop international cooperation to mitigate nuclear competition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 92-98
Author(s):  
Thomas MacDonald ◽  
Peter Roemer ◽  
Ethan Klein

Fifty years ago the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), an international agreement that seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, went into effect. Under the NPT, all countries party to the treaty are permitted to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful activities, but countries without nuclear weapons are not permitted to divert those technologies to manufacture nuclear weapons. In 2003, it was determined that Iran had pursued nuclear weapons under the guise of its civilian nuclear program, violating its NPT commitments. Unified international economic sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table, resulting in the Iran Deal, formally termed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015. The Iran deal placed additional limits beyond NPT restrictions, on materials and activities that could be diverted to developing a nuclear weapon, extending the time needed for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon from a few months to roughly a year. This changed when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and Iran announced the following year that it would no longer be bound by the terms of the deal. Lacking the added restrictions of the Iran deal, Iran has begun ramping up domestic nuclear activities, raising fears that they may pursue development of a nuclear weapon. The United States has several policy options available in seeking to forestall such an outcome. This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of several of these options, including economic sanctions, counterproliferation military action, or return to the JCPOA or a similar diplomatic agreement. The return to a cooperative agreement such as the Iran deal, though made challenging by mutual distrust, is assessed to provide the best chance to prevent Iran from resuming a nuclear weapons program.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-206
Author(s):  
Rahmah Kusumayani

Abstract Self defence known as an inherent right that is owned by states to protect its sovereignty from attack by other states. The international rules about self defence do not give any limitation about the type of weapon that can be used by states, including the threat or use of nuclear weapons to act self defence. In Practice, many requirements must be fulfilled by states when they claim the act of self defence. Since 2006, North Korea proclaimed its capability to develop nuclear weapons based on self defence argument. The Security Council concluded that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapon program is a threat to international peace and security and condemned such acts with sanctions based on act 41 UN Charter. The purposes of this study are to examine whether the North Korea’s nuclear program as an act of self defence and the UN Security Council’s sanctions to North Korea are in line with the principle of self defence in international law. The result of this research concludes that North Korea’s nuclear program does not meet the requirements as stated in article 51 UN Charter and customary international law regarding self defence. North Korea can not prove that the United States’ threat is jeopardy, and has a wide and dangerous effect for North Korea. Regarding the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, states must report his act of self defence to the Security Council immediately. As therefore, sanctions given by the Security Council are in line with the principle of self defence since North Korea can not fulfil the requested requirements of self defence. Keywords: Act 51 UN Charter, Korean Nuclear Development, Principle of self defence   Abstrak Hak untuk menerapkan self defence dimiliki oleh tiap negara untuk melindungi kedaulatannya dari serangan negara lain. Peraturan internasional mengenai self defence tidak membatasi jenis senjata yang dapat digunakan oleh negara, termasuk ancaman dan penggunaan senjata nuklir dalam melakukan tindakan self defence. Dalam prakteknya banyak syarat yang harus dipenuhi oleh negara-negara ketika akan mengklaim tindakan self defence. Sejak tahun 2006, Korea Utara mendeklarasikan kesiapannya dalam mengembangkan senjata nuklir dengan alasan self defence. Dewan Keamanan menganggap bahwa program pengembangan senjata nuklir Korea Utara mengancam perdamaian dan keamanan internasional dan berdasarkan Pasal 41 Piagam PBB, Dewan Keamanan memberikan sanksi kepada Korea Utara. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengkaji legalitas pengembangan senjata nuklir di Korea Utara atas tindakan yang diklaim negaranya sebagai self defence serta kesesuaian penerapan sanksi Dewan Keamanan PBB dengan prinsip self defence. Hasil dari penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa program senjata nuklir Korea Utara tidak memenuhi syarat yang terdapat dalam Pasal 51 Piagam PBB maupun hukum kebiasaan internasional terkait self defence. Korea Utara tidak bisa membuktikan bahwa ancaman Amerika Serikat bersifat genting dan nyata menimbulkan efek luas dan berbahaya bagi Korea Utara. Berdasarkan tugas utama Dewan Keamanan dalam menjaga kedamaian dan keamanan internasional, negara-negara harus melaporkan tindakan self defence  kepada Dewan Keamanan dengan segera. Berdasarkan uraian diatas, sanksi yang diberikan Dewan Keamanan tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip self defence karena Korea Utara tidak bisa memenuhi hal-hal yang disyaratkan untuk melakukan tindakan self defence. Kata Kunci: Pasal 51 Piagam PBB, Pengembangan Senjata Nuklir Korea Utara, Prinsip Pembelaan Diri


2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Jumbe ◽  
Adrienne Milner ◽  
Megan Clinch ◽  
Jonathan Kennedy ◽  
Richard J. Pinder ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Over recent years there have been several major terror attacks in cities across Europe. These attacks result in deaths, physical injuries, and pose long-term threats to mental health and wellbeing of large populations. Although psychologists have completed important work on mental health responses to disaster exposure including terrorist attacks, the mental health impacts of such attacks have been comparatively less examined in academic literature than the acute health response to physical injuries. This paper reflects on Southwark Council’s pioneering public mental health response to the June 2017 terror attack at London Bridge and Borough Market. It aims to explore perceptions of the mental health impact of the incident by those living and working in the borough. Methods A rapid qualitative evaluation informed by the logic underpinning Southwark Council’s response was conducted. Seven formative interviews were undertaken with individuals involved in the response planning and/or delivery, enabling the evaluation team to establish the response’s theoretical basis. Subsequently, nineteen semi-structured interviews with consenting Council employees, residents, business owners, and workers from the Borough were conducted to understand perceived mental health impacts of the attack and the success of the Council response. Thematic analysis of transcribed interviews was undertaken to evaluate the extent to which the response was implemented successfully. Results Participants reported feeling the attack had a wide-reaching negative impact on the mental health of residents, those working in the borough and visitors who witnessed the attack. Delivering the response was a challenge and response visibility within the community was limited. Participants suggested a comprehensive systematic approach to health needs assessment informed by knowledge and relationships of key Council workers and community stakeholders is imperative when responding to terrorist incidents. Improved communication and working relationships between statutory organisations and community stakeholders would ensure community groups are better supported. Prioritising mental health needs of terror attack responders to mitigate persisting negative impacts was highlighted. Conclusions This article highlights a potential public health approach and need for developing robust practical guidance in the aftermath of terror attacks. This approach has already influenced the response to the Christchurch mosque shooting in 2019.


Author(s):  
Federico Solla ◽  
Eytan Ellenberg ◽  
Virginie Rampal ◽  
Julien Margaine ◽  
Charles Musoff ◽  
...  

Abstract Objective: To analyze the cost of the terror attack in Nice in a single pediatric institution. Methods: We carried out descriptive analyses of the data coming from the Lenval University Children’s Hospital of Nice database after the July 14, 2016 terror attack. The medical cost for each patient was estimated from the invoice that the hospital sent to public insurance. The indirect costs were calculated from the hospital’s accounting, as the items that were previously absent or the difference between costs in 2016 versus the previous year. Results: The costs total 1.56 million USD, corresponding to 2% of Lenval Hospital’s 2016 annual budget. Direct medical costs represented 9% of the total cost. The indirect costs were related to human resources (overtime, sick leave), revenue shortfall, and security and psychiatric reinforcement. Conclusion: Indirect costs had a greater impact than did direct medical costs. Examining the level and variety of direct and indirect costs will lead to a better understanding of the consequences of terror acts and to improved preparation for future attacks.


2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDERS STRINDBERG

Syria's sharp criticism of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 opened a particularly tense phase in Syrian-American relations, culminating in the May 2004 imposition of U.S. economic sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act. While accusing Damascus of being on the ““wrong side”” in the wars against terror and Iraq, Washington has raised a number of other issues, including Syria's military presence in Lebanon, its support for Hizballah and various Palestinian factions, its alleged ““interference”” in Iraq, and its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction. This report, based on numerous interviews with government officials, analysts, opposition figures, and ordinary citizens, examines Syria's reactions to these allegations, gradual changes in Syrian political culture, and various domestic developments.


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