A Study on the Social Welfare Activities in Buddhism since the Modern Age - Focused on the Social Welfare Corporation -

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 597-623
Author(s):  
Seong-Hee Cho ◽  
Yung-Soon Jung
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Modern Age ◽  
The Social

An Analytical Exposition of the Social Welfare Role of Wealth in Islam

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Bello Dogarawa ◽  
Suleiman Muhammad Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
The Social

scholarly journals Demand Subsidy versus Production Regulation: Development of New Energy Vehicles in a Competitive Environment

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1280
Author(s):  
Zixuan Wang ◽  
Xiuzhang Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Vehicle Market ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

In the competitive market environment, the growth of new energy vehicles (NEVs) faces many obstacles. Demand subsidy or production regulation-related policies are widely used to promote the development of NEVs. A comparative analysis of the effects of the two types of policies on the competitive vehicle market requires further study. To fill this gap, we investigate which type of policy is more preferable from the perspective of the social planner. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game with a welfare-maximizing social planner and two profit-maximizing manufacturers producing NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs), respectively. Interestingly, although both types of policies can increase the quantity of NEVs, demand subsidy also promotes the growth of total vehicles at the same time; in contrast, production regulation reduces the total vehicles. Moreover, compared with the benchmark that no policy intervention, demand subsidy generally improves social welfare, while production regulation improves social welfare only with high consumer preference for NEVs. Nevertheless, production regulation always has a positive impact on the environment, whereas demand subsidy may have a positive impact only when the NEV is very environment friendly. The numerical results show that consumer environmental preferences and the regulation of environmental impact determine which type of policy dominates the other.

scholarly journals Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Commodity Taxation ◽  
Policy Rules ◽  
The Social

Abstract Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.

Local Policy Discretion in Social Welfare: Explaining Subnational Variations in China's De Facto Urban Poverty Line

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Yu Guo ◽  
Alex Jingwei He ◽  
Fei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Intergovernmental Relations ◽  
Urban Poverty ◽  
Poverty Line ◽  
Local Policy ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
The Social ◽  
Developmental Policies ◽  
Policy Arena

Abstract How do subnational agents exercise policy discretion in the social welfare sphere? To what extent do they do so as a result of various bureaucratic and fiscal incentives? The literature has documented several explanatory frameworks in the context of China that predominantly focus on the realm of developmental policies. Owing to the salient characteristics of the social policy arena, local adaptation of centrally designed policies may operate on distinctive logics. This study synthesizes the recent scholarship on subnational social policymaking and explains the significant interregional disparities in China's de facto urban poverty line – the eligibility standard of the urban minimum livelihood guarantee scheme, or dibao. Five research hypotheses are formulated for empirical examination: fiscal power effect, population effect, fiscal dependency effect, province effect and neighbour effect. Quantitative analysis of provincial-level panel data largely endorses the hypotheses. The remarkable subnational variations in dibao standards are explained by a salient constellation of fiscal and political factors that are embedded within the country's complex intergovernmental relations and fiscal arrangements. Both a race-to-the-top and a race-to-the-bottom may be fostered by distinctive mechanisms. The unique role of provincial governments as intermediary agents within China's political apparatus is illuminated in the social policy arena.

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