scholarly journals Assessing the Social Welfare Effects of Government Transfer Programs: Some International Comparisons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nanak Kakwani ◽  
Xiaobing Wang ◽  
Jing Xu ◽  
Ximing Yue
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
International Comparisons ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Transfer Programs ◽  
Government Transfer ◽  
The Social

scholarly journals Cards on the Table: Efficiency and Welfare Effects of the No-Surcharge Rule

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Henriques
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Electronic Payment ◽  
Price Efficiency ◽  
Payment Card ◽  
The Social ◽  
Card Payment

Abstract In Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs), the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this paper, I use a three-party model (consumers, local monopolistic merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes, heterogeneous card use benefits for merchants and network externalities of card-accepting merchants on cardholders to assess the efficiency and welfare effects of the NSR. I show that the NSR: (i) promotes retail price efficiency for cardholders, and (ii) inefficiently reduces card acceptance among merchants. The NSR can enhance social welfare and improve payment efficiency by shifting output from cash payers to cardholders. However, if network externalities are sufficiently strong, the reduction of card payment acceptance affects cardholders negatively and, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse off under the NSR. This paper also suggests that the NSR may be an instrument to decrease cash usage, but the social optimal policy on the NSR may depend on the competitive conditions in each market.

Naked Open-Market Manipulation and Its Effects

2018 ◽  
pp. 199-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merritt B. Fox ◽  
Lawrence R. Glosten ◽  
Gabriel V. Rauterberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Market Manipulation ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Trading Activity ◽  
The Social

More than 80 years after US federal law first addressed stock market manipulation, there is still dispute about manipulation law’s foundational principles; this chapter aims to provide clarity by offering an analytical framework for understanding a specific manipulation. There has been a sharp split among the federal circuits concerning manipulation law’s central question: Can trading activity alone ever be considered illegal manipulation? Economists and legal scholars do not agree on whether manipulation is possible in principle, let alone on how to address it properly in practice. The framework offered by this chapter aims to help clarify federal law and may guide regulators in successfully prosecuting financial law’s most intractable wrong. We draw on the tools of microstructure economics and the theory of the firm to provide an analysis of a particular form of manipulation, identify who is harmed by it, and evaluate the social welfare effects.

scholarly journals Analysis of the Social Welfare Effect of Environmental Regulation Policy Based on a Market Structure Perspective and Consumer

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Lijie Wang ◽  
Jianjun Lu
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Scenario Analysis ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Environmentally Friendly ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Welfare Effect ◽  
Environmental Tax ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government

With the implementation of regulatory policies, some new problems are emerging, such as uneven governance effects, large differences in economic growth, and social welfare inequalities. In order to promote the sustainable development of both the economy and the environment, it is necessary to provide theoretical explanations for the above phenomena. Thus, this paper constructs a theoretical model of social welfare effects based on the Cournot model. Additionally, the scenario analysis method is used to analyze the social welfare effects of environmental control policies from the perspective of market structure and consumer preferences. The findings of the scenario analysis are as follows: (1) the social welfare effect of environmental subsidy policy is greater than the social welfare effect of environmental tax policy when the absolute difference between the external value of environmentally friendly goods and non-environmental goods is less than 7.4 units and (2) the implementation of environmental subsidy policies or environmental tax policies will improve social welfare when the market structure is a completely competitive market and when both of the externalities of environmentally friendly commodities and non-environmental commodities are not the same at intervals (0, 0.335) and (−0.335, 0). We conclude that (1) the government should consider externalities, market powers, and consumer preferences when implementing environmental regulation policies and (2) the government can achieve a trend toward the development of environmentally friendly goods by guiding consumer preferences and harnessing market power.

scholarly journals Estimating the social welfare effects of New Zealand apple imports

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Cook ◽  
Luis R. Carrasco ◽  
Dean R. Paini ◽  
Rob W. Fraser
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
The Social

An Analytical Exposition of the Social Welfare Role of Wealth in Islam

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Bello Dogarawa ◽  
Suleiman Muhammad Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
The Social

scholarly journals Demand Subsidy versus Production Regulation: Development of New Energy Vehicles in a Competitive Environment

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1280
Author(s):  
Zixuan Wang ◽  
Xiuzhang Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Vehicle Market ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

In the competitive market environment, the growth of new energy vehicles (NEVs) faces many obstacles. Demand subsidy or production regulation-related policies are widely used to promote the development of NEVs. A comparative analysis of the effects of the two types of policies on the competitive vehicle market requires further study. To fill this gap, we investigate which type of policy is more preferable from the perspective of the social planner. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game with a welfare-maximizing social planner and two profit-maximizing manufacturers producing NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs), respectively. Interestingly, although both types of policies can increase the quantity of NEVs, demand subsidy also promotes the growth of total vehicles at the same time; in contrast, production regulation reduces the total vehicles. Moreover, compared with the benchmark that no policy intervention, demand subsidy generally improves social welfare, while production regulation improves social welfare only with high consumer preference for NEVs. Nevertheless, production regulation always has a positive impact on the environment, whereas demand subsidy may have a positive impact only when the NEV is very environment friendly. The numerical results show that consumer environmental preferences and the regulation of environmental impact determine which type of policy dominates the other.

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