Public Interest in Merger Control Systems in the EU and US:

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 380-391
Author(s):  
G. Piscitelli
2021 ◽  
pp. 852-870
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter briefly discusses the subject of merger control. Merger control is an important component of most, though not all, systems of competition law. Merger control has been under particular scrutiny in recent years, partly as a result of the rapid development of digital technologies and the emergence of powerful digital platforms. Separately there has been a certain backlash against the trend towards the globalisation of markets, and national governments, as well as the EU, have considered whether controls over the foreign acquisition of key industries are required, and whether the basic test of merger control – would a merger be harmful to competition? – should be supplemented by broader provisions enabling ‘the public interest’ to be taken into account. Against this background, the chapter begins by explaining what is meant by a ‘merger’ or ‘concentration’, the term used by the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). It then proceeds to describe the different effects of mergers between independent firms from within and different production levels, the proliferation of systems of merger control, why firms merge, and the purpose of merger control. The final section of the chapter deals with how to design a system of merger control when a country decides, as a matter of policy, to adopt one.


2021 ◽  
pp. 959-1018
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter discusses UK law on the control of mergers. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the domestic system of merger control. Section 3 explains the procedure of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) when determining whether a merger should be referred for an in-depth ‘Phase 2’ investigation and when deciding to accept ‘undertakings in lieu’ of a reference. Section 4 describes how Phase 2 investigations are conducted and Section 5 discusses the ‘substantially lessening competition’ (‘SLC’) test. Section 6 explains the enforcement powers in the Enterprise Act 2002, including the remedies that the CMA can impose in merger cases. The subsequent sections discuss various supplementary matters, such as powers of investigation and enforcement. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the merger control provisions work in practice and a brief account of the provisions on public interest cases, other special cases and mergers in the water industry. The withdrawal by the UK from the EU means that many mergers that were subject to a ‘one-stop shop’ under EU law are now subject to investigation in the UK as well.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Jenichen

AbstractIt is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to confirm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political language and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents, produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analysis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discursive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-92
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Mary Wilks

AbstractOn 9 July 2014, the European Commission (the Commission) published its White Paper “Towards more effective EU merger control”, which reviewed the operation of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) ten years after the introduction of the substantive test of “significant impediment to substantial competition” (SIEC) and proposed certain specific improvements, including the review of non-controlling minority interests under the EUMR. The 2014 White Paper followed approximately one year of consultation with Member States and interested parties, and was accompanied by a Staff Working Document, which analyses in more detail the considerations underlying the policy proposals in the 2014 White Paper, and an Impact Assessment, which analyses the potential benefits and costs of the various policy options considered.Less than six months after the consultation on the 2014 White Paper closed, Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager indicated that the Commission is reconsidering its proposals to allow it to review the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings under the EUMR. This decision has been welcomed by many in the business and legal community as the “targeted transparency system” proposed by the Commission had raised a number of concerns regarding proportionality, legal certainty, cost and administrative burden.Whilst we await the Commission’s next move, this article considers whether non-controlling minority shareholdings should be subject to EU merger control and the extent to which the Commission’s originally envisaged system adequately dealt with the issues it sought to address. This article also proposes a number of principles that the authors suggest should be taken into account when designing a balanced system of merger review for acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings in which the burden of the additional review is proportionate to the goals pursued.


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