PVBP: Parity Vector of Bargaining Power

ABSTRACT We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-à-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced risk premium (we label this a “risk transfer”), whereas the principal internalizes both managers' incremental risk premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers' incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. The optimal PPS, thus, trades off investment and effort incentives.

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Conclusion

10.1093/oso/9780190697518.003.0005 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Roberts Cynthia ◽

Leslie Armijo ◽

Saori Katada

Keyword(s):

Economic Growth ◽

South Africa ◽

Bargaining Power ◽

Global Finance ◽

Middle Income ◽

Outside Options ◽

Power Shift ◽

Global Power ◽

Common Interests ◽

Sustainable Economic Growth

The chapter analyzes the prospects for continued BRICS collective financial statecraft. Contrary to initial expectations, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have hung together by identifying common aversions and pursuing common interests within the existing international order. Their future depends not only on their bargaining power, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions. To continue successfully with collective financial statecraft, the members must tackle the so-called middle-income trap, as well as their preferences for informal rules originating from their own institutional weaknesses or regime preferences. This study shows that, in the context of a global power shift, the BRICS club has operated to protect the member countries’ respective policy autonomy, while also advancing their joint voice in global governance. Recently, the BRICS have made concrete institutional gains, giving them expanded outside options to achieve specific objectives in global finance.

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