To Wait or to Pay for Medical Treatment? Restraining Ex-Post Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Author(s):  
Stefan Felder
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekaterina A. Alexsandrova ◽  

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chan Wook Jung ◽  
Sojung Carol Park

Abstract The supply-side contribution to the surge of medical expense is overlooked in the Korean health insurance market. Commonly, the demand-side is accounted for the excessive increase in medical consumption. Previous studies suggest the moral hazard or adverse selection of Fee-For-Service Health Insurance (FFS) policyholders as the source of the problem. However, this paper focuses on the moral hazard of medical institutions using Korea Health Panel (KHP) Data version 1.5 from year 2008–2016. This study finds the medical usage difference between FFS holders and non-holders were greater for clinics and local hospital visits than the visits to general hospitals or special hospitals. This implies that supply-side contributes to the ex-post moral hazard of health insurance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 100031
Author(s):  
Seyed Alireza Otobideh ◽  
Hasan Yusefzadeh ◽  
Siamak Aghlmand ◽  
Cyrus Alinia

Author(s):  
Indranil Chakraborty ◽  
Fahad Khalil ◽  
Jacques Lawarree

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