CEO Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Investigation

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Young Sang Kim ◽  
Wallace N. Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Shareholder Rights

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

2005 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Young Sang Kim ◽  
Wallace N. Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Shareholder Rights

scholarly journals Corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from Canadian capital markets

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parveen Gupta ◽  
Duane Kennedy ◽  
Samuel Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Composite Scores ◽  
Governance Disclosure

The Globe and Mail’s Report on Business annually publishes governance rankings for more than 200 companies represented in the TSX/S&P index. There are four sub-categories that comprise the composite scores: board composition; board and CEO compensation; shareholder rights; and board governance disclosure. The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between the composite or sub-category corporate governance scores and various measures of firm value. We test for this association using data for 2002 through 2005 on the Report on Business rankings and various financial and market measures. Overall, our study does not find an association between the composite or subcategory corporate governance scores and the various measures of firm value.

Changing National Business Systems: Corporate Governance and Financing in the Netherlands, 1945–2005

2010 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abe de Jong ◽  
Ailsa Röell ◽  
Gerarda Westerhuis
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Business Systems ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Corporate System ◽  
National Business Systems ◽  
National Business

This study traces the evolution of corporate governance and financing structures in the Netherlands during the second half of the twentieth century. A description of Dutch shareholder rights, fi nancing structures, and networks of directors reveals the changes that have occurred in many aspects of the Dutch corporate system over the course of six decades. The case of Royal Ahold illustrates some of the developments that have taken place. Most indicate a transition from a coordinated market economy to a more liberal system. The internationalization of the Dutch economy, which has played an important role in the transition of the system, is reflected in the expansion of Dutch firms beyond the national borders and in the growing number of foreign investors in Dutch fi rms.

scholarly journals Can compensation committees effectively mitigate the CEO horizon problem? The role of co-opted directors

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Ruonan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Accruals Management ◽  
Compensation Committees

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

scholarly journals TATA KELOLA, KOMPENSASI CEO, KARAKTERISTIK CEO, ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES DAN TAX AGGRESSIVENESS

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Ririn Juliawaty ◽  
Christina Dwi Astuti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Analysis Model ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Positive Effect

<p><em>The purpose of this research is</em><em> </em><em>to examine the effect of corporate governance, CEO characteristic, CEO compensation, and accounting irregularities on tax aggressiveness. The dependent variable in this research is tax aggressiveness, while the independent variable in this research are corporate governance, characteristic CEO and CEO compensation</em><em>.</em></p><p><em>This study used secondary data with entire population manufacture companies listed at the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for 2015 -2017. The research sample are consists of 37 companies. The sampling method used to determine the sample is purposive sampling. The analysis model used in this research is multiple regression of panel data.</em><em></em></p><p><em>Based on analytical results concluded that independent director have a significant and negative effect on tax aggressiveness while accounting irregularities has a significant and positive effect on tax aggressiveness. The board size, CEO compensation, age, and CEO tenure have no significant effect on tax aggressiveness. </em></p>

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