scholarly journals Bilateral Market Power and Vertical Integration in the Spanish Electricity Spot Market

Author(s):  
Kai-Uwe Kuhn ◽  
Matilde Pinto Machado
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza de Braganca

<p>This thesis proposes a new framework to jointly analyze electricity spot market and hedging decisions in an oligopolistic setup. Firstly, we find that, when exogenous, both quantity of electricity hedged by contract and vertical integration decrease the equilibrium spot price. Secondly, we use a hybrid approach and show that market structure can affect a generator’s decision to vertically integrate under uncertain demand. Thirdly, we consider uncertainty in costs and demand and show that concentration in the spot market, for a given hedge quantum, can increase forward prices and affect the slope of the forward curve. Our empirical results indicate that the model fits the New Zealand electricity market well. This evidence that market structure and hedging decisions are closely connected is further explored in a three period equilibrium model for the spot and forward markets, where hedging occurs prior to the submission of supply curves. Taking into account demand-side and supply-side uncertainties, we find that when hedging is endogenous, hedging quantities are affected by spot market parameters, but market power is itself mitigated in the conscious hedging choice of generators. We also show that forward markets can coexist with highly vertically integrated markets. The importance of our results is general. Our models can be used by policy makers to analyze investment and forward price implications of changes in the spot market structure. Our results also indicate that electricity generators, in equilibrium, face a trade-off between market power and hedging. Given that it is socially beneficial to manage risk, the equilibrium impact of their choices on welfare should not be considered in isolation by competition authorities.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Qian Sun ◽  
Yuting Xie ◽  
Xiuzhen Hu ◽  
En Lu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
...  

The identification of generating units that abuse market power is an essential part of risk prevention in a spot market, especially in the early stage of the construction of the spot market. In this study, a model for identifying generating units that abuse market power is designed based on the AdaBoost-DT algorithm. It is targeted at the imbalance between samples of generating units that abuse market power and normal generating units in the spot market. First, the four main methods by which market power is abused by generating units in the spot market are described: collusion, economic withholding, physical withholding, and extreme quotation. Second, the specific characteristics of the four methods are analyzed, and the identification indexes for generating units that abuse market power are established. Thereafter, a sample set of generating units that abuse market power using different methods is constructed. Furthermore, a training set is formed with samples of normal generating units to construct a model based on the AdaBoost-DT algorithm, for identifying generating units that abuse market power. Finally, the spot market data of a certain region are used for an example analysis. The results show that the accuracy of model identification is 97%, which validates the method.


2020 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 01017
Author(s):  
Sen Wang ◽  
Can Sun ◽  
Zhiyong Gan ◽  
Liansheng Zhou ◽  
Guilin Wang ◽  
...  

With the development of China’s electricity spot market, planned power and market power will coexist for a long time. At the same time, by avoiding the risk of market price fluctuation through medium and long-term market, spot market guarantees electricity balance and secure operation of the grid. The electricity market mechanism has an increasingly large influence on the operation and dispatching model of power system. In spot market, decoupling operation model of market and non-market power has a large influence on both supply and demand sides and improper dredging mechanism may cause significant settlement deviation. To solve this problem, the paper, taking a city in northern China as an example, analyzes the electricity spot market, compares the sources of difference fund of market and non-market power under decoupling and non-decoupling models and compares the pros and cons of coupling and decoupling. The paper also studies the disparity of difference fund and proposes advice adapted to the electricity spot market development of northern China.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza de Braganca

<p>This thesis proposes a new framework to jointly analyze electricity spot market and hedging decisions in an oligopolistic setup. Firstly, we find that, when exogenous, both quantity of electricity hedged by contract and vertical integration decrease the equilibrium spot price. Secondly, we use a hybrid approach and show that market structure can affect a generator’s decision to vertically integrate under uncertain demand. Thirdly, we consider uncertainty in costs and demand and show that concentration in the spot market, for a given hedge quantum, can increase forward prices and affect the slope of the forward curve. Our empirical results indicate that the model fits the New Zealand electricity market well. This evidence that market structure and hedging decisions are closely connected is further explored in a three period equilibrium model for the spot and forward markets, where hedging occurs prior to the submission of supply curves. Taking into account demand-side and supply-side uncertainties, we find that when hedging is endogenous, hedging quantities are affected by spot market parameters, but market power is itself mitigated in the conscious hedging choice of generators. We also show that forward markets can coexist with highly vertically integrated markets. The importance of our results is general. Our models can be used by policy makers to analyze investment and forward price implications of changes in the spot market structure. Our results also indicate that electricity generators, in equilibrium, face a trade-off between market power and hedging. Given that it is socially beneficial to manage risk, the equilibrium impact of their choices on welfare should not be considered in isolation by competition authorities.</p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 11-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza de Bragança ◽  
Toby Daglish

2021 ◽  
Vol 687 (1) ◽  
pp. 012090
Author(s):  
Dunnan Liu ◽  
Tingting Zhang ◽  
Yuan Gao ◽  
Hua Li ◽  
Mingguang Liu ◽  
...  

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