Voting Models, Corporate Elections and Takeover Bids

Author(s):  
Paul H. Edelman ◽  
Randall S. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
James F. Adams

This chapter broadly surveys spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions, where, in Western democracies, the first dimension is typically the left-right dimension pertaining to policy debates over income redistribution and government intervention in the economy. The second dimension may encompass policy debates over issues that cross-cut the left-right economic dimension, or it may encompass universally valued “valence” dimensions of party evaluation such as parties’ images for competence, integrity, and leadership ability. The chapter reviews models with office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. It also surveys both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on these topics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 353-362
Author(s):  
Marieke Wyckaert

This paper explores takeover bids in Europe in times of the COVID-19 pandemic. The search for a balance between maintaining the open market as a European achievement and the protection of national security and public order is not a new phenomenon. This search is not easy with the future FDI Regulation and will raise additional questions.The FDI Regulation became very concrete thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic: At the beginning of the crisis, the Commission presented a Communication setting out guidelines for FDI to be applied prior to the regulation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Mach ◽  
Gerhard Schnyder ◽  
Thomas David ◽  
Martin Lupold

Switzerland was for a very long time characterised by a strong tradition of self-regulation by private actors in the economic sphere rather than by an extensive and detailed legal framework. This is particularly true in the field of corporate governance and more precisely visible in the Stock Corporation Law, the supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to very lax legal rules, mechanisms of "private governance" complemented the minimal legal framework in these three fields. Over the last twenty or so years, these mechanisms of self-regulation have nonetheless undergone profound change. In fact, private self-regulation has been incrementally formalised and replaced by more specific public regulations in five important fields: the transferability of shares, proxy-voting by banks, takeover bids, supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to changes in the international context, to the shifting preferences of important economic actors, and to the emergence of new actors (institutional investors and accountants), the legal framework of Swiss corporate governance has been reformed in a significant way.


1975 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent E. McHale ◽  
Richard D. Partch
Keyword(s):  

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
KEES AARTS ◽  
STUART ELAINE MACDONALD ◽  
GEORGE RABINOWITZ

The Netherlands represents the prototypic case of a consociational democracy; in addition, the Dutch system has an extremely low threshold for obtaining representation in the legislature, making it open to challengers of any political persuasion. This article has two explicit goals: to compare two models of issue-based party choice, the directional and proximity models; and to understand the changing nature of electoral competition in the Netherlands. The article's analytic focus is the elections of 1971, 1986, and 1994. These elections, the only ones for which appropriate data are available for testing the issue theories, represent important points in the historical sequence. Tests of the alternate issue voting models generally favor directional over proximity theory. The broader analysis suggests substantial change in Dutch politics, away from the tight structuring of subcultural allegiances to a more politically homogeneous culture in which party strength appears rather fluid.


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