Managerial Delegation with Quality Differentiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kangsik Choi
Keyword(s):  
Quality Differentiation ◽  
Managerial Delegation

scholarly journals Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-275
Author(s):  
Ufuk Akcigit ◽  
Harun Alp ◽  
Michael Peters
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Firm Growth ◽  
Firm Dynamics ◽  
Fixed Time ◽  
The United States ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Poor Countries ◽  
Managerial Practices ◽  
Managerial Delegation

Delegating managerial tasks is essential for firm growth. Most firms in developing countries, however, do not hire outside managers but instead rely on family members. In this paper, we ask if this lack of managerial delegation can explain why firms in poor countries are small and whether it has important aggregate consequences. We construct a model of firm growth where entrepreneurs have a fixed time endowment to run their daily operations. As firms grow large, the need to hire outside managers increases. Firms’ willingness to expand therefore depends on the ease with which delegation can take place. We calibrate the model to plant-level data from the United States and India. We identify the key parameters of our theory by targeting the experimental evidence on the effect of managerial practices on firm performance from Bloom et al. (2013). We find that inefficiencies in the delegation environment account for 11 percent of the income per capita difference between the United States and India. They also contribute to the small size of Indian producers, but would cause substantially more harm for US firms. The reason is that US firms are larger on average and managerial delegation is especially valuable for large firms, thus making delegation efficiency and other factors affecting firm growth complements. (JEL D22, G32, L25, L26, O14)

Different Aspects of Translation Revision Process

2021 ◽  
pp. 107-126
Author(s):  
V. V. Sdobnikov
Keyword(s):  
Professional Competence ◽  
Translation Process ◽  
Revision Process ◽  
Quality Differentiation ◽  
Translation Quality ◽  
Translation Practice ◽  
Text Content ◽  
Better Than

Translation revision is an integral part of the overall translation process and aims to enhance the translation quality. Differentiation should be made between revision (editing) and proofreading. Special attention is paid to functions performed by a reviser, i.e. actions aiming at producing the text devoid of any defects. The research is topical because an attempt is made to develop a general approach to translation revision which so far is lacking in translation practice. The article reveals the results of an experiment in which the same text has been revised by seven professional revisers. It is concluded that a reviser can enhance the translation quality provided his / her professional competence is better than that of the translator. But still the translated text can have weaknesses missed by the reviser. Moreover, it is found that thorough revision and rewriting of the text not always make it ideal; in some cases, the quality can suffer due to the false interpretation of the text content by the reviser. The research is innovative because it identifies subjective approaches of revisers to translation revision.

Relational Contracts and Managerial Delegation: Evidence from Foreign Entrepreneurs in Russia

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 628-648
Author(s):  
Elena Kulchina ◽  
Joanne Oxley
Keyword(s):  
Local Market ◽  
Entrepreneurial Firms ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Industry Growth ◽  
Relational Contract ◽  
Local Product ◽  
Managerial Delegation ◽  
Court Proceedings ◽  
Soviet Russia ◽  
Foreign Entrepreneurs

We examine the managerial delegation decisions of foreign entrepreneurs and assess how these decisions are shaped by characteristics of the local product and labor market environment. We argue that actual or perceived home bias in court proceedings leads foreign entrepreneurs to place little reliance on formal contracts in their dealings with local agent-managers. Adopting the lens of relational contract theory, we develop hypotheses linking managerial delegation decisions to market conditions associated with stable self-enforcing agreements and test the hypotheses in the context of post-Soviet Russia. Consistent with our arguments, we find that foreign entrepreneurs are more likely to hire an agent-manager in local markets where industry growth creates a substantial “shadow of the future,” where managers’ outside employment options are relatively limited, and where competition and the variability of returns are not so high as to induce defection from an informal agreement. Similar observations on a sample of Russian-owned entrepreneurial firms suggest that these delegation decisions are relatively insensitive to local market conditions but that they are influenced by the density of local reputation networks. Our study thus contributes to understanding of the distinctive features of foreign entrepreneurs’ managerial delegation decisions and reinforces the view that contracting impediments constitute one important aspect of the “liability of foreignness” for entrepreneurial firms.

Quality differentiation in a dual-channel supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 290 (3) ◽  
pp. 1000-1013
Author(s):  
Zhe Zhang ◽  
Huaming Song ◽  
Victor Shi ◽  
Shilei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Differentiation ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Managerial Delegation Contracts, “Green” R&D and Emissions Taxation

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Poyago-Theotoky ◽  
Soo Keong Yong
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Emissions Tax ◽  
Managerial Delegation ◽  
Sales Compensation ◽  
Firm Owners

Abstract We introduce an explicit environmental incentive into a managerial compensation contract in the context of a Cournot duopoly with pollution externalities under an emissions tax regime. We show that, depending on the effectiveness of “green” R&D, compared to a standard sales compensation contract, the explicit environmental focused contract results in more abatement. As a consequence, the regulator sets a lower emissions tax, and social welfare is higher. Moreover, in general, firm owners earn higher profits when adopting the environmental delegation contract.

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