scholarly journals Central Bank Financial Independence

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Ramon Martinez Resano
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Independence

scholarly journals Financial Independence of Central Bank through the Balance Sheet Prism

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Ivanović
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Financial Independence ◽  
Balance Sheets ◽  
Financial Strength ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

Abstract The main reason for central bank independence lies in the fact that it is necessary to clearly distinguish spending money from the ability of making money. Independence of central banks is now a characteristic of almost all developed and highly industrialized countries. In this respect, it represents an essential part of the overall economic reality of these countries. Over the past decade or somewhat earlier, the issue of importance of central bank independence has been raised in developing countries, making the institutional, functional, personal and financial independence of central banks current topics for consideration. The key reason for the growing attention to financial independence of central banks is due to the effects of the global financial crisis on their balance sheets and therefore the challenges related to achieving the basic goals of the functioning of central banks - financial stability and price stability. Financial strength and independence of central banks must be developed relative to the policy and tasks that are carried out and risks they face in carrying out of these tasks. Financial independence represents a key base for credibility of a central bank. On one hand, the degree of credibility is associated with the ability of central banks to carry out their tasks without external financial assistance. In order to enhance the credibility of central bank in this regard, it must have sufficient financial strength to absorb potential losses and that power must be continuously strengthened by increasing capital and rearranging profit allocation arrangements. This is particularly important in times of crisis.

scholarly journals Non-Neutrality of Open-Market Operations

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno ◽  
Salvatore Nisticò
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Financial Independence ◽  
Wealth Transfer ◽  
Political Constraints

We analyze the effects on inflation and output of unconventional open-market operations due to the possible income losses on the central bank’s balance sheet. We first state a general Neutrality Property, and characterize the theoretical conditions supporting it. We then discuss three non-neutrality cases. First, with no treasury’s support, sizeable (current or expected) balance sheet losses can undermine the central bank’s solvency and should be resolved through an increase in inflation. Second, a central bank might also engineer higher inflation in the case it wants to limit or reduce losses because of political constraints or to seek more financial independence. Third, if the treasury is unable or unwilling to tax households to cover the central bank’s losses, the wealth transfer to the private sector also leads to higher inflation. (JEL E23, E31, E52, E58)

scholarly journals A New Insight into the Measurement of Central Bank Independence

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Fouad Jasmine ◽  
E. Fayed Mona ◽  
A. Emam Heba Talla
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Government Accountability ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Financial Independence ◽  
Vulnerability Indicator ◽  
Two Indices ◽  
Monetary Policy Reaction Function ◽  
New Variables ◽  
Almost All

Abstract The present paper attempts to expand the existing literature on Central Bank Independence (CBI) by proposing new measures for CBI. It designs two indices: one tackling the de jure CBI and the other assessing the de facto level of CBI. The two measures outweigh traditional measures in various aspects; first, the two indices are more comprehensive in terms of possible institutional arrangements. The de jure index incorporates several aspects related to CBI that were not previously grouped together in a unified index i.e. financial independence, limitations related to indirect credit to government, accountability and transparency. The de facto index comprises the main existing indicators for measuring actual CBI (i.e. turnover ratio, political vulnerability indicator and monetary policy reaction function) in addition to new variables, as the lender of last resort function, independence of central bank board, and financial independence that were not included in almost all previous studies. Second, the two indices allow a higher level of precision as they comprise aspects that can be objectively codified with a minimum level of subjectivity. Third, the two indices cover the same attributes of CBI to facilitate measuring the deviation between de jure and de facto level of independence for any central bank. The current paper provides a comprehensive definition and analysis of both indices to enable their replication in future studies.

scholarly journals A Central Bank Theory of Price Level Determination

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-283
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Price Level ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Financial Independence ◽  
The Interest Rate

This paper develops a theory in which the central bank can control the price level without fiscal backing. It is shown that the remittances policy and the balance sheet of the central bank are important elements to specify. A central bank that is appropriately capitalized can succeed in controlling prices by setting the interest rate on reserves, holding short-term assets, and rebating its income to the treasury from which it has to maintain financial independence. (JEL E31, E52, E58)

Was für eine Europäische Verfassung?

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (139) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Étienne Balibar
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
European Constitution ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
European Central

The problem of a European Constitution is discussed at a fundamental level. In which way, can we speak about such a Constitution? Thearticle argues against the “postnational souveranism”, legitimating state against citizens. A new kind of citizenship is favoured based on extended social rights. The constitution now proposed contrarily makes the European Central Bank and its neoliberal policy to central and nearly unchangeable institution.

Conditions for the Hi-tech Complex Development

2003 ◽  
pp. 26-39
Author(s):  
V. Maevsky ◽  
B. Kuzyk
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Industrial Society ◽  
Monetary Base ◽  
Complex Development ◽  
Bank System ◽  
Post Industrial

A project for the long-term strategy of Russian break-through into post-industrial society is suggested which is directed at transformation of the hi-tech complex into the leading factor of economic development. The thesis is substantiated that there is an opportunity to realize such a strategy in case Russia shifts towards the mechanism of the monetary base growth generally accepted in developed countries: the Central Bank increases the quantity of "strong" money by means of purchasing state securities and allocates the increment of money in question according to budget priorities. At the same time for the realization of the said strategy it is necessary to partially restore savings lost during the hyperinflation period of 1992-1994 and default of 1998 and to secure development of the bank system as well as an increase of the volume of long-term credits on this base.

The end of Alchemy of Finance and Sovereign Money (on the books by M. King “The end of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global Economy” and by J. Huber “Sovereign Money. Beyond Reserve Banking”)

2017 ◽  
pp. 131-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Yefimov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Money Supply ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Private Banks ◽  
Money Creation ◽  
Ministry Of Finance ◽  
Reserve Banking

The review discusses the institutional theory of money considered in the books by King and Huber, and the conclusions that follow from it for economic policy. In accordance with this theory, at present the most of the money supply is created not by the Central Bank but by private banks. When a bank issues a loan, new money is created, and when the loan is repaid this money is destructed. The concept of sovereign money involves the monopoly of money creation of the central bank. In this case the most of newly created money is handed over to the ministry of finance to implement government spending.

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