scholarly journals Non-Neutrality of Open-Market Operations

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno ◽  
Salvatore Nisticò

We analyze the effects on inflation and output of unconventional open-market operations due to the possible income losses on the central bank’s balance sheet. We first state a general Neutrality Property, and characterize the theoretical conditions supporting it. We then discuss three non-neutrality cases. First, with no treasury’s support, sizeable (current or expected) balance sheet losses can undermine the central bank’s solvency and should be resolved through an increase in inflation. Second, a central bank might also engineer higher inflation in the case it wants to limit or reduce losses because of political constraints or to seek more financial independence. Third, if the treasury is unable or unwilling to tax households to cover the central bank’s losses, the wealth transfer to the private sector also leads to higher inflation. (JEL E23, E31, E52, E58)

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Ivanović

Abstract The main reason for central bank independence lies in the fact that it is necessary to clearly distinguish spending money from the ability of making money. Independence of central banks is now a characteristic of almost all developed and highly industrialized countries. In this respect, it represents an essential part of the overall economic reality of these countries. Over the past decade or somewhat earlier, the issue of importance of central bank independence has been raised in developing countries, making the institutional, functional, personal and financial independence of central banks current topics for consideration. The key reason for the growing attention to financial independence of central banks is due to the effects of the global financial crisis on their balance sheets and therefore the challenges related to achieving the basic goals of the functioning of central banks - financial stability and price stability. Financial strength and independence of central banks must be developed relative to the policy and tasks that are carried out and risks they face in carrying out of these tasks. Financial independence represents a key base for credibility of a central bank. On one hand, the degree of credibility is associated with the ability of central banks to carry out their tasks without external financial assistance. In order to enhance the credibility of central bank in this regard, it must have sufficient financial strength to absorb potential losses and that power must be continuously strengthened by increasing capital and rearranging profit allocation arrangements. This is particularly important in times of crisis.


Author(s):  
Irena Pyka ◽  
Aleksandra Nocoń

Due to the implementation of non-standard monetary policy by the European Central Bank, concentrated in the first part of the financial crisis mainly on the unconventional open market operations, and in the second on the Quantitative Easing policy, the exit strategies and monetary policy normalization have become the subject of intensified discussion. The concept of a return to "normal" monetary policy of the ECB will require the implementation of two aspects: raising of interest rates and reduction of the size of central bank balance sheet. However, it is undisputed that the exit strategies of the ECB could be implemented only after completing of the asset purchase program and stabilization of euro area public finances. It seems that at this moment the monetary policy of Eurozone will have to wait. The main aim of the study is to identify the determinants of the monetary policy normalization of the European Central Bank. Particular attention will be paid to the conditions of normalization relating to the support for creation of economic recovery in the euro area, the increase of inflation towards the inflation target, stimulation of dynamics of lending activity and the situation on the financial market. The following research methods will be used: the literature studies, including domestic and foreign literature, case studies, cause and effect analysis, observation analysis as well as synthesis analysis. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-283
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno

This paper develops a theory in which the central bank can control the price level without fiscal backing. It is shown that the remittances policy and the balance sheet of the central bank are important elements to specify. A central bank that is appropriately capitalized can succeed in controlling prices by setting the interest rate on reserves, holding short-term assets, and rebating its income to the treasury from which it has to maintain financial independence. (JEL E31, E52, E58)


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Roger E. A. Farmer ◽  
Pawel Zabczyk

This paper is about the effectiveness of qualitative easing, a form of unconventional monetary policy that changes the risk composition of the central bank balance sheet. We construct a general equilibrium model where agents have rational expectations, and there is a complete set of financial securities, but where some agents are unable to participate in financial markets. We show that a change in the risk composition of the central bank’s balance sheet affects equilibrium asset prices and economic activity. We prove that, in our model, a policy in which the central bank stabilizes non-fundamental fluctuations in the stock market is self-financing and leads to a Pareto efficient outcome.


2021 ◽  
pp. 329-342
Author(s):  
David Stockman

We are now far advanced into the third central bank generated bub-ble of the last two decades, but our monetary politburo has taken no notice whatsoever of its self-evident leading wave. Namely, the massive malinvestments and debt mania in the shale patch. Call them monetary bourbons. It is no exaggeration to say that inhabitants of the Eccles Building deserve every single word of Talleyrand’s famous epithet: «They learned nothing and forgot nothing». To wit, during the last cycle they claimed to be fostering the Great Moderation and permanent full employment prosperity. It didn’t work. When the housing and credit bubble blew-up, it washed out all the phony gains from the Greenspan/Bernanke printing spree. By the time the liquidation was finished in early 2010, there were 2 million fewer payroll jobs than there had been at the turn of the century. Never mind. The Fed simply doubled-down. Instead of expand-ing its balance sheet by 50%, as happened during the eight years between 2000 and 2008, it went into monetary warp drive, balloon-ing its made-from-thin-air liabilities by 5X in only six years.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document