On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friedman ◽  
Jean Paul Rabanal ◽  
Olga Rud ◽  
Shuchen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Correlated Equilibrium

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

scholarly journals Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell

2017 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-468
Author(s):  
Rabah Amir ◽  
Sergei Belkov ◽  
Igor V. Evstigneev
Keyword(s):  
Correlated Equilibrium

A SECURE REVERSION PROTOCOL THAT GENERATES PAY-OFFS DOMINATING REWARDS FROM CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (06) ◽  
pp. 887-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
CEDRIC WANKO
Keyword(s):  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Averse

We define the reversion protocol of a voluntarily implementable Bayesian mechanism in which risk-averse players have no incentive to cheat or to deviate from the mediator's recommendation and that can greatly improve their equilibrium expected pay-offs as compared to those generated through coordination applied to the results of an unsatisfactory mediation.

Convention as correlated equilibrium

Erkenntnis ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Correlated Equilibrium
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