Hide and Protect: The Role of Global Financial Secrecy in Shaping Domestic Institutions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova ◽  
Michael Lokshin
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Financial Secrecy

The Influence of the Two Covenants on States Parties Across Regions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Besson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
The Third ◽  
International Human ◽  
Domestic Influence ◽  
Domestic Law

As a companion to the five regional reports in this volume, this chapter’s aim is a double one: first, to bring the comparison up to the regional level, and second, to analyse the international and domestic institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that affect how international human rights instruments influence domestic law. The chapter is therefore both a study in comparative international human rights law and a contribution to its methodology. Its structure is four-pronged. The first section clarifies the aim, object, and method of the comparison. The second section presents a comparative assessment of the Covenants’ domestic influence across regions and develops a grid of comparative analysis. The third section addresses the authority of the Committees’ interpretations of the Covenants, relying on a bottom-up comparative law argument. The fourth section discusses the role of human rights comparison and of regional human rights law in enhancing the legitimacy of the Committees’ future interpretations.

Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 914-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongryn Mo
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Foreign Country ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
International Bargaining ◽  
Informational Effect

Putnam's (1988) conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent. I show that a negotiator's decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent. When the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator's preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent, the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent. However, this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences, and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power. The attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect. By granting veto power to an agent, the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto.

The Threat of Communism during the Cold War: A Constraint to Income Inequality?

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-393
Author(s):  
Andŕe Albuquerque Sant' Anna ◽  
Leonardo Weller
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Income Distribution ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Income Redistribution ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
The World ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Empirical Contribution

Did the threat of communism influence income distribution in developed capitalist economies during the Cold War? This article addresses this question by testing whether income inequality in OECD countries was related to events linked to the spread of communism—revolutions and Soviet interventions—around the world. We argue that the threat of the spread of communism acted as an incentive for the elites and governments to keep economic inequality low. This article provides an empirical contribution to the recent literature on inequality, which highlights the role of domestic institutions but ignores the role of the Cold War in redistributing income. We find a robust relationship between income inequality and the distance to communist events. The results, reinforced by cases studied, suggest that the spread of communism fostered income redistribution deals between domestic elites and workers. Finally, we show that these effects were reinforced by strong unions and the presence of strong communist parties.

19. Policy-Making in a Time of Crisis Trends and Challenges

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Pollack ◽  
Helen Wallace ◽  
Alasdair R. Young
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
European Union Policy ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Policy ◽  
Union Policy ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines trends and challenges in European Union policy-making during times of crisis. It first considers the main trends in EU policy-making that emerge from policy case studies, including experimentation with new modes of policy-making, often in conjunction with more established modes, leading to hybridization; renegotiation of the role of the member states (and their domestic institutions) in the EU policy process; and erosion of traditional boundaries between internal and external policies. The chapter proceeds by discussing the issue of national governance as well as the interaction between European and global governance. Finally, it explores how the EU has responded to the challenges of coping with enlargement from fifteen to twenty-eight member states, digesting the reforms adopted following the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, and responding to the economic dislocation associated with the global financial crisis.

The Role of Domestic Institutions

2018 ◽  
pp. 113-151
Author(s):  
Anca M. Voicu ◽  
Somnath Sen ◽  
Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Institutions
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