scholarly journals Labor Market Signaling and the Value of College: Evidence from Resumes and the Truth

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kreisman ◽  
Jonathan Smith ◽  
Bondi Arifin
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Signaling

scholarly journals Labor Market Signaling and the Value of College: Evidence from Resumes and the Truth

2021 ◽  
pp. 0119-9979R2
Author(s):  
Daniel Kreisman ◽  
Jonathan Smith ◽  
Bondi Arifin
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Signaling

scholarly journals Estimating the Labor Market Signaling Value of the GED

2000 ◽  
Vol 115 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Tyler ◽  
R. J. Murnane ◽  
J. B. Willett
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Signaling

scholarly journals Estimating the Labor Market Signaling Value of the GED

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Tyler ◽  
Richard J. Murnane ◽  
John B. Willett
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Signaling

Why do firms utilize the flexibility allowed in CEO-employee pay ratio disclosure? Evidence from Dodd-Frank Act Section 953 (b)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sun Moon Jung ◽  
Natalie Kyung Won Kim ◽  
Han Seong Ryu ◽  
Jae Yong Shin
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ratio Calculation ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Ratio Data ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Market Signaling

Section 953 (b) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires all listed firms to disclose a CEO-employee pay ratio. Firms are given the flexibility to use permitted discretions in their required pay ratio calculation and to disclose a supplementary pay ratio if necessary. We explore this unique regulatory setting and analyze the CEO-employee pay ratio data of S&P 1500 firms with fiscal year ends from December 31, 2017, through December 31, 2018. We find that both informational and opportunistic motives affect firms' supplementary pay ratio disclosure, while informational motives appear to dominate firms' use of permitted discretions. Firms consider political costs when using permitted discretions and disclosing a supplementary pay ratio. Firms with labor market signaling incentives disclose a supplementary pay ratio that is higher than the required pay ratio. The supplementary pay ratio, when issued, captures a firm's economic pay disparity better than the required pay ratio and is positively associated with subsequent firm performance.

The Labor Market Signaling Value of Promotions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bobak Moallemi ◽  
Ramana Ramakrishnan ◽  
Ryan Shyu
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Signaling

scholarly journals Institutional Origin: Labor Market Signaling in Higher Education

1984 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean C. Wyer ◽  
Clifton F. Conrad
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Signaling

The dual avenues of labor market signaling

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 120-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Waldman
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Signaling
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document