Indian Country’s Voice: Recognizing, Respecting and Protecting Our Electoral Power

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Coby Klar
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Vijayabaskar

This paper contributes to the emerging literature on state rescaling by examining how processes of restructuring in late transitioning countries like India shape spaces of collective action for labour. India’s subnational States, which have become increasingly critical scales for shaping processes of economic restructuring, face competing governance imperatives. On one hand, they must offer a business-friendly environment, including cheap labour, in order to attract private investments. On the other hand, in a democratic polity, they are compelled to secure political power through electoral appeal to labour. Through a study of labour regimes in the southern State of Tamil Nadu, I argue that subnational governments have responded to this challenge by enabling a scale of labour governance that undermines labour’s ability to engage with new spaces of collective action opened up by reforms and globalization. Rather, the State subsidizes labour through welfare provisioning in their residential spaces even as it draws upon inter-State migrant labour that wields less electoral power.


Author(s):  
Efrén Ernesto Guerrero Salgado

Resumen: La llegada al poder de Rafael Correa en el 2007 supuso diversos cambios en Ecuador, no sólo ideológicos sino también políticos, canalizados a través de una Asamblea Constituyente con el fin de ajustarse a los preceptos de la llamada “Revolución Ciudadana”. La nueva Carta Magna estableció un mayor número de controles sobre el Ejecutivo y creó nuevas funciones, como el Poder Electoral y de Transparencia y Control Social, que también girarían en torno a las decisiones del presidente de turno. Esto, combinado con la personalidad de Correa, generó un escenario de hiperpresidencialismo, amparado por elecciones populares que legitiman los cambios realizados por el Gobierno. En el caso ecuatoriano, lo que sucedió fue una disolución de la legalidad mediante la acción mediática, en el que la palabra del presidente no sólo fue regla de conducta, sino también una percepción de que la actividad pública no puede ser discutida, rebasando sus competencias constitucionalmente establecidas. El presente texto, busca explorar los mecanismos de existencia de un discurso decisionista en el periodo de gobierno 2013-2017 y sus consecuencias en la gobernabilidad democrática, para demostrar que la existencia de una autoridad que escape del poder del Estado sólo puede ser contenida por la norma y la fortaleza de las instituciones democráticas, capaces de mejorar la intensidad de la ciudadanía.Palabras clave: Hiperpresidencialismo, Rafael Correa, Ecuador, legalidad.Abstract: The arrival to power of Rafael Correa in 2007 involved various changes not only ideological but also political, channeled through a Constituent Assembly to conform to the precepts of the so-called "Citizen Revolution". The new Magna Carta established a greater number of executive controls and created new functions, such as the Electoral Power and Transparency and Social Control, which would also revolve around the decisions of the incumbent president. This, combined with the personality of Correa, generated a scenario of hyper-presidentialism, supported by popular elections that legitimize the changes made by the government. In the Ecuadorian case, what happened was a dissolution of legality through media action, in which the president's word was not only a rule of conduct, but also a perception that public activity cannot be discussed, exceeding its Constitutionally established competences. The present text, seeks to explore the mechanisms of existence of a decisionist discourse in the period of government 2013-2017 and its consequences in democratic governance, to demonstrate that the existence of an authority that escapes the power of the State can only be contained by the norm and the strength of democratic institutions, capable of improving the intensity of citizenship.Keywords: Hyperpresidencialism, Rafael Correa, Ecuador, Constitution, legality. 


Author(s):  
Michael Bruter ◽  
Sarah Harrison

This chapter briefly explores the scope and historical context of this book, introducing some key new concepts and their articulation with the existing concepts and literature of electoral behaviour. Homo Suffragator literally means ‘person who can vote’. What this power entails, what it changes with regard to man's condition and social interaction, and what the psychological mechanisms are that determine whether or not one exercises this power are all questions central to the puzzles the study aims to resolve. Throughout, the book explores the relationship between human nature, personality and morality variations, cognitive and emotional elements, and systemic choices and determinants which constrain and shape voters' electoral power. The chapter then highlights how one can borrow from the combination of physiological, anthropological, and psychological insights traditionally applied to understand the stages of human evolution similarly to comprehend the psychology, functioning, personal/societal relationships, and behaviour of Homo Suffragator.


Author(s):  
Cas Mudde ◽  
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

The relationship between populism and democracy has always been a topic of intense debate. Depending on its electoral power and the context in which it arises, populism can work as either a threat to or a corrective for democracy. To better understand this complex relationship, “Populism and democracy” presents a clear definition of (liberal) democracy, which helps to clarify how the latter is positively and negatively affected by populist forces. It then presents an original theoretical framework of the impact of populism on different political regimes, which allows us to distinguish the main effects of populism on the different stages of the process of both democratization and de-democratization.


2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Kim Doo Rae

This study explores the dynamic nature of maternity policy formation by focusing on the role of the female constituency and electoral competition in rendering policy makers, regardless of their gender, more receptive to the interests of women. The study utilizes original data on maternity policy benefits collected from local governments in Korea. The results show that a strong female constituency and intense electoral competition can lead local policy makers to establish greater maternity benefits. These findings suggest that the electoral power of women in the citizenry and the political vulnerability of elected officials constitute alternative channels for female influence on the formation of local maternity policy in Korea.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Lili Romli

The Islamic political parties in the Reform era grew up exceeding the period of Parliamentary Democracy. In the electoral competition during the Reform era, Islamic political parties did not receive adequate votes. The votes won by Islamic parties tend to go down from election to election. There are several factors that have caused the Islamic party to fail to win the support of Muslim votes. First, Islamic parties are fragmented and internal conflict. Second, Muslim voters do a change in ideological orientation which no chooses an Islamic party but a nationalist party. Third, nationalist parties accommodate Muslim aspirations by forming Islamic organizations. Fourth, the crisis of leadership of the Islamic party. Fifth, the absence of a real party program. To improve the electoral, Islamic parties must concern on programs to improve people's welfare, democratization, eradicate corruption, and realize social justice. The leader of Islamic parties must be exemplary, visionary, integrity, and rooted in the community.


Res Publica ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-153
Author(s):  
William Fraeys

Organized after an almost complete term of office, but the end of which was marked by the resurgence of the community-linked problems and by the departure of the Ministers of the Volksunie, the parliamentary elections of 24th November 1991 will remain characterized by the punishment inflicted by apart of the voters, not only on the majority's parties, but also on the traditional parties as a whole.The opposition of the dissatisfied voters did not show itself either in a reduced participation to the vote, a rather normal phenomenon in a country where voting is compulsory, or in a rise of the blank and spoilt ba/lot papers. The 1991 figures are, in these respects, very similar to the average figures of the last thirty years.The opposition was first characterized by high variations in the choice of the voters, which dit not, however, exceed the size of the movements noticed at previous elections. The rate of external mobility, as computed by us, is ranked fifth among the 22 levels that have been counted since universal suffrage has been introduced in Belgium. In 1991, this rate was the highest in Brussels, which is traditional, but it was also considerably higher in Flanders than in the Walloon Region, which quite seldom happens.Then, the opposition found expression in a setback for the Jour ruling parties.This set back amounted to about 8% and even 10% if account is taken of the Volksunie which was part of the Government until the very last weeks before the dissolution of the Houses of Parliament. Such a setback for an outgoing majority is not exceptional; a more unusual phenomenon lies in the f act that this decline was not profitable, on the whole, to the third traditional "family", i.e. the Liberals. As a result of this simultaneous setback for the three traditional families, these total only about 70% of the valid votes, which is the worst result of the whole Belgian electoral history.The political formations that are progressing are the Ecologists, on the one hand, and the far-right lists, on the other hand. Ecolo improves its results considerably in the Walloon Region and in Brussels, without however reaching the level obtained at the 1989 European elections, while Agalev only registers a slight progress.On the contrary, the winner of the elections in the Flemish Region, is unquestionablythe Vlaams Blok, as well as the "Rossem" lists that draw some 5% of the angry voters.If the far-left trend has almost disappeared from the Belgian political scene, the far-right parties, on the contrary, are making a breakthrough on it. The current made up by the Vlaams Blok and the openly far-right lists wins a bit less than 8% of the votes in the whole country. It is likely, however, that those who voted for the Vlaams Blok do not all adhere to the far-right ideas, but that some of them are attracted by the Flemish autonomist stands. The real electoral power of the far-right parties can then be assessed at 6 to 7%, which is much more than in 1987, hut does not make a record in comparison with other European countries.The votes of opponents without any clear political orientation, the bulk of which is won by the "Rossem" lists, amount to some 3%, which is new for Belgium.In a country where voting is optional, many of these voters would probably have stayed at home.This being so, and as f ar as these concepts still remain meaningful, the Belgian electoral pendulum shifted some 5% towards the right, at the expense of the left for more than 3% and the centre for a bit less than 2%.As far as the Parliament is concerned, the situation is clear in the Walloon Region and in the French-speaking Community where the Socialist Party, by far the most important party, is almost inevitable. It is however much more vague on the Flemish side, where the CVP's setback and the dispersion of the polical farces make several types of coalitions possible.


Author(s):  
Chantal Berman

Islamists were the Arab Spring’s largest immediate beneficiaries, yet Islamist parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco played markedly different roles in the historic uprisings of 2011. Why was Islamist mobilization more visible in some cases than others? This chapter breaks down the question of Islamist mobilization on two levels, asking (1) to what extent Islamist parties served as “revolutionary organizations,” and (2) to what extent Islamist beliefs shaped individuals’ protest behavior. The chapter finds that Islamist parties responded strategically rather than ideologically to escalating protest movements in early 2011, reflecting each party’s experience of authoritarianism and its resulting expectations over the benefits of a democratic future. Islamist mobilization was highest where Islamists prior to 2011 occupied a “middle ground” between repressed outsider and regime insider. In Egypt, where the Muslim Brothers operated large networks of social service provision but were constrained from amassing electoral power, Brotherhood leaders organized their supporters to protest. In Morocco, where the PJD played the role of “loyal” parliamentary opposition, the party urged its followers not to protest. In Tunisia, where Harakat Ennahda was totally repressed, Islamist leaders were unable to play a large mobilizing role. Survey analyses show heterogeneous effects of Islamist beliefs on protest across countries, indicating that many Islamist individuals did follow their leaders’ edicts to either protest or abstain. Many others protested without formal Islamist leadership, galvanized by economic grievance. These results highlight the diversity of Islamist actors and the importance of studying Islamist politics on both organizational and individual levels.


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