scholarly journals History-Based Price Discrimination with Imperfect Information Accuracy and Asymmetric Market Shares

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Colombo ◽  
Clara Graziano ◽  
Aldo Pignataro
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Market Shares

scholarly journals Price discrimination in two-sided markets

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Zhang ◽  
Weiqi Liu
Keyword(s):  
Discount Rate ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Discrimination Threshold ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Time Increase ◽  
Exogenous Variables ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Good For ◽  
Two Sided Markets

The use of a price discrimination strategy is an important tool in competition. It can hurt firms and benefit consumers in a one-sided market. However, in two-sided markets, its primary goal is to attract more agents or increase profits. Here, the performance of a second-degree price discrimination strategy in the context of duopoly two-sided platforms is analysed. Two exogenous variables, which include the discount rate and the price discrimination threshold, are used in order to examine whether the price discrimination strategy could help two-sided platforms achieve their objective, which is to maximise their market value. Three cases are considered, and we demonstrate that the price discrimination strategy cannot attract more agents and at the same time increase the profits; a lower price discrimination threshold cannot ensure larger markets shares; a higher discount rate is detrimental to the profit of a platform. However, this is good for its market shares. Moreover, discriminative pricing increases the competition.

scholarly journals Good Co(o)p or Bad Co(o)p? Redistribution Concerns and Competition in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 657-694
Author(s):  
Marcello D’Amato ◽  
Christian Di Pietro ◽  
Mariafortuna Pietroluongo ◽  
Marco M. Sorge
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Credit Rationing ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Organizational Models ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Credit Cooperatives

Abstract Non-profit organizations (NPOs), such as financial cooperatives, have a longstanding tradition in advanced market economies. We develop a model of ‘mixed credit markets’ where pure for-profit institutions (e.g. commercial banks) can coexist with financial NPOs which feature a concern for inter-member surplus redistribution (e.g. credit cooperatives) and enjoy privileged borrower-specific information vis-à-vis their for-profit peers, while facing higher funding costs. We formally investigate market competition between the two alternative financial organizations both offering contracts whose terms entail cross subsidization. We argue that heterogeneity in organizational models can explain stable coexistence under competitive conditions, and also help us interpret the variety of market outcomes — in terms of e.g. overall coverage and market shares — as documented in modern financial systems. Importantly, the viability of redistribution-oriented NPOs is shown not to rest on under-investment issues or concerns about market power, for they can successfully operate in markets where credit rationing never arises.

Competition in Multi-Sided Markets: Divide and Conquer

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Jullien
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Selection Criteria ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Divide And Conquer ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Market Shares

This paper studies Stackelberg price competition in a multi-sided market. The second-mover can engage in divide-and-conquer strategies, which involve cross-subsidies between sides. The paper recovers bounds on profits, and refines the results with a selection criteria whereby consumers resolve coordination failure in favor of a focal platform. It then analyzes perfect price discrimination with network effects, and two-sided market, sheding lights on inefficiencies and strategic choices by platforms. A leading platform may refrain from selling to some side in order to soften competition, it tends to favor excessively balanced market shares and may prefer compatibility to reduce price competition. (JEL D43, D85)

scholarly journals Pro-competitive regulatory policies for post-paid and pre-paid mobile phone markets

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (218) ◽  
pp. 85-104
Author(s):  
Dejan Trifunovic ◽  
Djordje Mitrovic
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Phone ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Switching Cost ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Mobile Operator ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Number Portability ◽  
Access Charges

There are two types of switching costs when users change their mobile operator. The first stems from price discrimination when the network charges a lower price for on-net than for off-net calls. If the majority of the switching user?s contacts are in their current network, this imposes an obstacle to changing the network, since in the new network they would have to pay a higher price for off-net calls. The other switching cost results from the switching user having to inform all their contacts about their new number in the other network. Mobile phone number portability (NP) reduces this switching cost. This paper?s aim is to determine pro-competitive regulatory policies for the post-paid and pre-paid market segments. This distinction is important since the post-paid market dominates in developed countries, while in less developed countries the prepaid market dominates. There are two operators in our model, the incumbent and a new entrant. In the postpaid market, NP reduces the level of market concentration. In the pre-paid market, NP has no impact on the convergence of market shares, and the reduction of access charges (the fee for terminating calls in the rival network) turns out to be a pro-competitive regulatory policy. There is no need for asymmetric access regulation where the incumbent pays higher access charges than the new entrant.

scholarly journals PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND PRICING-TO-MARKET BEHAVIOR OF BLACK SEA REGION WHEAT EXPORTERS

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
GULMIRA GAFAROVA ◽  
OLEKSANDR PEREKHOZHUK ◽  
THOMAS GLAUBEN
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
World Market ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Pricing To Market ◽  
Black Sea Region ◽  
Exercise Price ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Imperfectly Competitive ◽  
The World

AbstractSubstantial changes in the world wheat market have resulted in a shift in the market shares of the main wheat exporting countries. Since 2002, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine (KRU) have become important wheat exporters on the world market, and their pricing behavior has become a vital issue. By applying the pricing-to-market model to wheat exports, this study analyzes the price-discriminating behavior of KRU wheat exports from 1996 to 2012. The results demonstrate that KRU are able to exercise price discrimination in some importing countries, but in most they either face perfect competition or set common markups in imperfectly competitive markets.

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