Environmental Rights as Fundamental Rights in India: A Journey of the Supreme Court Towards a New Destination

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanta Boruah
Author(s):  
Cynthia Belén Contreras

Las sentencias exhortativas de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación son un instituto jurídico de reciente y novedosa aparición en nuestro sistema argentino de derecho. Entre los años 2005 a 2012, la Corte Argentina, llegó el punto más álgido en lo que respecta a la producción y dictado de este tipo de sentencias atípicas, sobre todo en casos complejos y de transcendencia pública e institucional que involucraban a su vez derechos fundamentales. Nuestro país, está dando los primeros pasos en lo que respecta al dictado de sentencias exhortativas y en el camino se ha topado con algunos obstáculos al momento de la ejecución de sentencia. Este trabajo propone la identiicación y descripción de dichas dificultades con las que deben lidiar los operadores jurídicos, víctimas y actores a los fines de hacer realidad los derechos declarados en las sentencias exhortativas de la Corte.Abstract The exhortative sentences of the Supreme Court of Justice are a legal institute of recent and novel appearance in our Argentine system of law. From 2005 to 2012, the Argentine Supreme Court reached to the highest point with regard to the production and delivery of this type of atypical sentences, especially in complex cases of public and institutional transcendence which involved fundamental rights. Our country is taking the irst steps regarding the issuance of exhortative sentences and along the way it appears some obstacles at the time of the execution of the sentences. his work proposes the identiication and description of the diiculties with which legal operators, victims and actors must deal with in order to make the rights declared in the Court's exhortative judgments a reality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-118
Author(s):  
Simeneh Kiros Assefa

The criminal law is adopted as a means of achieving the common good; it is interpreted and applied by the court. The judge chooses the type of legal theory and method to employ in the interpretation and application of the criminal law. Such theories may be acquired from higher norms or from the decision of the Supreme Court. Because such choice of theory and method determines the outcome of the case, the judge is also expected to be guided by the doctrines in criminal law inspired by the values of rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, enshrined in the Constitution. This article examines how courts harmonise the application of the positive criminal law with the non-positivist theories of higher norms. After reviewing various criminal rules and their judicial application, it finds that the court applies the criminal law as it is written in disregard of the non-positivist theories of higher norms, at times in contradiction to the basic doctrines of the criminal law itself.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 563-590
Author(s):  
Sanjay Jain ◽  
Saranya Mishra

Abstract The Supreme Court of India (SC) pronounced a momentous judgment in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan in 1997, categorically recognizing the menace of sexual harassment (SH) at workplace and constitutionally rendering it as being in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India 1950. The Court also provided a mechanism for redressal against SH, which was ultimately reinforced by Parliament with the enactment of Sexual Harassment at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (POSH Act). However, when it comes to allegations of SH against judges in the SC and High Courts by its employees, interns, or lower court judges, the response of the SC has been abysmal to say the least. There is a systematic pattern to suggest foul play and conspiracy in each such allegation, and judges, including even the Chief Justice of India (CJI), have not hesitated to openly indulge in victim-shaming and-blaming. In other words, the court has not been able to uphold its own jurisprudence on sexual harassment, which it expects to be scrupulously adhered to by other organs of the state. It is submitted that in not supporting the cause of victims alleging SH against judges, the other organs of the state are also party to this constitutional decay and serious infraction of fundamental rights. It leads us to ask the question, how can we guard against the guardians?


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1258-1282
Author(s):  
Rehan Abeyratne

Abstract This article, a contribution to a symposium on dominion constitutionalism, looks at sovereignty in Ceylon’s Dominion period (1948–1972). While the Ceylon Constitution has been the subject of in-depth historical and sociopolitical study, it has received less attention from legal scholars. This article hopes to fill that gap. It analyzes Ceylon Supreme Court and Privy Council judgments from this era on both rights-based and structural questions of constitutional law. In each area, sovereignty-related concerns influenced the judicial approach and case outcomes. On fundamental rights, both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council adopted a cautious approach, declining to invalidate legislation that had discriminatory effects on minority communities. This reluctance to entrench fundamental rights resulted, at least in part, from judges’ undue deference to the Ceylon Parliament, which was wrongly looked upon like its all-powerful British progenitor. On constitutional structure, the Ceylon Supreme Court deferred to Parliament even when legislation encroached into the judicial realm. The Privy Council, though, was not so passive. It upheld a separate, inviolable judicial power that Parliament could not legislate away. But by asserting itself as a check on legislative power, the Council—as a foreign judicial body intervening in Ceylonese affairs—stoked concerns that Ceylon was less than fully sovereign, which ultimately ended Dominion status.


2019 ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
HARSH PATHAK

The constitution and jurist characterized Article 21 as, “the procedural magna carta, protective of life and liberty”. This right has been held to be the heart of the constitution, the most organic and progressive provision in Indian constitution, the foundation of our laws. Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty” by the “State” as defined in Article 12. Violation of the right by private individuals is not within the preview of it. Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e). Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person. The right to life is undoubtedly the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. There would have been no fundamental rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense. This Article will examine the right to life as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of India.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 425
Author(s):  
Edith Maria Barbosa RAMOS ◽  
Pedro Trovão do ROSÁRIO ◽  
Sara Barros Pereira de MIRANDA

RESUMOA presente pesquisa por escopo analisar os fenômenos da judicialização e do ativismo judicial a partir das experiências da Suprema Corte do Canadá e do Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. Observou-se que, em ambos os países, tem havido, nas últimas décadas, uma contínua expansão da autoridade do Poder Judiciário e da sua atuação em temáticas de natureza política até então abordadas apenas pelos Poderes Legislativo e Executivo, o que pode ser evidenciado a partir da análise das decisões proferidas pelas Cortes Supremas dos dois países. Apesar das diferenças na arquitetura constitucional, ambas as Cortes atuam como condutoras do processo de expansão alcance do poder de suas estruturas judiciárias. O presente artigo foi desenvolvido a partir de levantamento bibliográfico em artigos obtidos em diferentes bancos de dados e indexadores, publicados na integra em português e inglês, acessados de forma gratuita. Foram selecionadas revistas científicas na área do Direito Constitucional Comparado com extratos elevados, qualis A e B. Utilizou-se, ainda, dados constantes em documentos oficiais e na legislação pertinente com recorte epistemológico e científico fundado na construção teórica contemporânea dos Direitos Fundamentais. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Judicialização; Ativismo Judicial; Suprema Corte do Canadá; Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. ABSTRACTThis research by scope analyzes the phenomena of judicialization and judicial activism from the experiences of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Brazilian Supreme Court. It has been observed that, in both countries, there has been, in the last decades, a continuous expansion of the authority of the Judiciary Power and its action in themes of a political nature hitherto addressed only by the Legislative and Executive Powers, which can be evidenced by from the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of both countries. Despite differences in constitutional architecture, both courts act as drivers of the process of expanding the power of their judicial structures. This article was developed from a bibliographic survey in articles obtained in different databases and indexers, published in full in Portuguese and English, accessed for free. Scientific journals were selected in the area of Constitutional Law Compared with high extracts, qualis A and B. It was also used data in official documents and relevant legislation with epistemological and scientific basis based on the contemporary theoretical construction of Fundamental Rights. KEYWORDS: Judicialization; Judicial activism; Supreme Court of Canada; Brazilian Supreme Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Diana Ginn ◽  
Kevin Kindred

Trinity Western University (twu), an evangelical post-secondary institution in Canada, has litigated against three provincial law societies who refused to accredit twu’s proposed law school because of a mandatory University Covenant that prohibits sexual intimacy outside of marriage ‘between one man and one woman’. Leave has been granted to appeal this matter to the Supreme Court of Canada. This litigation involves a conflict between constitutional rights: freedom of religion and lgbtq equality rights. The Supreme Court of Canada mandates a non-hierarchical approach to resolving such conflicts, aimed at ensuring constitutional rights and freedoms do not depend on majoritarian support. Balancing competing fundamental rights and freedoms must be done contextually, with a weighing of harms and benefits on each side. Despite strong moral and theological objections to twu’s stance on same-sex relationships, the authors argue that, in this instance the balancing of harms and benefits weighs in favour of freedom of religion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Rao Imran Habib

In the modern democracies the protection of fundamental rights has gained immense importance. The fundamental rights are guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic states. The courts are empowered through the power of judicial review to protect fundamental rights against any violations of these. The concept of judicial review of executive actions emerged from the concept that the powerful executive can jeopardize the rights of the people for their political interests and there should be an independent forum to check the abuses of the human rights by the executive. In the modern era the power of judicial review has proceeded one step further as, in addition to the violation of fundamental rights, it has started examining the issues of good governance and disputes between state organs. Pakistan inherited the idea of judicial review of executive actions from the supervisory jurisdiction of English Courts to issue prerogative writs. Subsequently, Pakistan specifically incorporated the judicial review powers in the 1962 Constitution. The provincial high courts and the Supreme Court are entrusted with the power of judicial review; however, the Supreme Court can adjudicate upon matters of fundamental rights if they involve public importance. This research work examines the importance of judicial review of executive actions for the protections of fundamental rights. Then the evolution and exercise of judicial review of executive actions by the higher courts in Pakistan is analysed. This study finds that the superior courts in Pakistan have actively used this power to protect fundamental rights but in their drive to protect fundamental rights sometimes they have encroached into the jurisdiction of the other state institutions.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sital Kalantry

Significant scholarly attention has focused on the strong role played by the Supreme Court in the Indian constitutional democracy. Exercising its powers of judicial review, the Court will invalidate legislation if determines it to be in violation of the constitution. In the judicial appointments case, for example, it invalidated legislation that would have reformed the judicial appointments system. When there is no law, but the Court finds that certain circumstances in society violate the fundamental rights of certain groups of people, it may issue its own legislative-like guidelines. It did this in the internationally famous Vishaka case, in which it created guidelines on sexual harassment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-233
Author(s):  
EJ Marais

In Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Masinda 2019 5 SA 386 (SCA) (“Masinda”), the Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether the mandament van spolie is available for restoring quasi-possession of electricity supply. The respondent used the mentioned supply, which was sourced in contract, at her home. The court ruled that the spoliation remedy does not protect the quasi-possession of rights sourced in contract. For its quasi-possession to enjoy possessory protection, the right must be in the nature of a servitude, be registered or flow from legislation. This emphasis on the source of the right is problematic for two reasons. First, it contradicts certain common-law authorities which reveal that the quasi-possession of electricity supply sourced in contract does, in fact, enjoy protection under the spoliation remedy. This applies as long as the supply is a gebruiksreg (use right) and the spoliatus performs physical acts associated with the right on immovable property. Secondly, (over)emphasising the source of the right potentially undermines various fundamental rights. When the common law is open to several possible interpretations, as seems to be the case with quasi-possession, the supremacy of the Constitution and the single-system-of-law principle require that courts choose the interpretation that upholds (rather than impairs) constitutional rights. In the Masinda case, the court unfortunately opted for an understanding of quasi-possession which seems to undermine the Constitution. For these reasons, the decision is an unwelcome development.


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