THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM AND THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO MODELS FOR ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE EU.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filippo Annunziata ◽  
Mariateresa Maggiolino
Author(s):  
Wojciech Paweł SZYDŁO

Aim: The paper discusses cases in which a refusal by an energy enterprise to connect other enterprises to the network is treated as a prohibited abuse of the enterprise's dominant position and, equally, will represent behavior prohibited by art. 12 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by art. 9 par. 2 item 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Law as well as legal consequences of such refusal. It is important to pinpoint such cases since the EU sectoral regulation does not provide for obligating any undertakings which manage and operate oil pipelines to enter into contracts with other undertakings such as contracts on connecting into their network or contracts on providing crude oil transfer services. Conditions for accessing oil pipelines and selling their transfer capacities are determined by the owners of the networks: private oil companies in the countries across which the pipelines are routed. These conditions are not governed by the EU law.  Furthermore, the very obligation of connecting other entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector in Poland will only arise from generally applicable provisions of the Polish competition law.  Design / Research methods: The purpose of the paper has been reached by conducting a doctrinal analysis of relevant provisions of Polish and EU law and an analysis of guidelines issued by the EU governing bodies. Furthermore, the research included the functional analysis method which analyses how law works in practice. Conclusions / findings: The deliberations show that a refusal to access the network will be a manifestation of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position and will be a prohibited action always when the dominant's action is harmful in terms of the allocation effectiveness. It will be particularly harmful when delivery of goods or services objectively required for effective competition on a lower level market, a discriminatory refusal which leads to elimination of an effective competition on the consequent market, a refusal leading to unfair treatment of consumers and an unjustified refusal. Originality / value of the article: The paper discusses the prerequisites which trigger the obligation to connect entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector. The obligation has a material impact on the operations of the oil transmitting undertakings, in particular on those who dominate the market. The regulatory bodies in the competition sector may classify a refusal of access to own network by other enterprises as a prohibited abuse of the dominant position, exposing such undertakings to financial consequences.Implications of the research: The research results presented in the paper may be used in decisions issued by the President of the OCCP and in judgement of Polish civil courts and EU courts. This may cause a significant change in the approach to classifying prohibited practices to prohibited behavior which represent abuse of the dominant position. The deliberations may also prompt the Polish and EU legislator to continue works on the legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-63
Author(s):  
Panagiotis Liargovas ◽  
Nikolaos Apostolopoulos

Abstract The focus of this article is on the main aspects of economic governance in Greece during the period 2015–19 where the syriza-anel coalition party was in power. In August 2015, the syriza-anel government faced the dilemma either to accept a new agreement with the EU partners (as eventually happened) or go bankrupt and leave the Eurozone, becoming detached from EU solidarity mechanisms. A third program was agreed, offering Greece an additional €86 billion loan over a three-year period. The third programme was unnecessary considering that the syriza-anel governance inherited 0.8% growth rate and some progress in the structural reforms demanded during the first two agreements in 2010 and 2011. However, the political choices made had the consequence of Greece returning to recession in 2015 and 2016.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-511
Author(s):  
Valentine Lemonnier

Before the Covid-19 pandemic hit, the scheduled passenger air transport sector was already subject to several horizontal concentrations. The mix of free competition and strict regularization in the air transport sector in the EU raises the question whether the current framework will still be able to provide a level playing field to the market participants, notably airlines and airports. The study focusses on how EU competition law has influenced horizontal concentrations (i.e. mergers and horizontal co-operations) in the scheduled passenger air transport sector. The results of the discussion are the basis for a reflection of the effects of different types of horizontal concentrations on the negotiation power of airlines vis-à-vis airports. A third focus of the study is the identification of regulatory weaknesses with regard to airport financing under the Airport Charges Directive (Directive 2009/12/EC), how those weaknesses benefit airlines and how they might interfere with efforts made under the application of competition law.


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