scholarly journals Moral Hazard Heterogeneity: Genes and Health Insurance Influence Smoking after a Health Shock

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pietro Biroli ◽  
Laura Zwyssig
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Health Shock

scholarly journals Moral Hazard Heterogeneity: Genes and Health Insurance Influence Smoking after a Health Shock

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pietro Biroli ◽  
Laura Zwyssig
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Genetic Predisposition ◽  
Vascular Health ◽  
Jel Codes ◽  
Health Shock ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Health Insurance Status ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Cardio Vascular

AbstractDecision-making in the realm of health behaviors, such as smoking or drinking, is influenced both by biological factors, such as genetic predispositions, as well as environmental factors, such as financial liquidity and health insurance status. We show how the choice of smoking after a cardio-vascular health shock is jointly determined by the interaction between these biological and environmental constraints. Individuals who suffer a health shock when uninsured are 25.6 percentage points more likely to reduce smoking, but this is true only for those who have a low index of genetic predisposition to smoking. Individuals with a low index of genetic predisposition are more strategic and flexible in their behavioral response to an external shock. This differential elasticity of response depending on your genetic variants is evidence of individual-level heterogeneity in moral hazard. These results suggest that genetic heterogeneity is a factor that should be considered when evaluating the importance and fairness of health insurance policies.JEL CODESI12, I13, D63, D91

scholarly journals Indemnifying precaution: economic insights for regulation of a highly infectious disease

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher T Robertson ◽  
K Aleks Schaefer ◽  
Daniel Scheitrum ◽  
Sergio Puig ◽  
Keith Joiner
Keyword(s):  
Infectious Disease ◽  
Health Insurance ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risky Behaviors ◽  
Deterrence Theory ◽  
Legal Intervention ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Personal Risk ◽  
Personal Costs

Abstract Economic insights are powerful for understanding the challenge of managing a highly infectious disease, such as COVID-19, through behavioral precautions including social distancing. One problem is a form of moral hazard, which arises when some individuals face less personal risk of harm or bear greater personal costs of taking precautions. Without legal intervention, some individuals will see socially risky behaviors as personally less costly than socially beneficial behaviors, a balance that makes those beneficial behaviors unsustainable. For insights, we review health insurance moral hazard, agricultural infectious disease policy, and deterrence theory, but find that classic enforcement strategies of punishing noncompliant people are stymied. One mechanism is for policymakers to indemnify individuals for losses associated with taking those socially desirable behaviors to reduce the spread. We develop a coherent approach for doing so, based on conditional cash payments and precommitments by citizens, which may also be reinforced by social norms.

scholarly journals Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Sapelli ◽  
Bernardita Vial
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Self Selection
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