Bounded Rationality, Moral Hazard, and the Case for Relative Value Health Insurance

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell B. Korobkin
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Relative Value

scholarly journals Indemnifying precaution: economic insights for regulation of a highly infectious disease

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher T Robertson ◽  
K Aleks Schaefer ◽  
Daniel Scheitrum ◽  
Sergio Puig ◽  
Keith Joiner
Keyword(s):  
Infectious Disease ◽  
Health Insurance ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risky Behaviors ◽  
Deterrence Theory ◽  
Legal Intervention ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Personal Risk ◽  
Personal Costs

Abstract Economic insights are powerful for understanding the challenge of managing a highly infectious disease, such as COVID-19, through behavioral precautions including social distancing. One problem is a form of moral hazard, which arises when some individuals face less personal risk of harm or bear greater personal costs of taking precautions. Without legal intervention, some individuals will see socially risky behaviors as personally less costly than socially beneficial behaviors, a balance that makes those beneficial behaviors unsustainable. For insights, we review health insurance moral hazard, agricultural infectious disease policy, and deterrence theory, but find that classic enforcement strategies of punishing noncompliant people are stymied. One mechanism is for policymakers to indemnify individuals for losses associated with taking those socially desirable behaviors to reduce the spread. We develop a coherent approach for doing so, based on conditional cash payments and precommitments by citizens, which may also be reinforced by social norms.

scholarly journals Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Sapelli ◽  
Bernardita Vial
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Self Selection

A perverse ‘net’ effect? Health insurance and ex-ante moral hazard in Ghana

2012 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zelalem Yilma ◽  
Luuk van Kempen ◽  
Thomas de Hoop
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante
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