Stamping out Stamp Duty: Property or Consumption Taxes?

AbstractThis paper introduces durables into a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generation model with idiosyncratic income shocks and endogenous borrowing constraints, which depend on durables. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the welfare effects of consumption tax reforms in a richer model that captures the difference between nondurable and durable consumption. When durables are considered, the standard results that a shift to consumption taxes is welfare improving are overturned. The mechanism of this opposing result is that consumption tax makes durable consumption more expensive without relaxing the borrowing constraint. The inability of borrowing to insure against income risk deviates the economy further away from market completeness and particularly hurts young and poor households. As a result, welfare decreases, coupled with negative redistribution.

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Taxation of Land and Economic Growth

Economies ◽

10.3390/economies9020061 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. 61

Author(s):

Shulu Che ◽

Ronald Ravinesh Kumar ◽

Peter J. Stauvermann

Keyword(s):

Economic Growth ◽

Growth Rate ◽

Generation Model ◽

Young Generation ◽

Overlapping Generation ◽

Land Rents ◽

Stamp Duty

In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or consumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy.

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Taxing the Tails in a Global Economy: How Electoral, Party and Wage Bargaining Systems Interact to Determine the Taxes Paid by the Poor and Rich

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123420000861 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-20

Author(s):

Jude C. Hays

Keyword(s):

Global Economy ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Party Systems ◽

Wage Bargaining ◽

Labor Market Institutions ◽

Electoral Institutions ◽

The Poor ◽

The Rich ◽

Consumption Taxes ◽

Empirical Implications

Abstract A prominent line of research on electoral systems and income redistribution argues that proportional representation (PR) leads to tax-and-transfer policies that benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. This is because PR produces encompassing center-left coalitions that protect the poor and middle classes. Yet countries with PR electoral systems tend to rely heavily on consumption taxes and tax profits lightly, both of which are inconsistent with this expectation. Both policies are regressive and seem to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. This article argues that PR electoral institutions, when combined with trichotomous multipartism, are not as hostile to the rich as commonly believed, and that it is important to understand how electoral and party systems interact with labor market institutions in order to explain the puzzling pattern of taxation that is observed. The author develops a theoretical model and evaluates its empirical implications for a world in which production has become multinational.

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Welfare optimization and multinational monopolies

The Journal of the Australian Mathematical Society Series B Applied Mathematics ◽

10.1017/s0334270000000448 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 38 (1) ◽

pp. 16-25

Author(s):

A. M. Russell ◽

C. A. Martini ◽

J. A. Rickard

Keyword(s):

Parameter Space ◽

Home Country ◽

Domestic Market ◽

Consumption Tax ◽

Optimal Value ◽

National Welfare ◽

Consumption Taxes

AbstractThis paper examines the role of import tariffs and consumption taxes when a product is supplied to a domestic market by a foreign monopoly via a subsidiary. It is assumed that there is no competition in the domestic market from internal suppliers. The home country is able to levy a profits tax on the subsidiary. The objective of our analysis is to determine the mix of tariff and consumption tax which simultaneously maximizes national welfare. We show that national welfare does not have an internal maximum, but attains its maximum on a boundary of the consumption tax–tariff parameter space. Furthermore, the optimal value of national welfare increases as the tariff decreases and the consumption tax increases. The results obtained generalize the results of an earlier paper in which national welfare was maximized with respect to either a tariff or consumption tax, but not both.

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MEDICINE STAMP DUTY

The Lancet ◽

10.1016/s0140-6736(00)82815-9 ◽

1937 ◽

Vol 229 (5930) ◽

pp. 1000

Keyword(s):

Stamp Duty

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Swift and the Stamp Act of 1712

PMLA ◽

10.1632/456958 ◽

1916 ◽

Vol 31 (2) ◽

pp. 247-263

Author(s):

Joseph M. Thomas

Keyword(s):

House Of Commons ◽

The Government ◽

Stamp Duty ◽

Stamp Act

In a debate, December 22, 1819, in the House of Commons on the Newspaper Stamp Duties Bill, Sir James Mackintosh, speaking of the passage of the original act of 1712, said: “Swift—being then a distinguished Tory, suggested the first idea of a stamp duty for the avowed purpose of preventing publications against the government,—Swift, that parricide who endeavored to destroy that very press to which he owed so much, to which he owed all his fame, and at that very moment all his preferment.”

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