The Bullet-Proof Administrative Decision-Maker: Maximizing the Chances of Surviving a Judicial Review

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Stratas ◽  
David Williams
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review

Institutional Structures

2021 ◽  
pp. 32-64
Author(s):  
Paul Daly
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
General Aspects ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Personal Interests ◽  
Or History

This chapter is concerned with the structure of administrative decision-making institutions. Two general aspects of this important topic are particularly relevant to the law of judicial review of administrative action. First, the no-bias principle ensures that decision-making is impartial, by preventing decision-makers from acting where their personal interests, conduct or history could conceivably raise a concern about their ability to make a dispassionate decision on the merits. Second, the principle that a decision-maker must retain their discretion prevents decision-makers from delegating their powers (subject to an exception in the case of government ministers) and limits the scope for the development of policies about how discretionary powers will be exercised in the future. These principles can be understood as being structured by the values of individual self-realisation, good administration, electoral legitimacy and decisional autonomy.

R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Disciplinary Committee ◽  
Jockey Club

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, Court of Appeal (Civil Division). This case considered under what circumstances a decision-maker could be considered public, or to be exercising a public law function, for the purposes of determining whether that decision-maker was subject to judicial review. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

8. Abuse of Discretion II

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Elliott ◽  
Jason Varuhas
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Variable Intensity ◽  
English Law ◽  
Proportionality Test

This chapter examines grounds of judicial review that are substantive in two senses: it reduces the range of substantive options open to a decision-maker, or it involves judicial examination of the quality of the reasons for the decision itself, rather than the quality of the process adopted by the decision-maker. The chapter first considers the doctrine of reasonableness or rationality in administrative law before discussing the doctrine of proportionality and the notion of judicial deference in relation to variable intensity review. It also explores the role of the proportionality test in English law and the question of whether English courts are heading towards jettisoning the reasonableness doctrine in favour of utilizing proportionality in all relevant cases.

scholarly journals REASON AND AUTHORITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Grant
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Service Conception

AbstractIn judicial review of administrative action, the pivotal distinction between decisions about “jurisdiction” (for the reviewing court) and “the merits of the case” (for the administrative decision maker) is a source of much confusion. This article argues that jurisdiction should be understood as the scope of legitimate authority, the best theory of which is Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. As well as explaining how to determine jurisdiction, this article explains that a legitimate authority's intra-vires decision “pre-empts” the reviewing court's judgment on the merits, and that the concept of jurisdiction precludes any standard of reasonableness for reviewing a legitimate authority.

scholarly journals JUDICIAL REVIEW: A STUDY IN REFERENCE TO CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN INDIA

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 51-55
Author(s):  
Rahul Tripathi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
The State ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
The Supreme Court

Judicial review is the process by which the Courts determine whether or not an administrative decision-maker has acted within the power conferred upon him or her by Parliament. That places the question of statutory construction at the heart of the enquiry. The Supreme Court enjoys a position which entrusts it with the power of reviewing the legislative enactments both of Parliament and the State Legislatures. This grants the court a powerful instrument of judicial review under the constitution. Research reveals that the Supreme Court has taken in hand the task of rewriting the Constitution, which is an important aspect in present scenario.

scholarly journals Rethinking the Ramifications of Reasonableness Review: Stare Decisis and Reasonableness Review on Questions of Law

2018 ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Michelle Biddulph
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future

The recent fashion in the Canadian law of judicial review is to apply the reasonableness standard of review to virtually any decision rendered by an administrative decision-maker. Reasonableness review is a deferential standard of review that requires a court to ensure that the administrative decision falls within a range of reasonable outcomes that are defensible in light of the facts and law. When reasonableness review is applied to questions of law, the Supreme Court has occasionally ruled that the question admits of only one reasonable interpretation and has affirmed or quashed an administrative decision on that basis.This article addresses the difficult question of whether a judicial decision affirming that a provision admits of only one reasonable interpretation is strictly binding on an administrative decision-maker interpreting that provision in the future. If reasonableness review is premised on deference, then deference ought to apply to an administrative decision-maker’s interpretation of that question in the future, even if it differs from the court’s interpretation. After situating this issue within the principled foundation of the Canadian law of judicial review, this article explores possible solutions to this problem, attempting to balance the need to protect the rule of law against the rationale for deference to administrative interpretations of law in the first place. It ultimately concludes by suggesting that, should Canadian courts continue to apply reasonableness review to virtually all questions of law, a uniquely administrative law approach to stare decisis will need to be developed in order to maintain a coherent and principled system of judicial review.

scholarly journals Two Myths of Administrative Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark P Mancini
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
Do So

In an upcoming set of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will review its approach to the standard of review of administrative action. In this paper, the author suggests that the Court must go back to the foundation of judicial review in redesigning the standard of review, namely, the task of courts to police the legal boundaries of the administrative body. To do so, courts must authentically interpret the legislative grant of authority to the administrative decision-maker, particularly to determine the appropriate intensity of review. To that end, the author suggests that the Court should discard two myths that have pervaded modern administrative law: (1) that administrative decisionmakers should be granted deference based on purported expertise in matters of statutory interpretation; and (2) that jurisdictional questions exist separately from questions of law. The myths may impose a different standard of review than the one discernible with the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. The author argues that these court-created devices should not exist at the expense of the constitutionally prescribed duty of the courts to exercise their policing function and engage in genuine statutory interpretation to determine the appropriate standard of judicial review in a given case.

R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Disciplinary Committee ◽  
Jockey Club

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, Court of Appeal (Civil Division). This case considered under what circumstances a decision-maker could be considered public, or to be exercising a public law function, for the purposes of determining whether that decision-maker was subject to judicial review. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Disciplinary Committee ◽  
Jockey Club

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, Court of Appeal (Civil Division). This case considered under what circumstances a decision-maker could be considered public, or to be exercising a public law function, for the purposes of determining whether that decision-maker was subject to judicial review. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

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