Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Unit Object Allocation with Money: (Non)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Qquasi-Linearity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroki Shinozaki ◽  
Tomoya Kazumura ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Object Allocation ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryosuke Sakai ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Econ Theory ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Object Allocation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

Strategy-proof mechanism for online resource allocation in cloud and edge collaboration

Computing ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jixian Zhang ◽  
Laixin Chi ◽  
Ning Xie ◽  
Xutao Yang ◽  
Xuejie Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Online Resource ◽  
Strategy Proof

Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences

2021 ◽  
Vol 193 ◽  
pp. 105197
Author(s):  
Vikram Manjunath ◽  
Alexander Westkamp
Keyword(s):  
Strategy Proof
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