Coordinating Inventory and Pricing Decisions Under Total Minimum Commitment Contracts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiting Gong ◽  
Frank Y. Chen ◽  
Quan Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Pricing Decisions

CEO and CFO Equity Incentives and the Pricing of Audit Services

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Anthony Billings ◽  
Xinghua Gao ◽  
Yonghong Jia
Keyword(s):  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Accounting Scandals ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Distinctive Role

SUMMARY: The alleged perverse role of managerial incentives in accounting scandals, and the distinctive role of auditors in identifying and intervening in attempted earnings manipulation, highlight the importance of explicitly considering executive incentive plans by auditors in the auditing process. By empirically testing auditors' responses to CEO/CFO equity incentives in planning and pricing decisions using data from 2002 through 2009, we document compelling evidence that CFO equity incentives are positively associated with audit fees and CEO equity incentives are not statistically related to audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive heightened audit risk associated with CFO equity incentives. Our further analyses reveal that the positive association between CFO equity incentives and audit fees is more pronounced in firms with weak internal controls, indicating heightened risk associated with CFO equity incentives in this setting perceived by auditors. JEL Classifications: G30, G34, M42, M52.

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

An Approximation Algorithm for Network Revenue Management Under Nonstationary Arrivals

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 834-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuhang Ma ◽  
Paat Rusmevichientong ◽  
Mika Sumida ◽  
Huseyin Topaloglu
Keyword(s):  
Approximation Algorithm ◽  
Revenue Management ◽  
Capacity Control ◽  
Network Revenue Management ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Multiple Products ◽  
Performance Guarantees ◽  
Optimal Capacity ◽  
Airline Tickets ◽  
Network Revenue

Many revenue management problems require making capacity control and pricing decisions for multiple products. The decisions for the different products interact because either the products use a common pool of resources or the customers choose and substitute among the products. When pricing airline tickets, for example, different itinerary products use the capacities on common flight legs and the customers choose and substitute among different itinerary products that serve the same origin-destination pair. Finding the optimal capacity control and pricing decisions in such problems can be challenging because one needs to simultaneously consider the capacities available to serve a large pool of products. In “An Approximation Algorithm for Network Revenue Management under Nonstationary Arrivals,” Ma, Rusmevichientong, Sumida, and Topaloglu develop efficient methods to make decisions with performance guarantees in high-dimensional capacity control and pricing problems.

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