Effects of Compensation Contracts Disclosure on Executive Behavior

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joonghwa Oh ◽  
Atsushi Shiiba
Keyword(s):  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Executive Behavior

scholarly journals Beware of Venturing into Private Equity

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludovic Phalippou
Keyword(s):  
Private Equity ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Stock Market Index ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Market Index ◽  
Standard And Poor's ◽  
Equity Funds ◽  
Private Equity Funds ◽  
Public Equity

As a step towards understanding whether a private equity governance structure reduces overall agency conflicts relative to a public equity governance structure (as is often argued), this paper describes the contracts between private equity funds and investors, and the returns earned by investors. The paper sets the stage with a puzzle: the average performance of private equity funds is above that of the Standard and Poor's 500—the main public stock market index—before fees are charged, but below that benchmark after fees are charged. Why are the payments to private equity buyout funds so large? Why does the marginal investor invest in buyout funds? I explore one potential answer (and probably the most controversial): that some investors are fooled. I show that the fee contracts for these funds are opaque. Considering this and the way that compensation contracts bury, in details, costly provisions that are difficult to justify on the basis of proper incentive alignment, it would be premature to assert that the agency conflicts are lower in private equity than in public equity.

The Use of Contract Adjustments to Lengthen the CEO Horizon in the Presence of Internal and External Monitoring

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane S. Dikolli ◽  
Susan L. Kulp ◽  
Karen L. Sedatole
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Job Change ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Short Horizon ◽  
High Level ◽  
A Current

ABSTRACT We investigate whether boards of directors adjust compensation contracts to lengthen a CEO's decision horizon, and if the use of such contract adjustments depends on the levels of external (i.e., shareholder-based) and internal (i.e., board-based) CEO monitoring. Based on insights from the career-concerns literature, we identify short-horizon CEOs as those nearing retirement, at a firm with a current earnings decline or loss, and/or with an impending job change. We find that firms with a CEO identified as having a short-horizon place greater contract weight on forward-looking information. This horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is less pronounced when there is greater external monitoring (i.e., as proxied by a high level of shareholder rights), consistent with the intuition that increased shareholder rights mitigate CEO entrenchment, leading to less myopic decision making, independent of a contract adjustment. However, we also find that the horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is more pronounced when there is greater internal monitoring (i.e., as proxied by characteristics of the board), consistent with the intuition that increased employment risk from more intense internal monitoring itself creates a demand for increased incentive weights as a means of compensating the CEO for the increased risk. Data Availability: Data used for this study are derived from publicly available databases and proxy statements. JEL Classifications: M52; M41; J33.

Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts

2017 ◽  
Vol 157 ◽  
pp. 14-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Chaigneau ◽  
Nicolas Sahuguet ◽  
Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
Keyword(s):  
Compensation Contracts

scholarly journals Pragmatic Intellectualism Syndrome in emergency response and military leadership

2019 ◽  
Vol 192 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-364
Author(s):  
Kazimierz Nagody-Mrozowicz ◽  
Piotr Pietrakowski
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Response ◽  
World View ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Leadership ◽  
Ethical Aspects ◽  
Value System ◽  
Research Perspective ◽  
Executive Behavior ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Employee Teams

Values are a component of the human personality that affects a world-view, opinions, emotions and behaviors. This applies equally to managerial and executive behavior, while in the case of rescue organizations, both levels of behavior are also an important factor of organizational effectiveness. The aim of the article is to show the relationship between the ethical aspects of rescue operations and the value system represented by mountain rescuers. The applied idiographic research perspective can become an example for research on other types of organizations and employee teams, including the armed forces.

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