Terrorism Risk Insurance Act: Time to Renew . . . or Rethink?

This paper examines the role that insurance has played in dealing with terrorism before and after September 11, 2001, by focusing on the distinctive challenges associated with terrorism as a catastrophic risk. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was passed by the U.S. Congress in November 2002, establishing a national terrorism insurance program that provides up to $100 billion commercial coverage with a specific but temporary risk-sharing arrangement between the federal government and insurers. TRIA's three-year term ends December 31, 2005, so Congress soon has to determine whether it should be renewed, whether an alternative terrorism insurance program should be substituted for it, or whether insurance coverage is left solely in the hands of the private sector. As input into this process, the paper examines several alternatives and scenarios, and discusses their potential to create a sustainable terrorism insurance program in the Unites States.

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The Terrorist Risk Insurance Act of 2002: The Federal Government's Role in Addressing Losses Caused by Terrorism

Policy Perspectives ◽

10.4079/pp.v11i1.4122 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 51

Author(s):

Michael P.G. Stinziano

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Risk Sharing ◽

Market Failure ◽

Private Insurance ◽

The United States ◽

Insurance Companies ◽

Terrorist Attacks ◽

Terrorism Risk ◽

The Government ◽

Risk Insurance

In response to problems associated with insuring against the risk of foreign terrorist attacks in the United States, Congress passed The Terrorist Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) to help solve an availability and affordability crisis in the private marketplace for terrorism risk insurance. TRIA established a temporary three-year federal program that created a risk-sharing mechanism to provide private insurance companies with a tool to manage the allocation of their risk resulting from foreign terrorist attacks. The role of government in helping to provide financial protection from losses not served by private markets is not new, but protecting against terrorism risk is. TRIA and its possible alternatives remain a topic of considerable discussion and debate as our country continues to address the threat of terrorism in the United States. One important element of this analysis is to determine what permanent role, if any, the government should play in providing terrorism risk insurance to address the market failure that occurred after September 11. Another is to explore possible alternatives to the current temporary program.

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Feasibility questions about government-sponsored insurance for business interruption losses from pandemics

Journal of Insurance Regulation ◽

10.52227/22111.2020 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-26

Author(s):

Robert W. Klein ◽

Harold Weston

Keyword(s):

Crop Insurance ◽

Private Insurance ◽

Economic Losses ◽

Preliminary Review ◽

Working Paper ◽

Strong Interest ◽

Terrorism Risk ◽

Insurance Program ◽

Risk Insurance ◽

Business Interruption

Widespread economic losses to many businesses due to COVID-19 business closures have led many plaintiffs’ attorneys to assert in lawsuits that business interruption (BI) insurance policies cover these losses, while insurers generally contend that their BI policies exclude coverage for a variety of reasons. We explain the basic coverage contentions below. Additionally, several states are considering measures that would retroactively establish coverage for pandemic-caused losses under BI policies. While the resolution of coverage disputes and the legality of retroactive coverage expansions in the courts is uncertain, clearly there is strong interest in making BI pandemic insurance available going forward. While a few insurers have offered BI pandemic coverage, no firms have purchased it (Lerner, 2020). Further, many insurers are reluctant to expand their BI policies to cover pandemic losses. Hence, there is strong interest in creating a federal government insurance program that would provide BI pandemic coverage. Currently, there are at least two formal proposals to establish such a program. One proposal is the Pandemic Risk Insurance Act of 2020 (PRIA), which was introduced in the U.S. Congress as H.R. 7011; PRIA would establish a Pandemic Risk Reinsurance Program (PRRP) modeled after the Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Program (TRRP) established by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). Three industry trade associations also have proposed a Business Continuity Protection Program (BCPP) as an alternative to PRIA that is similar in some regard to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). PRIA intends to create a public and private insurance program that would provide BI insurance for pandemics, with participating private insurers retaining 5% of losses above a deductible. We critique the program contemplated by PRIA and discuss the BCPP. Additionally, we consider a program concept of our own design that would also borrow from the NFIP (but would differ somewhat from the BCPP), as well as a program similar to the federal crop insurance program. We conclude that frameworks based on the NFIP or the federal crop insurance program would have several advantages over PRIA, which has a number of problems, but even these alternative frameworks would face many challenges. This policy brief provides a preliminary review of the PRIA and BCPP drafts, as well as other alternative frameworks, and draws from a longer working paper by the authors (Klein and Weston, 2020)

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